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Abstract
Claiming Time:
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith on Freedom and Futurity
by
Jennifer Corby
Advisor: Susan Buck-Morss
This dissertation engages the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam
Smith through the lens of time. By first analyzing their earlier works on the nature of selfconsciousness, it demonstrates that each offers a theory of subjectivity that, despite important
differences, shares a singular point of distinction from those that typified early modern thought.
Against the predominant view that human freedom necessitates immaterial agency, each
theorizes a materialist agent that is able to overcome the determinism of the material world by
way of the temporal nature of subjectivity. Each understands self-consciousness to be constituted
by an extension of memory into the past and imagination into the future, which, they argue,
allows humans to act beyond, or in spite of, the present that would otherwise determine behavior.
In conceiving subjectivity materially and temporally, their theories of freedom center equally on
the futurity that makes freedom possible and the social context of its expression. As such, rather
than simply being the implicit foundations for political thought, this dissertation demonstrates
that their theories of subjectivity are necessarily political concepts—political concepts that are
foundational to liberal thought. Through analyzing the particular methods each employs in
theorizing the relationship between freedom and futurity, this dissertation offers new
interpretations of their work, while charting movements between their ideas in the interest of
opening the historical, neoliberal present to temporal analysis.
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Introduction
Project Inspiration
There is something at once compelling and confusing about the neoliberal experience. It
is an experience saturated in a narrative of possibility, expressed in the language of pursuit, and
relentlessly affirmative of the future. And all this remains true despite counter narratives of
decline, despite perpetual threats of economic and ecological devastation, and despite a present
that can often seem intractable and disconnected from the possibilities embodied in ideas of the
future. This conflicted experience is one steeped in time—both its promise and its paralysis stem
from the manifold ways we interpret our present and try to think beyond it. The desire to
decipher the chaotic temporality of neoliberal subjectivity is the inspiration for this project, but
one that prompted an investigation not into the present, but into the past. For although the
experience of this present appears at once to be the product of forces distinct to late stage
capitalism, such as globalization and technological development, it nevertheless simultaneously
appears as part of a larger story. As novel as life in the 21st century is, in some ways it feels like
this novel is a tale as old as time. Or at least, a tale as old as modern time. That perpetually
echoed language of pursuit is old, but at one time it was new. So what changed?
Although new ideas ways of thinking about time can be broadly identified as a modern
phenomenon, the impetus for this inquiry stems from an experience of time that is not merely
modern, but specifically neoliberal. This project therefore intervenes into the early modern
moment, investigating how and why new ways of thought impacted the philosophy of the
progenitors of political and economic liberalism to which contemporary Western, and especially
American, society is greatly indebted.
The central argument herein is that reading the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, and Adam Smith through the lens of time opens their thought in a number of new and

important ways. Beginning not with the political works each published later in life, but their
earlier works exploring the nature of self-consciousness and agency, it finds each to offer a
theory of subjectivity that, despite important differences, shares a singular point of distinction
from those that typified early modern thought. Against the predominant view that freedom
required an immaterial agency, each theorizes a material subject who overcomes the determinism
of the material world by virtue of a temporal theory of consciousness. That is, they conceive of
human freedom as a function of time, which makes temporality an important point of connection
between their earlier works concerning the self and their later political works concerning the
political subject. Through analyzing the particular methods Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, employ
in theorizing the relationship between freedom and futurity, each chapter offers a new
interpretation of their work that both reconciles elements of their thought often seen in tension,
while problematizing existing interpretations. It also moves beyond their shared conception of
subjectivity to chart movements between their work that reflect crucial developments in modern
thought and modern society more broadly, in the interest of opening the historical present to
temporal analysis.
The Materialist Turn of the Early Modern Moment
The early modern moment was marked by a conscientious turn away from the past. Its
philosophers questioned not only the possibility of finding truth within the dominant
philosophical paradigm of Scholasticism that typified the Medieval epoch, but the possibility of
finding truth by looking to the past at all. Instead, they saw the present as the location of
philosophic knowledge; they did not seek to return to the beginning, but to establish a new
beginning. In 1620, Francis Bacon first captured the sentiment of philosophic and historical
newness quite succinctly in his New Organon when he declared,
2

It is futile to expect a great advancement in the sciences from overlaying and
implanting new things on the old; a new beginning has to be made from the
lowest foundations unless one is content to go round in circles for ever, with
meager, almost negligible, progress.1
Bacon’s choice of title was not incidental, but an intentional challenge to Aristotle’s
Organon, which was the foundation for Scholastic natural philosophy and scientific inquiry.
Bacon and his contemporaries were particularly critical of the persistence of Ancient notions of
Forms,2 which may initially be surprising, as Aristotle was himself deeply critical of Plato’s
Forms. In Physics, Aristotle details an empirical approach to understanding contra Plato’s
rationalism. Whereas Plato contends that Forms have real existence apart from the material
world, Aristotle counters that Forms have no real existence apart from the particulars that
embody them; particulars are prior to universals. The mind, he further argues, does not have the
innate cognition of universals as Plato postulates, but is designed to recognize them through
experience,3 which subsequently allows for the ordering of particulars that constitutes science.
However, despite beginning with experience rather than reason, the process of recognition by
which knowledge is obtained that Aristotle outlines is qualitatively different from sense
perception. It is an intellectual rather than empirical grasp of an object’s essence. As such, the
ultimate source of understanding for Aristotle and his Scholastic successors is fundamentally
intellectual, as it is for Plato. This means that although Aristotle offered alternative conceptions
of, and relations between, the ideal and the real, and the universal and particular, he challenges
1

Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne, Cambridge Texts
in the History of Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 39 (i.13).
2
One of the most enduring aspects of the theory Forms was its ability to account for the order
observed in nature and connect it to the human ability to grasp that order. Observing that human
perception and experience is not chaotic, or Hericlitean, but rather ordered and relational, Plato
postulates that nature produces things in accordance with rational patters, that must necessarily
be distinct from and prior to particulars.
3
Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. Gisela Striker, Clarendon Aristotle Series (New York:
Clarendon Press, 2009), 2.19.
3

neither the premises that make these distinctions necessary, nor the epistemological and
ontological rationalism necessarily entailed by them.4
Bacon, however, countered that to assume that logic reflects the structure of reality, and
can therefore uncover permanent relations among real objects is to mistake reason for reality. He
argued, “forms are figments of the human mind, unless you call those laws of actions forms,”
and as such, “[m]atter rather than forms should be the object of our attention.”5 In other words,
there are no forms to grasp; matter, motion, and the laws regulating their relations cause the
regularity of reality. Consequently, knowledge of nature can be arrived at neither by intuition nor
a direct connection between our minds and nature. Instead, Bacon contends that if empirical data
is painstakingly collected, while the temptation to generalize is resisted, and disconfirming
evidence is constantly sought, it is possible to arrive at generalizations that are true to nature and
that may eventually produce a “summary law of nature” to explain the natural world.
With New Organon, Bacon fired the opening salvo against previous traditions of thought,
be they Ancient or Scholastic, and ushered in a modern era of thought typified by a mechanist
ontology and empiricist epistemology. Although mechanism is a rationalist ontology insofar as it
assumes a rule-bound order of the material world is intelligible, it is distinct from Ancient
rationalism in that the principles are perceptible in the functioning mechanics of the natural
world. And, because mechanism relies on the actual perception of machinery, it is well-suited to
empirical epistemologies in which sense-perception provides the raw materials of understanding.
There is great variability in the extent to which early modern philosophers subscribe to

4

Ontological rationalism essentially assumes that change occurs in accordance to fundamental
rules that are necessary and can be grasped a priori by the mind, though perhaps not the finite
mind. Epistemological rationalism contends there is some method that can be employed by
human intellect to decipher necessary laws of change.
5
Bacon, The New Organon, 52 (i.51).
4

empiricism, but even those identified as rationalists like Descartes subscribe to the notion that
experience is the primary source of ideas. Descartes rationalism is nevertheless important to
note, as it marks an epistemological divide that provides the necessary context for understanding
how Hobbes, Locke, and Smith each develop their philosophies by way of critiquing competing
methods. For Hobbes, this occurs primarily by way of challenges he poses to Aristotle and
Descartes, for Locke, by way of a triangulation between Hobbes and Descartes, and for Smith by
a rejection of both the English traditions of rationalism and empiricism in favor of
sentimentalism. In this way, epistemology is also useful for charting important differences
between their thought, despite their shared concern for developing a materialist subject.
Epistemological variation aside, early moderns shared a common endeavor to establish a
new philosophical foundation that reflects a disposition both historical and temporal. That is,
their proclamations of a new epoch entailed not merely a rejection of a historical tradition, but
also a metaphysical rejection of a way of thinking about time. This is because the mechanist
ontology adopted by early moderns is a worldview inextricably tied to the time of matter and
motion—a notion of time that is unidirectional, linear, objective, and future oriented. Such a
system cannot accommodate concepts that function within alternative temporalities, which
means such concepts must therefore be either reconceptualized or abandoned.
The context for classical moral concepts, for example, is the cyclical temporality of
nature. As Jason Segal explains, it is owing to the Ancient belief that the time of human
experience is typified by the inherent destructiveness of nature, that “classical thought equated
the good with a transcendental or atemporal value that was linked to the permanent structure of

5

political life.”6 In this way, finite existence could be infused with the meaning of the eternal
through political forms. In other words, classical morality consisted not only of transcendental,
eternal concepts; it also entailed an experiential temporality of decline, in which meaning could
be accessed insofar as action transcended the futility of one’s earthly existence. The fundamental
temporal structure of this model was largely unchanged by the Scholastics, if it did undergo a
religious conversion of sorts.
The mechanist turn undermines these conceptions in important ways. In the first, it
conceives of the material world as a source of knowledge, which can establish the authority of
human knowledge. For, if truths can be discovered in the world by the human mind, authority is
wrested from external sources of knowledge, be they theological or ideal. Moreover, if the order
of the world can be discerned in the causal forces of matter and motion rather than in the
universal forms or divine structure, knowledge of the natural world can assume a predictive
quality, which brings the world under human control. As philosophers developed laws of matter
and motion, they simultaneously asserted the authority of human knowledge in ways that had far
reaching moral and political consequences. As Schneewind explains, during this period,
“established notions of morality as obedience came increasingly to be contested by emerging
conceptions of morality as self-governance.”7 Early moderns established the authority of human
knowledge by way of a temporal system of validation—future outcomes are a source of

6

Segal offers an excellent summary of the identity between individual and political order in
classical political thought, and the difficulties that stem from the elimination of “the rational
certainty of a purposeful universe” and liberating “the idea of the good from the fixed structure
of common life.” Jacob Segal, “A Storm from Paradise: Liberalism and the Problem of Time,”
Critical Review 8, no. 1 (January 1994): 24.
7
Schneewind notes this phenomenon not as a result of mechanism per se, but rather in the
service of demonstrating the connection between moral law and natural law in early modern
thought. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.
6

verification. This not only makes the future a new object of thought, but the sudden appearance
of an open and actionable future raised important questions regarding the source and meaning of
freedom.
Yet even as the material world emerged as a source of human knowledge, it did not
necessarily appear as either the source or the site of human freedom. For the material world,
governed as it is by causal, material forces, is itself a determined world. So even as scientific
knowledge was a source of empowerment, and even as the prospect of predictive knowledge
simultaneously expanded the horizon of its future while bringing its authorship under human
control, human freedom, it seemed, must not be of this world. This is a helpful way to frame
theories of subjectivity that emerged in this period, most notably that of Descartes, whose
dualism located human freedom in immaterial agency. Though assuming a number of forms, the
prevailing argument of the time was that since the world of matter is determined, the realm of
human freedom lies not in the material world of the body, but in the immaterial realm of the
mind.
However, the key insight revealed in a temporal analysis of Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, is
that they find a conception of immaterial agency problematic for beings that live in the material
world. The freedom available to an immaterial being is an atemporal one—it is conceptual and
immediate, not actionable and temporal. Against this supposition, they counter that human life is
lived; it is an experience fundamentally material and finite, which renders freedom a necessarily
temporal concept. As such, each develops a materialist theory of subjectivity, in which behavior
is determined not cognitively, by rational agency, but affectively, in response to the present.
They do accept that human agency cannot be divorced from the material context of one’s life,
which renders it determined in some respects. Yet each posits that insofar as we are able to
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overcome the determinism of the material world, it is by virtue of the temporal nature of
subjectivity, which allows us to live beyond the present. It is because each understands selfconsciousness to be constituted by an extension of memory into the past and imagination into the
future that humans can act beyond, or in spite of, the present that would otherwise determine
behavior. In conceiving subjectivity materially and temporally, these theories of freedom center
equally on the futurity that makes freedom possible and the social context of its expression. In
other words, because these concepts are rooted in the lived world, they compel political thought
in ways that Cartesian models do not. As such, rather than simply being the implicit foundation
for political thought, their subjectivities are necessarily political concepts. Collectively, we
therefore find that the mechanist turn in modernity compelled for them not only a reconfiguration
in the relationship between morality and time, but a transformation in the relationship between
time and the political.
Chapter Outline
The first chapter, entitled Paradoxes of Possibility: Empowerment and Anxiety in Thomas
Hobbes’s Materialist Subject, critically engages Hobbes’s materialist concept of subjectivity, and
in so doing counters prevailing interpretations that either reject the possibility of materialist
agency or that conclude that his theory is philosophically unintelligible. It demonstrates that
Hobbes rejects Cartesian dualism in favor of material dualism in which meaningful agency is
possible. It reveals that he understands humans not to simply be bodies acted on by external
forces, but reactive bodies that respond not only to the present, but to their own unique history
and futural imagination. Rather than seeing humans as beings that all inhabit a singular, shared,
uniform time, he conceptualizes each person as a distinct time. It is for this reason, he argues,
that human interaction remains uncertain and undetermined. Moreover, it argues that properly
8

understanding the temporality of his subject illuminates his political philosophy in new ways.
Specifically, it finds that state of nature to be not a place but a time—a time of anxiety and
insecurity that he conceives temporally. It is precisely because the particular history and future
trajectory of others are unknown that we find ourselves unable to imagine future outcomes of
interaction. When we are unable to act for the future, he argues, we attempt to secure ourselves
by dominating the present. Hobbes’s political imaginary represents his attempt to overcome this
problem, by resurrecting the concept of the eternal, politically. The Leviathan embodies an
artificial eternity that stabilizes the future, which frees us from the domination of the present, and
which makes trust and cooperation possible.
The second chapter, Internalizing the Eternal, The Moral and Material Temporality of
John Locke’s Subject, complicates traditional interpretations that ascribe an immaterial, rational
agency to Locke’s subject, by showing how his theory of identity and action are fundamentally
temporal. It establishes an affinity between his thought and Hobbes, as both understand human
behavior to be determined by feelings produced by the experience of the present. Distinctive of
Locke’s thought is that he locates human freedom in the ability to suspend the will, which
momentarily frees us from the pressures of the present, thereby allowing the imagined pressures
of the future to determine the will in the present. However, this chapter identifies a tension
between Locke’s empirically based, affective theory of agency, and his moral rationalism. For,
he argues that subjectivity cannot be divorced from the material context that informs motivation,
yet moral responsibility and judgment is neither reflected in, nor affected by, material conditions.
The crucial intervention made herein, is that Locke bridges competing material and moral
sources of motivation through temporal concepts. Like Hobbes, he does so by way of the eternal,
however Locke’s eternity is neither external nor secular, but internal and divine—the temporality

9

of his subject is both material, on account of our finite existence, and moral, on account of our
rationality. In this way, Locke is able to inscribe subjects with a moral responsibility for material
outcomes that nevertheless precludes consideration for particular material contexts. This analysis
demonstrates that the lens of temporality reveals the fundamentally inegalitarian nature of his
concept of subjectivity. This gestures towards important consequences for his political thought,
as it reveals that he understands the material inequality manifested under his egalitarian political
institutions to accurately reflect a latent moral hierarchy. The role of the state can therefore be
understood as protecting those with the “right time” from those with the “wrong time”—from
those whose temporal subjectivity fails to extend into the divine future.
The third substantive chapter, Adam Smith’s “Circles of Sympathy” and “Dangerous
Disorders”: Virtue, Vice, and Timescales of Interaction, demonstrates that Smith also articulates
a materialist subject, for whom freedom is a temporal concept. However, although he shares with
Hobbes and Locke the position that the material foundation of human subjectivity makes
consciousness future oriented, the material context for Smith’s subject is society itself. This
means that not only is his subject necessarily social—as it is by dint of others that we become
intelligible to ourselves, but so too is the temporality of the subject social. In other words, it is
not the causal system of nature that primarily governs our ideas of the future, but the causal
forces of society—our expectations relate to others. And, it is because thinking about ourselves
entails thinking about others that he develops a concept of subjectivity that is necessarily moral.
It is because we desire to be approval worthy and because we recognize our responsibility to
others, he argues, that we are compelled to develop a faculty of judgment he conceives as “the
impartial spectator.” By transcending the biases and pressures of the present by assuming a
position equidistant from the present and future, the impartial spectator makes free, moral action
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possible. In demonstrating the necessarily social and moral nature of Smith’s subject, a concept
of self-interest is revealed that challenges traditional liberal interpretations, as he understands
both the self and the interests of the self to be formed in response to, and with responsibility to,
society.
This chapter further shows an important point of distinction between his and Locke’s
thought, as Smith offers both a material source of moral knowledge, and a moral motivation that
is not informed by a personal relationship with an afterlife, but a personal relationship with the
past and future of society. This idea, that agency entails not merely acting for the future we
individually imagine, but that the ideas of the future we act for are socially constructed, is
distinctive of his thought. It is this idea that leads Smith to analyze how social organization can
inhibit or expand the perception of possibilities, and to designate a uniquely temporal role for
political institutions. For him, government does not secure an eternal future or even a singular
future, but rather acts in the service of expanding the timescales of interaction—by promoting
economic relations that facilitate acting for a more distant future. This entails the creation of
legal structures that allow people to enter into arrangements that allow them to mutually and
equitably extend their expectations of one another into a more distant future, which makes it
possible for each to imagine, and to act for, a future of greater possibility. It also entails
intervention into forms of economic organization that incentivize private speculation, and the
offsetting of the risks of such endeavors to the public—of economic arrangements that encourage
the sacrifice of the long-term, public future, for short-term, private gain.
The concluding chapter, Reclaiming Time: The Future is Making a Comeback, draws the
analysis of the preceding chapters into the present. The analysis of the previous three chapters
traces a transformation from one in which the temporal nature of subjectivity renders individuals
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fundamentally antisocial to one in which both time and the self are socially constituted. That is,
there is a movement from an individual to a social conception of the moral, material self. In
Hobbes, we find a temporal subject understood in causal, mechanist, individual terms, whose
uniqueness engenders antisocial behavior characterized as a war of all against all. With Locke,
we have a temporal subject understood in terms both causal and divine, who has a natural
community with those who share this temporality, but which engenders a conflict with those who
do not, producing a war of some against some. And with Smith, we have a subject whose identity
and temporal imagination result from a reciprocal relationship with society, and which locates
the source of conflict not within or even between individuals, but as a byproduct of the dynamic
nature of social organization broadly. This development parallels a developing in their political
thought, insofar as Hobbes can be read as proto-liberal, Locke as foundationally liberal, and
Smith as reacting to the realization of liberal political and economic institutions.
Smith’s lived experience of liberalism is crucial, for even as he contributes to the
development of liberal thought, maintaining its futural and acquisitive features, he is uniquely
able to investigate how economic and political organizations fundamentally shape our ideas of
the future. He argues that what is possible, and how far we can plan, are all shaped by the
timescales of organizational arrangements. This means that what is preventing acting for the
long-term future is not, for him, a missing eternity as it is for Hobbes and Locke, but rather an
appreciation for how social organization can incentivize behavior that is amoral, short-term, and
antisocial. His criticism is exceptionally astute and relevant, as the society he principally
analyzes is, like ours, a commercial one.
Turning to our contemporary experience, the final chapter highlights how the lens of time
employed by Hobbes, Locke, and Smith can illuminate facets of our present. Exploring examples
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ranging from the environment to the economy, it demonstrates how the destabilizing relationship
Hobbes discerns between power and anxiety, and the atemporality of Locke’s liberal political
institutions can help render contemporary political discourse and behavior more intelligible. It
further considers the implications of Smith’s critique—of economic organizations that
incentivize maximum risk seeking and maximum security seeking in ways that sacrifice public
futures for personal gain—in a commercial society typified by such organizations. These
connections can be hard to see, but the lens of time reveals our present. And by seeing the
temporal source and nature of its paralysis more clearly, we can begin to see new possibilities for
reclaiming time.

13

Paradoxes of Possibility:
Empowerment and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes’s Materialist Subject
Introduction
The central argument of this chapter is that reading Thomas Hobbes through the lens of
time renders a number of tensions in his work intelligible, and simultaneously opens his thought
to forms of inquiry that speak directly to our time. Specifically, I demonstrate that it is time that
liberates his subject from the determinism that governs the rest of the material world, as human
behavior is affected not only by the material conditions of the present, but also by memories of
the past and imagination regarding the future. This gives humans the unique ability to imagine
futures different from the past and to shape the material world of existence accordingly. In this
way, Hobbes’s radically expands the possibilities of freedom. At the same time, however,
materialist subjectivity allows us to recognize not only our own agency, but that of others, which
disrupts our ability to think about the future. That is, our material existence engenders ideas
about time that simultaneously enable and undermine agency. I argue that this is the central
paradox around which Hobbes’s philosophy pivots, and it is fundamental to interpreting his
political imagination. To this end, I demonstrate that he conceptualizes insecurity as a
fundamentally temporal problem—it reflects an inability to think beyond the present moment,
which compels domination in it. The primary purpose of political institutions is then to project an
eternal, stable future that makes meaningful agency and sociable behavior possible in the
present.
This chapter begins by situating Hobbes historically, locating him within the early
modern tradition, and charting the evolution of his own ideas about time. The early modern
moment in which Hobbes wrote was a time of upheaval, characterized by a conscientious
severing from inherited intellectual traditions and philosophic methods, and by reevaluations of
14

the nature and value of history. In addition to changing dispositions towards the past, it was also
a period in which mechanist philosophy identified matter and motion as the source of
knowledge, which carries with it a fundamentally new way of thinking about time—the time of
the material world, causal, linear, predictive, and devoid of meaning. In short, Hobbes’s time was
one carefully rethinking time. The first section explores the relationship between ideas about
time and philosophy, to demonstrate the significance of reevaluating them. In one sense, ideas
about time are central to human questions of meaning—the eternal cyclicality of the Ancients
and the eternal divinity of the Scholastics both served to imbue the finite nature of human
existence with meaning purpose. Aside from questions of meaning, the pursuit of knowledge is
also often attended by temporal concepts. This is most evident in the treatment of history as a
source of ethical or practical knowledge—a practice dating back to Thucydides. But history also
shapes philosophic ideas, insofar as ideas have an intellectual history that is shaped over time.
This is all to say, time is a through line that runs through the most powerful and essential features
of human life. The stakes to rethinking time are high, yet amidst the scientific and philosophic
revolution of the early modern moment, seemingly unavoidable.
The impact of this revolution are evident within Hobbes’s work, as a transition is evident
in his own thought, as he shifts the source of knowledge from the narrative, moral time of history
to the causal, linear time of science. The impetus for this shift stems from his desire to avoid
what he sees as the Scholastic and Ancient tendency to extend the scope of human knowledge
into unknowable realms, resulting in speculation and confusion. Hobbes therefore limits the
scope of human knowledge to that which could be produced by philosophic inquiry into the
mechanist nature of the world—a closed system in which all material causes and effects could be
understood by the laws governing matter and motion. He distinguishes himself from other
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mechanists, however, by denying not simply the ability to speak intelligibly about immaterial
substances, but their very existence. All things, he argues, even those that seem to exist
independent of material objects, have a material cause. He thus articulates a philosophy of
nature, man, and society that was materialist and mechanist, fusing the predictive certainty of the
natural world with the philosophy of the human world. In this way, he employs temporal
concepts to establish a new foundation of knowledge and agency, and seeks to develop a way of
thinking that freed the future from the past.
Despite this promise, Hobbes’s philosophy poses significant challenges to questions of
human authority and autonomy, and the second section concentrates on the challenges posed by
Hobbes’s temporal reevaluations. Essentially, in the new and isolated moment he envisions—one
unmoored from the past and detached from traditional meaning the question he must confront is:
how can we find common ground? How can we make sense of our own experience and the
experience of one another? Hobbes draws on a scientific understanding of time to develop a
theory of knowledge in which a common interpretive framework is made possible by innate
causal reasoning. It is, he argues, our temporal recognition of before and after that allows us to
recognize the causal nature of ourselves and the world, and which compels us to develop
knowledge by seeking validation from others. In this way, he collectively elevates the
possibilities of human understanding while undermining individual or abstract reason. Reason is,
for Hobbes, mediated by our material and temporal existence, and knowledge is a necessarily
social endeavor.
Subsequent sections of this chapter turn to Hobbes’s materialist subject. In his day and in
ours, it is Hobbes’s materialism that draws the most sustained criticism. His contemporaries
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tended to focus on his flawed understanding of optics and mechanics.8 However, contemporary
scholarship is less concerned with his scientific errors and rather finds his materialism to be a
deeply problematic foundation for political thought. Most interpretations of Hobbes’s subject
find an irreconcilable tension between his mechanism and agency, as the determinism of the
former would seem to elide any possible freedom of the latter. This has led some, like Peters and
Taifel to conclude that Hobbes’s materialism indeed precludes any meaningful agency, because
the behavior of his subject is compelled by a crude determinism.9 Tom Sorell offers a richer and
more generous reading of Hobbes, but he too ultimately concludes that Hobbes’s subjects do not
“qualify as fully-fledged thinkers,”10 because, the “relation between agents and actions…tends to
be reduced to a relation between events that take place in agents.”11 In other words, materialism
precludes the possibility of an agent being the source rather than the site of her actions. The heart
of Sorell’s critique is that Hobbes’s materialism prevents us from being agents of our own
thoughts. And if we are not the agents of our thoughts, we are not the agents of our behavior.
However, since such determinism is a politically useless concept, many conclude that Hobbes
simply did not intend to incorporate human volition into the sphere of determinism—that
because meaningful materialist subjectivity is untenable, it is either an “embarrassing”12
accident, an “oversimplification,”13 or simply philosophically unintelligible. This skepticism
regarding Hobbes’s mechanism informs the two most common readings of Hobbes’s political
philosophy, both of which attempt to bridge the chasm perceived between his stated materialism
8
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and his political objectives. The first is that reflected in Sorell’s reading, and largely interprets
his work through the lens of reason, replacing Hobbes’s materialist subject with a rational selfinterested individual.14 The second interpretation is that offered by Quentin Skinner, who claims
that Hobbes’s political writings are rhetorically, not philosophically mechanist. That is, that
Hobbes invokes materialist rhetoric in an act of philosophic misdirection, which allows him to
obscure his true intentions and engage in polemical argument.15
These criticisms are not without merit, however I wish to problematize such
interpretations of Hobbes’s materialism, and to demonstrate that it indeed contains a conception
of subjectivity and agency that makes political thought possible. The apparent contradiction
between materialism and agency is made intelligible if the unique temporality engendered by
Hobbes’s subject is properly understood. I first explore his conception of time, which is distinct
from his mechanist peers because he understands it to be ideational, having no objective
existence. However, I argue that it is precisely this subjectively constituted concept of time that
allows him to develop a materialist subjectivity in which agency is possible. Against Cartesian
models in which self-consciousness arises through introspection and the immaterial agent directs
the material body, Hobbes outlines a temporal subject whose self-consciousness stems from
retrospection and whose agency is exercised not in the immediate present but through
imagination. Though he incorporates human volition into a schema of material cause and effect,
he understands humans to be not merely passive recipients of causes, but reactive “thinking
bodies”—each human body bears and reacts to his own history, and his own ideas about the
future. There is not for Hobbes one time humans inhabit. Rather, each person is living
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embodiment of distinct temporal systems in which memory and imagination are themselves
causal forces. This means that for Hobbes, the causal forces of human experience are neither
singular nor exclusively external. Though material beings, it is the uniquely temporal nature of
human subjectivity that allows us to transcend the mechanistic forces that determine the rest of
the natural world. Unlike the determined nature that characterizes the world of passive bodies,
the human world is rather one of interdependence and contingency. It is a world that is
simultaneously determined by forces and therefore predictable, yet uncertain, precisely because
the world has not one causal temporal framework, but is instead animated by the multiplicity of
human temporal trajectories constantly colliding. This is what makes human interaction
unpredictable, and what makes futures different from the past possible.
It is within the context of multiple, particular temporalities that Hobbes locates the
paradox of human existence—coexistence creates the possibility of a future that is undetermined
by the past and under human control, yet its openness produces a profound anxiety that
undermines the possibility for deliberative action. These concerns are addressed in the final
sections, as Hobbes describes how the presence of others, who embody temporalities like but
distinct from our own, causes anxiety and insecurity that arrests the imagination, causing the
present to be a location not of freedom but domination. Though the tension between individuals
and society is a well-known feature of Hobbes’s thought, a proper understanding of his subject
illuminates this tension in novel ways. Specifically, it reveals that the anti-social qualities he
describes are neither innate nor inevitable, but stem from a temporal problem. Encountering
others, each of whom has a discrete history and unknown trajectory, hinders our ability to

19

imagine futures. He describes the state of nature not as a place, but as “a tract of time,”16
characterized by insecurity and anxiety—both of which Hobbes understands to be fundamentally
temporal, insofar as the they reflect an inability to locate oneself in the future.
This paradox—that the ideas about time engendered by material conditions
simultaneously enables and undermines agency—is the proper context for understanding
Hobbes’s political imagination. It shows how his political project is thus concerned with
controlling the environment so that interaction produces trust rather than anxiety. Security is has
been well-established as a primary concern for Hobbes, but what is often missed is that Hobbes
understands security as a primarily temporal concept—mitigating the anxiety that prevents
cooperation and long-term planning requires the creation of an illusion of eternity, continually
reinforced by the state. He presents the Leviathan as “an artificial man” comprised of all, but
“greater in stature and strength than the natural.”17 The artificiality of the Leviathan allows it to
overcome human limitations, the most crucial of which is mortality. Because it is not enough
“for the security, which men desire should last all of the time of their life,”18 “the artificial man
[must have] an artificial eternity of life.”19 Embodying an eternal hope, the Leviathan projects a
stable future, which allows for the present anxieties and insecurities that inhibit both meaningful
agency and social behavior to be overcome.
This reconceptualization of time signifies a marked shift in notions of the individual and
society, most notably because it allows for the future to become not merely an object, but the
primary object of thought, both personally and collectively. Of course, upon this soil of
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expanded possibility, Hobbes constructs a political vision primarily identified by its limitations.
A temporal reading does not thoroughly undo the conservatism of Hobbes’s authoritarian state,
but it does allow for an interpretational shift in which the state can be viewed not as an
instrument of control over people, but an attempt to control the environment such that people can
exercise a greater degree of freedom and autonomy.
Time is the loophole through which Hobbes first postulates and then overcomes what
appears to be an utterly determined human world. And, I argue, we are well-served by reading
his political philosophy as an attempt to open the future by securing the future. This work opens
Hobbes’s theory to not only to new, but to relevant, insights. Though in many ways compelling,
one need not adopt his mechanism to appreciate how material conditions shape ideas about the
future. In particular, his work is helpful for thinking through insecurity and anxiety not as purely
material or psychological concepts, but as materially conditioned temporal ideas. Moreover, his
understanding of the arresting nature of these temporal concepts vis-à-vis agency provide a
framework for thinking through the production, experience, and behavioral impact of insecurity
in today’s world.
Hobbes’s Break with the Past: The Annihilation Hypothesis
Hobbes’s philosophic response to Scholasticism makes an implicit connection between
systems of knowledge and historical possibility. Articulating a new kind of philosophy that was
accessible and demonstrable would, he thought, create new possibilities—because creating a
framework of mutual intelligibility could bring the conditions of possibility necessary for peace
into existence. Consequently, a new kind of historical development could be forged.
Understanding philosophy to be deeply tied to questions of history, he seeks to make a forcible
break from both history and philosophy.
21

Hobbes was part of the early modern movement that was explicitly engaged in a project
of severing connections to the past and establishing a new foundation for knowledge and society.
This fact gives the opening lines of “The First Grounds of Philosophy” in De Corpore added
significance. He writes:
In the teaching of natural philosophy, I cannot begin better…than from privation;
that is, from feigning the world to be annihilated. But, if such annihilation of all
things be supposed, it may perhaps be asked, what would remain for any man
(whom only I except from this universal annihilation of things) to consider as the
subject of philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what to give names unto for
ratiocination’s sake.20
This passage, generally referred to as the “annihilation hypothesis,” serves a number of purposes,
and reveals a number of dimensions crucial to understanding Hobbes’s thought and project.
Though not the first to employ the annihilation hypothesis,21 his use serves new and varied
functions. This tactic of imbuing traditional devices with new meaning is common of his work,
as he repurposes the annihilation hypothesis to convey not just a philosophical method, but a
historical disposition. Regarding the latter, one of the reasons we imagine the end of the world is
so that we can separate ourselves from the knowledge about it that we have inherited. That is,
when he asks his reader to inhabit the mental landscape of the lone survivor, he is not just asking
us to imagine the end of the material world, but the end of our human world, and the intellectual
history we have inherited. By creating an artificial intellectual distance, he implies, we are better
able to give sober appraisal of this world and our experience of it, unencumbered by the
mistakes, bias, and dogma of inherited knowledge, religious truths, and cultural objects.
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In this sense, the annihilation of the world is the annihilation of history, and we, like the
lone survivor, are left to contemplate existence isolated and “in the dark.”22 But unlike the
fictional lone survivor whose state of isolation is terminal and whose contemplation is ultimately
impotent, our separation from past knowledge is followed by a return to a world we share. The
world we return to is, however, no longer as it was before, by virtue of our newly obtained
sobriety, which allows us to not merely appraise the world and our experience of it, but to shape
it as well. Though it may seem contradictory at first, Hobbes's condemnation of much of prior
philosophy is simultaneously an affirmation of the relationship between history and the present,
insofar as errors in present thinking can be understood to have their origin in a flawed past.
Rather than focusing on reshaping the present to restore the validity of foundations of thought
established in the past, Hobbes focuses on the present as a foundation for the future—an
approach that affirms history, even as it breaks from it. In such a present, severed from the past,
Hobbes works to establish a new historical trajectory by way of a new kind of time—the time of
matter and motion, cause and effect, the linear time of science which imparts no meaning and is
not prescriptive but predictive. And, the predictive quality of this time turns the mind to the
future. This philosophic disposition, oriented, as it is, to the future, is also mirrored in Hobbes’s
theory of subjectivity. It further parallels a reorientation in Hobbes’ own thought from the past to
the future.
Although his later, more eminently political works are markedly ahistorical, his most
notable early work was a full translation and annotation of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. He
embarked on this project in order to extract its political truths. In it, he explains, “the principle
and proper work of history, [is] to instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, to
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bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future.”23 Yet even as he
advocates for historical instruction, he is weary of what seem to be unavoidable misfires. He
notes, “For in history, actions of honour and dishonour do not appear plainly and distinctly,
which are which; but in the present age they are so disguised, that few there be, and those very
careful, that be not grossly mistaken in them.”24 Here, the present is not illuminated but hidden,
and judgments regarding its truth are only evident retrospectively. Though the past is a source of
knowledge, insofar as its meaning is clear in the present, that knowledge is largely unactionable
because the present can only be properly assessed in the future. By the time he writes Leviathan,
this unease has given way to a formal split, and he explains that there are two kinds of
knowledge:
one is knowledge of fact; the other, knowledge of the consequence of one
affirmation to another. The former is nothing but sense and memory, and is
absolute knowledge…and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is
called science, is conditional; as when we know that: if the figure shown be a
circle, then any straight line through the center shall divide it into two equal parts.
And this [scientific knowledge] is the knowledge required in a philosophy.25
Here, he presents history as the post hoc affirmation of a series of consequences made by
witnesses. Scientific causality, however, requires no witness. Whereas history affirms past truths,
science offers axiomatic truths that can be projected into the future. In this way, the present can
become a time of certainty.
The transition in the role of history in his thought essentially signifies a change in his
understanding of the meaning of history and its relationship to truth. The problem for Hobbes is
that at its best, history’s value is prudential not predictive. Its lessons can help develop a more
providential disposition in individuals, but regarding the future with mere caution and informed
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speculation is an insufficient foundation for political knowledge, let alone a systematized
political philosophy. In order to be lasting, he argues, political knowledge must be based on a
foundation of predictive certainty. Science, and its causal laws of motion, provides Hobbes with
the kind of predictive certainty he was looking for. Upon a new foundation of knowledge, a new
history could emerge. Or put differently, Hobbes believed that producing a future that was
different from the past required not just injecting new ideas into an existing system, but rather
required establishing a foundation for thinking and for grounding truth claims that was
rigorously ahistorical. For him, liberating the future from the errors of the past requires a causal
system whose temporality operated independently of history, thus allowing history to develop
without distorting or invalidating philosophy. As such, despite his implicit recognition of the
ways in which history cannot be divorced from politics so long as people have a history, because
Hobbes understands historic knowledge to be insufficient, and because he understands science
itself to be ahistorical, history is excluded from his political philosophy entirely. In its stead, the
ahistorical temporality of science, understood in terms of cause and affect allows him to consider
temporality divorced from history, and to expose what he views as the true nature of the human
psyche, and, consequently, the real possibilities and limitations of human life.
Finding Common Ground
Hobbes’s philosophical and historical separation is not without consequences, however.
Samantha Frost points out that “when neither God nor nature provide us with an indubitable
cosmological map according to which we place ourselves in the universe…actions and events
can mean radically different things to each of us.”26 What this indicates to Hobbes, is that
without a common interpretive framework, individuals become convinced and indignant
26
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regarding their own claims to right reason, and violence is the result. Hobbes’s argument, then, is
that uses of reason that are either wholly abstract or independently held are exclusionary and
inaccessible, and therefore, socially destructive. Philosophic inquiry must therefore be limited to
the realm of the demonstrable, lest we continue to fall victim to the myth making and fearmongering of the philosophers and theologians who, Hobbes believes, have used their powers of
reason to build consensus around nonsense. Thus, any society that has hope of survival must
have an inferential framework for mutual intelligibility that is at least provisionally available to
all, and oriented to a good desired by all. Within these limitations, he argues, it is possible to
create a system of knowledge that is universal, logical, and predictive. The whole of Hobbes
mechanistic metaphysics can be understood as the “science of causes,” which makes mutual
intelligibility possible through methods by which the “dependence of connexion” between
“antecedent and subsequent event” are mutually experienced, demonstrated, affirmed.27 In this
way, Hobbes postulates a new cosmological map that allows people to situate themselves in the
universe, free from God or history, and grounded in temporal reason—the common ability to
make connections between before and after is the key to his philosophy.
The annihilation hypothesis can be read not only as highlighting the shift in Hobbes’s
thought wherein the time of science supplants history as the source of philosophic truth. It is also
a demonstration of the method by which he grounds and validates knowledge. It is an
intersubjective method that appeals to the common experience of consciousness to establish selfevident truths. Hobbes expects us to immediately identify with, and to understand, the experience
of the lone survivor on account of the features of consciousness common to humans. His
invitation to consider the mind of the lone survivor is intended to direct our attention to the inner

27

Hobbes, Leviathan, 2012, 4:168 (I.xii).
26

working of our consciousness. He seeks not to have a reader recognize and identify not what or
he thinks, but how we think. He continues his annihilation exegesis:
For seeing, that after the destruction of all other things, I suppose man still
remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers, there can be
nothing for him to think of but what is past; nay, if we do but observe diligently
what it is we do when we consider and reason, we shall find, that though all things
be still remaining in the world, yet we compute nothing but our own phantasms.
For when we calculate…we do not ascent into heaven that we may divide it into
parts…but we do it sitting still in our closets or in the dark.28
Hobbes entreats us to recognize that human consciousness is inherently temporal, as the ideas
that constitute consciousness are born of past perceptions, and that reason is embedded in the
temporality of ideas and experience. We, like the lone survivor, have only ideas of the world
produced by past experience to contemplate. This is a truth, he argues, we can recognize to be
true not only of ourselves, but all human minds. Even as Hobbes invokes this commonality, he
does so in the service of subverting common sense. That is, rather than affirming what common
sense tells us is our immediate experience of the world, Hobbes seeks to reveal that our
experience is not of the world, but of the representations given to us by the world. That is, our
experience is not of objects in themselves, but of the way objects appear to us, as mediated by
our senses. By asking us to imagine the world after its annihilation, Hobbes is really asking us to
see that our minds are non-identical to the world that produces them. This is why, he agrues, that
other minds are essential to philosophic knowledge. Individual reason and experience are
insufficient grounds of knowledge, their validation requires the corroboration of others. This is
the same approach he later echoes in the Leviathan, which Hobbes opens by declaring,
for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and
passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considerate what he
doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c. and upon what grounds;
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he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other
men upon like occasions.29
By reflecting on the nature of our own consciousness, he argues, we identify qualities that are not
particular to ourselves, but general features of consciousness, which makes others’ consciousness
intelligible. Some argue these instances are ones in which Hobbes abandons his scientific
methods for methods of persuasion and rhetorical manipulation.30 However, despite the
rhetorical turn in Hobbes’s later, explicitly polemical work, we would be remiss to overlook the
appeals to our commonality that are present throughout his work, because they demonstrate that
his entire system of knowledge is consistently and exclusively validated by intersubjective
appeals. This is an intentional move on his part, for the solipsism and abstraction of
Scholasticism, is only prevented by a philosophy that can be demonstrable to, and verified by,
others. It is, he argues, the causal reasoning innate to humans that makes such a philosophy
possible.
It is because Hobbes understands causal reasoning to be the source of knowledge that he
defines philosophy as, “the knowledge, acquired by right reasoning, of the qualities of bodies
known by means of a conception of their generation, and conversely of possible generations
from correct reasoning from their known properties.”31 Or put differently, philosophy is
29
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reasoning from apparent effect to possible cause, or from known causes to possible effects.
Hobbes’ outlines two methods of “right reason,” the analytic and the synthetic, which are
designed to develop a common and accessible interpretive framework by demonstrating a
reproducible system of connectedness.32 Hobbes’s insistence on demonstration that connects
generative definitions (i.e. maker’s knowledge) rather than merely conventional definitions,
prevents his system from having a merely internal logic that lacks reproducibility.
The first method he describes, the analytic method, moves from effects to causes, or more
specifically, from sensory effects (ideas), to material causes. He offers an example of the former
by analyzing gold, which is a composite idea that must be resolved into more basic ideas such as
“solid, visible, and heavy,”33 which are further resolved until the most universal concepts are
reached. The synthetic method on the other hand, begins from causes to find possible effects, and
is, therefore, a much more generative and open-ended method. However, it is also a method that
requires analytic knowledge. In the case of civil and moral philosophy, Hobbes stresses that the
philosopher applies the synthetic method to the analytic principles discovered in first philosophy
in order to develop an entire system of thought. Crucial to his argument, however, is that
everyone can analytically affirm, individually, these synthetically derived principles. This is
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because analytic principles are ultimately either “self-evident”34 or essentially evident in
ourselves.
Hobbes’s position that causal reasoning is innate is tied to his particular conception of
materialist subjectivity. It is, he argues, fundamentally self-evident that the cause of all
conceptions is body and motion.35 Humans are unique, in that we are not simply the recipients of
external causes, but reactive, each person is a contingent system of cause and effects. Our
constitution means that we do not have to apply reason to understand the actions and reactions of
our bodies, they are evident merely by observation. As he explains, unlike the non-human bodies
of the world, “the causes of the motions of the mind are known, not only by ratiocination, but
also by the experience of every man that takes the pains to observe those motions within
himself.”36 This essentially means that although discovering and systematizing all the principles
of civil philosophy requires applying a synthetic method to the analytic principles of first
philosophy, these principles can be affirmed analytically even by those lacking philosophic
training, by simply consulting one’s own mind. Hobbes offers an example in which a person can
determine the justice or injustice of a particular action, by consulting his own experience and
arriving at the same conclusion as the philosophic principle that would compel the same action.37
Hobbes’s intention here is to demonstrate that neither reason alone nor my status as a sentient
animal are sufficient grounds for validation, which requires the corroboration of others. He is
developing a system in which reason does not have independent authority, but is always
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mediated in its use by the temporality and materiality of the agent. Its validation stems from
congruency with other similarly mediated agents, and it is this commonality that is also what
makes mutual intelligibility possible. Hobbes reinforces this point when he concludes his
introduction to Leviathan as follows:
He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that
particular man; but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn
any language or science; yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly,
and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, if he also find
not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admitteth no other
demonstration.38
Hobbes’s annihilation hypothesis is similarly intended to help us reach this point of common
identification.
Hobbes’s Modern Mechanism
The first step to understanding how Hobbes liberates his material subject through time, is
his rejection of the objective existence of time. Like his early modern peers, Hobbes is engaged
in a project of explaining the human world in mechanist terms. However, unlike his
contemporaries, his mechanism is totalizing. Where others such as Descartes maintain that laws
of matter and motion are the proper source of knowledge of the material world, but knowledge of
immaterial substances can only be discovered through reason, Hobbes denies the existence of
immaterial substances wholecloth. He instead argues that matter and motion are all that exist. As
such, he endeavors to explain the material causes of all ideas, and how ideas that have no
material existence can be conceived.
In De Corpore, Hobbes offers a fairly typical mechanist account of perception. All ideas,
he explains, have their origin in material objects, whose qualities press on our senses, causing
motions that are then propagated through our bodily organs, which react to produce a phantasm
38

Hobbes, Leviathan, 2012, 4:18.
31

or appearance of an object.39 This explanation is largely consistent with other mechanist ideas of
perception, with one crucial exception. When it come to ideas of time and space produced by
objects, Hobbes’s contemporaries find them to be immaterial, self-sufficient, substance-like
entities. That is, the find time and space to be real. Hobbes denies the objective existence of time
and space, and blames others’ errors on the human tendency towards abstraction. In this case, the
experience of material particulars (i.e. things with real space) gives rise to imaginary universals
(i.e. infinite space). Likewise, motion provides examples of particular instances of time, which
gives rise to the idea of time as an infinite, singular, universal. However, Hobbes argues that
since phantasmata are, like all other ideas, mediated by perception, nothing universal can be said
of the external objects that give rise to them.
Yet Hobbes does view time as unique, because it is not the property of an object, but of
an object’s motion. Whereas space is a quality of objects that is largely static and independent,
time requires a subject.40 Or put differently, although our knowledge of material objects is
mediated by perception, we nonetheless know that objects exist spatially, independent of our
measurement. The same cannot be said for time, which is a process of the mind with no objective
existence. With this move, Hobbes lays the foundation for a theory of human subjectivity in
temporal terms. In his treatment of time, however, he seems particularly sensitive to the fact that
his position regarding time has radical implications for philosophy. And this helps to explain
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why, despite elsewhere expressing no shortage of derision for the “Darknesse from Vain
Philosophy and Fabulous Traditions”41 caused by the Scholastic tradition generally and Aristotle
specifically, in De Corpore, he employs Aristotle as an unlikely ally. He begins by explaining
that his idea “is that, which (without receding much from the common opinion, or from
Aristotle’s definition) I call Time.”42 However, he fundamentally alters the meanings of the
concepts he appropriates in ways that allow him to reject central Aristotelian conclusions.43
He then offers more “complete definition” explaining that, “time is the phantasm of
before and after in motion; which agrees with this definition of Aristotle, time is the number of
motion according to the former and latter…”44 And, he explains, these concepts of before and
after are not attributable to objects or time—time is an idea produced by material stimulus in the
mind, yet has no independent existence. A past motion no longer exists, a future motion does not
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yet exist, and the present is a frozen, isolated moment that lacks the successive element of time,
which means it axiomatically is not time. It is only within the human mind that movement caused
by past and present perceptions combine to give us the idea of a successive, continuous time. He
thus concludes that time does not objectively exist, but is instead the “phantasmata of motion,
insofar as we imagine prior and posterior or succession in motion.”45 He finds further support by
elaborating the clause, “the number of change,” in Aristotle’s definition. If time is the
numbering—the actual counting of change, it is not a property of the moving bodies, but a
property of the mind that measures them. That is, numbers and the process of counting numbers
exists only in the rational mind and not in the empirical world, so to define time as “the number
of change” implies that time is a product of the numbering process of the mind, and hence an
idea which has no objective reality. Hobbes claims Aristotle’s statement that “time is neither
movement nor independent of movement,”46 provides still more support for the unreality of time.
Materialist Subjectivity: The Temporal Subject
Hobbes was not the only philosopher to argue against the objective existence of time. Yet
an ideational, and therefore subject dependent, conception of time would seem to be precluded
by his extension of mechanism into the sphere of human volition. And indeed, whereas his
contemporaries argued that matter was determined and the mind was free, Hobbes argued that
the mind was matter, and as such, determined.47 How can time be subjective while the subject
determined? One possible answer is that our tendency to view this dimension of Hobbes’s
thought as paradoxical may simply reflect our own Cartesian bias. As Samantha Frost explains in
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her provocative recent book, Lessons from a Materialist Thinker, the violent, calculating, and
authoritarian iconography that has become emblematic of Hobbes's work stems from a de facto
rejection of his materialist subject in favor of a Cartesian subject. It is, she argues, “Descartes’s
rendering of the self as split into two ontologically distinct but practically related entities of mind
and body that gives to the iconic Hobbes his hard-core individualism and the accounts of
rationality, desire, and political absolutism that are its corollary.”48 If, she continues, we attempt
to read Hobbes in his own terms, the iconographic Hobbes is undermined, and an ethical subject
emerges.
For Frost, Hobbes not only challenges the Cartesian subject, but does so successfully, and
in so doing, he radically undermines some of the most uncontested assumptions about
contemporary political philosophy, such as agency and the individual. While fascinating, this
conclusion is not without difficulties,49 and more to the point, it takes us further than required. It
is not necessary to abandon the Cartesian subject in order to faithfully read Hobbes. Rather, we
must merely suspend the Cartesian bias that renders Hobbes's philosophy unintelligible—a bias
that is the source of the apparent paradox at hand between Hobbes's materialism and his
ideational idea of time.
Against the Cartesian model in which “this I which is thinking is an immaterial substance
with no bodily element,”50 Hobbes posited the idea of a wholly embodied subject. Crucially,
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Hobbes distinguishes these “thinking-bodies”51 from mere automata—a distinction that cannot
be understood from the materialist armature of the Cartesian model, in which bodies are uniform,
as is the motion that determines them. This perspective implicitly informs reactions to Hobbes
that depict him as essentially reducing humans to machines,52 or alternatively, elevating rocks to
thinking matter.53 But what does this distinction really mean? Does materialism not require
Hobbes to argue that humans lack independence and agency—that all our behavior is
determined? Yes and no. As a general point, it would make little sense for Hobbes to commit so
much of his life to writing about thinking, reasoning, abstraction, and philosophy, let alone
politics, if human behavior were mechanically determined. However, it is true that Hobbes posits
a wholly embodied subject, fully enmeshed in the material world—a condition that renders our
thinking unfree in some respects. Despite these limitations, he consistently and repeatedly
explains that we are thinking subjects, capable of the self-awareness and self-knowledge that
comprise subjectivity—not through the immediacy of Cartesian introspection, but through
temporally constructed retrospection.
When Hobbes likens us to the lone survivor for whom “there can be nothing…to think of
but what is past,”54 his point is that all of our ideas stem from perceptions that have already
passed, and therefore what we take to be our immediate experience is an illusion, as is its
introspective corollary. Experience is instead mediated not only by the process of perception that
produces appearances, but also by the process of temporal mediation in which newly received
perceptions are compared to previous perceptions. In De Corpore he describes sense as a
51

Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, 1839, 1:34 (I.3).
Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall, Hobbes and Bramhall: On Liberty and Necessity, ed. V.
C. Chappell, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
53
Sorell, Hobbes.
54
Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, 1839, 1:34 (I.3).
52

36

particular kind of reaction in a sentient body that is provoked by external stimuli. He explains
that “sense…must necessarily have in it a perpetual variety of phantasms, that they may be
discerned one from another…it being almost all one for a man to be always sensible of one and
the same thing, and not to be sensible at all of anything.”55 Here he suggests that perception
shares a central component with the rest of his philosophy—it does not exist independently, and
its existence is conditioned by its context. Recognition is thus a process of distinction, in which
this is distinguished from that.
To be clear, Hobbes is not referring to the variety of perceptions owing to the differing
sensory organs, but to the variety of perceptions over time. Perceiving the same smell for the
duration of one’s life is essentially tantamount, in Hobbes's argument, to lacking an olfactory
sense all together—that singular scent would be unrecognizable, as would a singular touch, taste,
sight, or sound. Our ability to identify different perceptions stems from our ability to compare
the most recent perception to the one that preceded it, a process that implies the temporal
category memory. Similarly, the ideas that comprise thought are themselves partially constituted
by the ideas that preceded them and followed them in the past. Or put differently, just as
perception is rendered decipherable only through the context of variety, so too are ideas shaped
by the context that creates them—even if imperceptibly. For a contemporary example, the smell
of sunscreen is made possible by the coexisting smell of the ocean, after which the smell of one
creates a subtle expectation for the smell of the other. Ideas are likewise born in a context that
becomes surreptitiously embedded in them. It is perhaps easiest to understand this argument in
the context of day dreaming, or what he terms “unguided thought,” wherein “in the Imagining of
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any thing, there is no certainty what we shall Imagine next.”56 However, uncertainty does not
imply randomness. To the contrary, what appears to us as random actually has a structure, and
we can be sure that each thought, “shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one
time or another.”57 Likewise, when we engage intentional, guided thought, we do not
immediately, actively dictate the sequence of our ideas—their past context continues to impact
our thinking.
Hobbes’s assertion that “one conception followeth another, not according to our
election,”58 likely stirs some resistance, yet is also quite apparent to anyone who has sought to
express complex ideas in writing, only to find a maelstrom of ideas were orderly ones had been
masquerading seconds prior. This example is meant merely to highlight a central point in Hobbes
work—knowledge often appears to us as present where it is not, and the process of finding it is,
in some respects, a dialogue with the past. To wit, writing is a process in which the production of
knowledge is most visibly tied to the past, as going forward requires a constant re-examination
and re-articulation of past expressions.
The process by which discrete memory threads are woven into a fabric of experience is
simultaneously a process that shapes how new threads will be spun. As he explains, our
ideas are not always the same; but that new ones appear to us, and old ones
vanish, according as we apply our organize of sense, now to one object, now to
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another…And from hence it is manifest, that [ideas] are some change or
mutation in the sentient.59
In other words, because Hobbes understands thinking subjects to be reactive matter,
human sentience has universal qualities, but produces unique subjectivities and trajectories. His
explanation for this uniqueness stems not from a simple mechanical determinism, but from a
complicated interplay between external forces and the internal, temporally complex forces of
human sentience.60 Otherwise, human thought itself would be rote and unsurprising, akin to a
simple computer program, to offer an apt, if not anachronistic, metaphor. For Hobbes, memory
does not function as a mere rote transcription service, cataloguing various stimuli, but as part of a
dynamic temporal network of memory and expectation that is itself a causal force. Memory
interprets the present in terms of the past thereby making experience intelligible, while
recognition makes selfhood possible.
Locating Materialist Agency: Supplanting the Will with Imagination
Against concepts of consciousness, deliberation, will, and action derived from an
incorporeal agency that is thus intrinsically free, Hobbes offers an agent that is neither immediate
nor free from necessity—an idea that gives rise to the question, in our time as in his:61 how can a
material subject will? Theories of immaterial agency generally locate freedom in the exercise of
deliberation that precedes and determines the will. For Hobbes, however, deliberation and
willing are not prior and distinct from action; they are part of action. So, his assertion that “no
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man can determine his own will,”62 does not in itself foreclose the possibilities of human agency,
because he locates agency not in the will, but in the temporal category of imagination.
Just as guided and unguided thought are shaped by material and temporal
interdependence, so too is the deliberative thought that precedes action. Deliberation is
distinctive among the modes of thought Hobbes identifies, because it concerns the relationship
between the passions caused by stimuli. He explains that, “external objects cause conceptions,
and conceptions [cause] appetites and fear, which are the first unperceived beginnings of our
actions.”63 Sometimes, action immediately follows from the first appetite, and in this case, no
deliberation occurs. However, sometimes an immediate appetite is followed by a fear that
prevents us from proceeding, and this “alternate succession of appetite and fear during all the
time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we call deliberation.”64 This process of
deliberation is one in which the full spectrum of passions face one another in a kind of bracket
tournament until one remains; the remaining appetite constitutes the will. Hobbes is unwavering
in his insistence that neither passions, nor deliberation, nor willing is voluntary. We cannot help
but to react to the world, or to be drawn to or averse to different experiences. Yet his varying
explanations are telling. In some instances, he explains determination in terms of the passions,
“for where there is appetite, the entire cause of the appetite hath preceded; and, consequently, the
act of appetite could not choose but follow, that is, hath of necessity followed.”65 Elsewhere he
frames necessity in terms of the will itself, “every volition or act of the will…had a sufficient,
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and therefore necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated.”66
These explanations are essentially the same, which raises the question, how or in what way does
the will differ from the passions? The somewhat surprising answer is, they do not, and this is
precisely why Hobbes's demotes the will to the involuntary. He explains, “no man can determine
his own will, for the will is appetite; nor can a man more determine his will than any other
appetite, that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry or when not.”67 In other
words, willing is wanting, and wanting is involuntary. To be clear, Hobbes's claim is that all
appetite is will; the will is not simply a kind of appetite (e.g. the rational appetite) that competes
with others. Rather, the will is simply the movement from appetite into action. It is, “the last
Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof.”68
Despite the determined nature of the Hobbes's conception of the will, it possesses two
temporal features that prevent it from reducing the subject to mere automata—memory of the
past and imagination of the future. Memory is a force that contributes to the “continual mutation”
of the embodied subject, which makes “it impossible that all the same things should always
cause in him the same appetites and aversions.”69 Moreover, while some passions “are born with
men…the rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from experience.”70 In other
words, Hobbes understands a person’s desires and fears to be determined, not directly by
external stimuli, but by her own utterly unique and constantly evolving history and body. This
discussion is as much about the past as it is about the future, however, as the appetites and
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aversions that memory determines are themselves the first stages of action. Hobbes addresses
this point explicitly when he notes,
fancy [i.e. imagination] and memory differ only in this, that memory supposeth
the time past, which fancy doth not. In memory, the phantasms we consider are as
if they were worn out with time; but in fancy we consider them as they are; which
distinction is not of the things themselves, but the considerations of the sentient.71
Like memory, imagination, is the consideration of a body that is not in the present, and
imagination requires memory, as the ideas available to imagination are made intelligible by
memory. Yet unlike memory, which points to a past that is largely closed to us, and whose
contents “are by length of time decayed and lost,”72 imagination points to a future that represents
an enduring possibility of newness—a possibility that also conditions perception and shapes
desire. As he explains, “living creatures have sometimes appetite and sometimes aversion to the
same thing, as they think it will either be for their good or for their hurt.”73 Here he ascribes the
variability of desire to expectations of the future. While memories past provides our imagination
with context and experience, it is our idea of the future that most profoundly shapes behavior.
Hobbes elaborates this point in Leviathan, distinguishing voluntary “animal” motion
from involuntary “vital” motion. Vital motions are “begun in generation, and continued without
interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the
breathing…&c; to which motions there needs no help of imagination.”74 In more modern
language, these are the involuntary actions of bodies, which occur independent of thought.
Animal motions, on the other hand, are “voluntary…in such manner as is first fancied in our
minds” such as speech and movement of limbs.75 Because, any voluntary action relies on a
71
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precedent thought, he concludes that “imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary
motions.”76
It is the quality of human imagination that, for Hobbes, truly separates the voluntary
movements of humans from other sentient beings. He stipulates that voluntary action requires
causal reasoning, and concedes that all animals thus have basic memory structures, by which
before and after can be noted. All thinking bodies engage in a deliberative process whereing
from “an effect imagined we seek the causes or means to produce it.”77 For example, when
motions in the body give rise to hunger, deliberation seeks to find a cause of action that will
yield the desired effect, which is an end of that hunger. This process, he explains is “common to
man and beast.”78
However, unlike animals, who instinctively search for causes that will yield desired
effects, humans are aware that they search for causes, which means that we, unlike animals are
aware of the temporal nature of thinking. Without this awareness, animals remain in the present,
“having little or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation and memory of order,
consequence, and dependence of the things they see.”79 Animal life is rendered utterly
dependent, because theirs is a deliberative process limited to instinct and habituation—they lack
the ability to recognize their memory, which, in turn, prohibits them from recognizing their
selves, and consequently, their futures. But our deliberative process does not end when we
identify the object of our desire. Instead, we “[imagine]…all the possible effects that can by it be
produced, that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it when we can do with it when we
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have it.”80 The identification of desire is in some ways just the beginning. Even in the most
mundane deliberation, such as midday hunger, triggers a deliberation that does not end when a
suitable meal is identified, but triggers additional deliberations such as where to eat that meal,
with whom, and how these choices will affect dinner plans, and so on. The human thinking-body
is compelled not only by the necessity of the present, but also by the possibility of the future.
Animals engage in causal logic, but their limited memories preclude the kind of imagination that
futures different from the past would require; their temporal logic operates entirely within the
realm of known causes and known effects.81 But we can combine present conditions with past
experiences to postulate new effects Moreover, this imaginative process reveals the possibilities
of our own agency, precisely, for Hobbes, because it is not abstract or otherwise detached from
the material world, but born of it.
This means that while Hobbes understands subjectivity to be fundamentally rooted in the
past, he also describes a subject that is necessarily preoccupied with the future. This
preoccupation stems from the very same memory and causal reasoning that constitute selfhood—
having knowledge not simply of discrete facts, but the “dependence of one fact upon another,”82
allows us to consider the present as a future’s past. Moreover, it is by dint of the future that we
come to recognize the possibilities born of our own actions, which imbues us with actionable
selfhood. As he explains:
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Wherefore all conception of the future, is conception of power able to produce
something; whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to come, must conceive withal
some power in himself by which the same may be attained.83
This means that the desires that lead to the appetites and aversions that determine action are not
only comprised of past experience and present stimuli, but also of a perception of the possibility
of attaining them in the future. In other words, it is the consideration of the future, guided by
memory and causal reasoning, that we come to recognize ourselves as a causal force. The
recognition of our power does not entail the ability to direct it, in the unmediated present,
unaffected by any other causal forces, as Cartesian models of agency suggest. Rather, the ability
to direct actions instead occurs in the imagination that precedes deliberation. It is in the
imagination of all possible effects that precedes deliberation that agency lies, but it is an agency
that cannot escape material conditions—it is made possible but also limited by our finite
memories and speculation regarding future conditions. However, possibilities must be tangible
for them to spark deliberation. He explains, in order for deliberation to take place “there must be
hope of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, appetite and fear are expectations of the
future.”84 Once the material conditions of possibility are perceived, deliberation follows; it is
neither a choice nor an exercise of freedom. Imagination, on the other hand, is an exercise in
postulating possible conditions and subsequent effects such that the ability to perceive possibility
is expanded. Because imagination is least constrained by the material present, and the source of
the ideas that will constitute deliberation, it is where Hobbes locates agency.
For example, Hobbes’s theory would stipulate that a prison inmate’s confinement may
well produce the desire for escape, and this desire will shape her perceptions and memories. In
this state of pre-deliberation, before the possibility of escape presents itself, she can imagine the
83
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circumstances required for freedom and the potential consequences of an escape attempt. This
imaginative work has the effect of both heightening her ability to perceive the possibility for
escape, and will also inform the deliberative process that takes over should such a possibility
ever materialize. The link between the possibilities we can imagine and the ones that emerges is
crucial to understanding Hobbes’s political thought, as he views the primary task of statehood as
constructing environments that shape the perception of possibility, so as to encourage trust and
cooperation.
Of Futures Insecure: The State of Nature & The Kingdom of Darkness
Hobbes's temporal model of subjectivity and agency does not yet lead in any obvious
way to the state of nature described in his political works. In fact, his discussion of memory and
imagination lacks any hint of the anxiety and violence emblematic of those works. However, as
Hobbes shifts his consideration from a context in which every person is by himself “without
relation to others”85 to a consideration of our social existence, problems quickly emerge.
Although Hobbes’s conception of agency is fundamentally born of material interdependence, the
context of other thinking-bodies has the potential to disrupt our capacity to predict outcomes, to
disastrous effect.
In short, Hobbes’s state of nature is an analogy designed to show how material conditions
of insecurity dramatically restrict the temporal imagination, which induces violent behavior.
When we find ourselves unable to account for all contingencies, future conditions, and the
actions of others, we are essentially rendered impotent and vulnerable. This experience of
precarity, Hobbes explains, foreshortens the horizon of the future, and without the ability to
imagine a different future, the possibilities of the present become much narrower. Or put
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differently, the anxiety produced by insecurity prevents deliberation, and in its stead we act in
the immediacy of fear. Essentially, it is not our nature, but the physical state of nature that causes
the war of all against all.
It is worth taking a momentary step back from the state of nature, to note that however
important it is to Hobbes's political thought, it is not where he begins his discussion of human
cohabitation. The state of nature appears not in the first chapter of Leviathan, but the fourteenth.
And the three chapters that precede it are crucial to understanding the paradoxical role that
temporality plays in creating the promise and the problems of human coexistence. Even a
seasoned reader may be surprised to realize that he begins his discussion of communal living by
stating that “living together in peace, and unity”86 requires thinking about the nature of human
happiness. In earlier works, he rejected Ancient notions of happiness, explaining, “there is no
such thing in this world” as the “utmost end, in which the Ancient philosophers have placed
felicity…for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end.”87 There is,
for Hobbes, something profoundly unattainable, perhaps even morbid, about prevailing notions
of happiness, for they describe a condition of cessation that is possible only in death. For him,
viewing happiness as a terminus, as a state of satisfaction marked by the absence of desire and
anticipation, is a terminal diagnosis for a materially and temporally constituted subject. Opposed
to this, he introduces a notion of happiness that was as radical in his time as it is familiar in ours.
He describes happiness as, “continual prospering”88 that can be understood as
a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the
former, being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object
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of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to
assure for ever, the way of his future desire.89
In other words, because human consciousness keeps moving, and this motion is intelligible to us
as time, happiness cannot be understood as a state of satisfaction, but rather as a process of
continual satisfaction. This means that happiness is itself divided temporally, requiring both the
ability to fulfill desires in the present, and the ability to imagine oneself fulfilling future desires.
In its relation to happiness, the future has a liberating quality in Hobbes’s work. It is not
the fixed present, but in the contemplation of future possibilities that happiness and freedom are
made apparent to consciousness. However, in the state of nature, the future lacks this liberating
quality. Here, it is not the innate curiosity spurred by the futurity of happiness that causes men to
inquire into causes, but “anxiety for the future.”90 Moreover, this inquiry is not motivated by a
desire to fulfill individual needs, but rather “because the knowledge of them, maketh men the
better able to order the present to their best advantage.”91 This description of human behavior
lacks reference to desire or any individual proclivity at all, but rather reflects a calculation made
against others.
For Hobbes, human agency is rooted in the ability to know possible outcomes and to
predict with certainty. The decision I make to cross the street, despite oncoming traffic, is one I
could not make without a basic causal framework in which velocity, distance, my choice of
footwear, and the drivers' attentiveness are all at play. If I decide not to cross it is either because I
predict injury, or because I am unable to predict. To be clear, there is no guarantee that my
prediction will bear out. I may very well decide to cross and loose my footing or be hit by an
unseen cyclist. The key here is rather that action requires not just prediction but a feeling of
89
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confidence born of locating oneself among known variables. I may encounter unexpected
variables, but they will not deceive me—I can be reasonably confident that a car will behave as a
car and not a bird. The problem encountered in the state of nature, Hobbes explains, is that we
find ourselves in the context of countless, unpredictable variables. Although others are like us,
the particular history that provides the context for their actions is both unknown to us and further
concealed through “counterfeit”92 uses of speech. So without the means to property access and
assess the intentions of others, we are forced to deduce their motives from the most base
conception possible—the lowest common denominator of the will—survival.
Mere survival, for humans and animals alike, requires continual acquisition, yet Hobbes
describes a process in which the human awareness of this condition creates a psychological
paradox in which actions in the present become dominated by fears of the future. Specifically,
awareness of our perpetuity of need creates a desire for security that spurs contemplation of the
future. However, since ignorance of all future causes make it impossible to locate security in the
future, such contemplation has a paralyzing effect in the present—a torment Hobbes likens to
that of Prometheus:
For…it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoreth to secure himself
against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual
solicitude of the time to come; so that every man, especially those that are over
provident, are in a state like that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus…was bound
to the hill…an eagle feeding on his liver…so that man, which looks too far before
him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear
of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety,
but in sleep.93
Like Prometheus, whose giving of possibility to human life is punished with eternal torment, our
ability to contemplate the future similarly creates possibilities for human life, yet it also creates
an incessant torment; it is an ability simultaneously liberating and inhibiting.
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The same faculty that allows us to imagine and create futures different from the past also
creates a perpetual state of limbo. Attempting to imagine and account for all possible futures can
create anxiety that undermines the purposeful creation of any future. Moreover, in such
situations, the behaviors of both the provident man and the truly ignorant man are similarly
determined. In the face of a truly open future, the knowledge of causes possessed by the former
is overwhelming, making deliberation impossible. And the man who is ignorant of causes, be
they remote or natural, attributes everything to the immediate, and is incapable of detecting the
possibility required for deliberation.94 In this way, knowledge and ignorance, strength and
weakness are all rendered equal in the context of fear. Thus, Hobbes opens his discussion of the
state of nature by asserting just such an equality95—it is the fear and immediacy of the present
that similarly determines the actions all. Recognizing that preservation requires the continual
acquisition of material resources, when we cannot extend ourselves into the future, we try to
acquire everything in the present. It is not innate greed, but a conditioned fear that spurs this
acquisitive behavior. He reinforces this point when he writes that,
is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already
attained to; or that he cannot be content with a more moderate power: but because
he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more.96

94

Ibid., 4:158–160 (I.xi).
“Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there
be found
one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.”
Ibid., 4:188 (I.xiii).
96
Ibid., 4:152 (I.xi).
95

50

The “perpetual and restless desire for power after power,”97 he describes is does not stem from
egoism or a will to dominate, but rather reflect deliberations that occur in the context of
uncertainty, and consequently, anxiety.
This psychological foregrounding is essential to understanding Hobbes's state of nature,
as it is a state in which humans cannot help but to attempt to create security through the endless
accumulation of resources. Of course, it is never enough. Although the experience of insecurity
often presents itself materially as a deficiency of resources, it is, for him, a principally temporal
problem. In fact, Hobbes, like other early modern thinkers, is quite certain of the abundance of
material resources.98 And when he introduces us to the state of nature in the fourteenth chapter,
he is not introducing us to a place but to a time—a time of insecurity that produces misery. It is,
he explains “during the time that men live without a common power” that they are at war, “for
war consisteth not only in battle, or the act of fighting; but in the tract of time,” in which there is
both a known disposition to violence and “no assurance to the contrary.” It is during such “a time
of war” when every man is enemy to every man, because “they live without other security.”99
This violence is neither the product of moral defect nor irrationality.100 When tomorrow’s meal is
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uncertain, gorging and hoarding today is rational. That is, reason itself is conditioned by ideas
about the future, which are themselves materially conditioned in a very real way. Of course,
acting on ideas about the future that are divorced from material conditions is certainly possible,
and it is this—acting for a future that cannot exist—that Hobbes deems irrational. And so when
the horizon of the future extends only into the night, abundant resources will appear scarce,
making others’ needs appear as a direct threat to one’s own survival, hence violence towards
others becomes rational.
The long-term inviability of behaviors exhibited in the state of nature may tempt us to
reject Hobbes’s assertion that they are rational, but this is precisely his point—reason is
conditioned by temporality. We can only act for the future that is possible. Hobbes makes this
point explicitly when he explains that in the context of insecurity “there is no place for industry;
because the fruit thereof is uncertain.”101 Yet while this behavior is determined by a certain set of
conditions, it is not the only possibility. This is an important point of distinction, for it can be
tempting to read the kind of “brute” mechanics determining human behavior in the state of
nature into his philosophy of human nature more broadly. And the tendency of prevailing
interpretations to do just this prevents reading the impossibility of nature as a foil to the
possibility of the state.
In fact, the very title of this chapter discloses possibility, “The Natural Condition of
Mankind Concerning Their Felicity and Misery.” Misery makes sense—the entire chapter is an
explication for the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”102 lives produced by conditions of
insecurity. Aside from its appearance in the title, however, felicity is nowhere to be found in this
society, he quickly turns to explanations of social class that reify hierarchy and privilege.
Nonetheless, his argument about the destabilizing nature of insecurity is sharp.
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chapter. And yet, despite lacking any explicit reference to happiness, its presence can be found in
its absence. Happiness haunts the state of nature; it is a state of loss. As Hobbes pulls back from
the individual to depict the broader implications of insecurity, the depth and breadth of this loss
comes into focus. Of course, for individuals in such a state, personal death appears as the largest
threat, but in the aggregate, insecurity means,
no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be
imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving, and
removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the
earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society.103
The loss is not lives, but life, as the possibility for happiness or meaning, or culture or history all
but disappears. This means, however, that although Hobbes employs insecurity to illustrate the
value of security, misery and felicity are not quite foils. If absolute insecurity essentially strips a
person of the complex temporal fabric that constitutes subjectivity, it is a condition that
precludes subjectivity. As such, it is within the state of nature that human behavior becomes
most determined and least recognizable. And worse, it represents not a time past—this is not an
origin story, but an enduring possibility for the present. The importance of this assertion in
Hobbes's political thought cannot be overstated. The stakes are higher than we can imagine—
more than money, power, religion, or culture, what is at stake is the very capacity to be human.
Security is a well-known feature of Hobbes's political imagination, but its temporal
dimension is largely under-theorized. Perhaps it is his perpetual assertion that peace requires a
“force to overawe them all”104 that has lead to security being largely understood merely in terms
of force itself. However, force alone cannot produce security. There is an objective material
prerequisite for security—too few resources make people insecure, regardless of power. But,
even in the context of material abundance, force cannot produce security, as humans only feel
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secure when the safety of the moment is anticipated to continue in the time to come. In other
words, because Hobbes understands subjectivity materially and temporally, security is likewise
understood in these terms. And, he concludes, the kind of action that can be identified as truly
human—the kind that originates in the imagination of a thinking-subject known to itself through
memory, causal reason, and anticipation—is truly possible only when the future is secure. And,
he argues, in the context of security, the forces that determine behavior create possibility, as
opposed to the impossibility created by insecurity.
Towards Futures Secure
So what does determinism look like in the context of security? It is true that Hobbes
maintains that human behavior is always determined by the sum of all forces, but he is careful to
stipulate that it is not “one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains,
joined together…and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one
single chain, but on many together.”105 Moreover, any particular person’s inclinations “arise
from a six-fold source: namely from the constitution of the body, from experience, from habit,
from the goods of fortune, from the opinion one hath of oneself, and from authorities.”106 The
particularity of each body itself tops his list, because its constitution and its “continual change”
give rise to the singularity of each person’s experience—a singularity made further unique by the
additional dimensions he enumerates. The forces that constitute any one person’s experience are
indeed so complex that they often appear mysterious.
The kind of determinism that would truly render human life without agency would
require a single, universal temporal structure. However, Hobbes’s world is populated by a

105

Hobbes, “Liberty, Necessity, and Chance,” 105.
Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen: De Homine and De Cive, ed. Bernard Gert, trans. Charles
T. Wood, T. S. K. Scott-Craig, and Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1991), 63.
106

54

multiplicity of distinct temporalities, which renders his determinism distinct from destiny.
Behavior may be determined by the intersection of one’s personal history and external
conditions, but there are always other possibilities available through alternate intersections. He
explains, each person has a particular lived history that has its own causal trajectory, distinct
from the historical determinate of the world. When these innumerable, overlapping, trajectories
coincide, the results are unpredictable. In other words, though causal trajectories are determined,
humans are not simply matter inserted into one universal chain of events. Rather, each embodies
a particular history, itself constituted by manifold forces, and as such the world is characterized
by its multiplicity of temporalities—the overlap, exchange, and intersection of which produce
unforeseen effects. And it is, he suggests, for the sake of these unknown possibilities that humans
truly live. Life is miserable in the state of nature not only because it is limited in quantity (that is,
duration), but because it is limited in quality. A life solely determined by the immediate
imperatives of survival eliminates the possibility of meaning, for it precludes creativity,
curiosity, and industry.107 In short, it lacks the production of knowledge and culture made
possible only through “the greatest of human powers,” in which each person’s “present means to
obtain some future apparent good” is combined, compounded, and thereby amplified.108 Read in
this light, it is easier to see that the fear that permeates Hobbes's state of nature is really his own.
Fear is often identified as the connective tissue that animates Hobbes's Leviathan—in the
state of nature people fear one another, which leads to war; in the civil state people fear the ruler,
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which leads to peace. His depiction of human nature is often characterized as an ad hoc argument
intended to preserve existing English political structures. To this end, Hobbes's politics are often
characterized as essentially dogmatic theory constructed to serve a proto-conservative agenda.109
Yet even if security and a strong state ultimately came to represent an important component of
conservatism, this reading of Hobbes's thought is not merely anachronistic. By essentializing
Hobbes's fear as particular to his personal experience, it precludes the possibility that his
philosophy and psychology are in any way legitimate. While it is certainly true that the
geopolitical and socio-economic tumult that contextualized Hobbes's life shaped his concerns,
his fear is not reducible to the personal. Despite whatever personal motivations and prejudices
inflected in his work, the overarching fear that animates Hobbes's work is universal, not
particular. He fears losing the capacity for being human itself, and he perceived two primary
threats to this capacity, both of which undermine the foundation of society, thereby undermining
the conditions required to develop the subjectivity required for meaningful agency. The first,
discussed above, is the threat posed by insecurity, conceived in material and temporal terms. The
second, is the threat posed by ignorance, which is a different kind of insecurity, conceived of in
intellectual and temporal terms.
Within the tendency towards absurdist philosophy in Scholasticism, Hobbes deduced a
political motive. He builds his case in the chapter “Of the Darkness from Vain Philosophy and
Fabulous Traditions,” which begins with his most strident critique of Aristotle, charging him
with the development of an artificial philosophic framework and meaningless philosophic
questions. However, he immediately parlays this critique into one against the Church. After all,
Scholasticism itself was a tradition developed within the Church, and in such a setting Aristotle’s
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metaphysics were “mingled with the Scripture to make School divinity”—the means by which
separated essences disseminated to the public.110 Rather than interpret metaphysics as “books
written or placed after his natural philosophy…schools take them for books of supernatural
philosophy,”111 and ontological status is thereby conferred on sprits and souls. This creates quite
a problem for a thoroughly material world occupied by thinking subjects whose agency stems
from the predictive powers of causal reasoning. Namely, it has created a world governed, in the
literal sense, by those who possess a faux-knowledge that is inaccessible to, and therefore
inviolable by, the public. The unsurprising result was states of domination. One might reasonable
ask, so what—does Hobbes not argue for a strong state too? He does indeed argue for a strong
state maintained by a “confederacy of deceivers.”112 However, Hobbes does not consider the
“Kingdom of Darkness” to be a strong state, because it employs domination and deception in
ways that do now foster public trust but instead reproduces the instability of the state of nature.
Hobbes takes issue neither with the exploitation of religious authority for political gain
nor the instrumental use of religion—any casual reader of Leviathan knows that religion is an
important source of political power. Instead, his problem is that the kind of ignorance fostered by
Scholasticism, which creates the very conditions of the state of nature. As he notes, some may
wonder why he addresses matters of theological doctrine in a political discourse, but the
connection is clear to him—“this doctrine of separated essences, built on the vain philosophy of
Aristotle, [frights citizens] from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names; as men
fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet, a hate, and a crooked stick.”113 Moreover,
Hobbes's charges the church with purposively appropriating Aristotle’s thinking in order to
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corroborate religion and to exact an unassailable obedience from people. For who, he asks, “will
not obey a priest, that can make a God, rather than his sovereign?”114 It can certainly be argued
that Hobbes's did not seek to liberate subjects politically or from their fear; he rather sought a
different kind of obedience—to the sovereign rather than the priest. His primary critique of the
church, however, is that it maintains obedience through forceful ignorance. He sought to replace
this system, with one of a learned obedience—a possibility that would only arise under
conditions that fostered the development of subjectivity. In other words, his central indictment of
church doctrine is that it extracts obedience at the expense of subjectivity.
As has already been made clear, Hobbes understands humans to be thinking subjects
whose agency is fundamentally rooted in material reality and causal reasoning. If this most basic
framework is supplanted by one that is independent from and alien to the thinking subject, so too
do the means of self-knowledge and understanding become alien. The resulting anxiety produced
by the Kingdom of Darkness parallels the anxiety of the state of nature; the former is the
intellectual foil for the materiality of the latter. He argues that the initial creation of “one God,
eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may have more easily been derived, from the desire men have
to know the causes of natural bodies…than from the fear of what was to befall them in the time
to come.”115 However, establishing an unintelligible progenitor of all material causality, whose
eternal intervention essentially suspends all rules and all certainty, changes the nature of our
expectation. Rather than scanning the horizon in search of future causes, the anxiety of God
“both inclines to fear, and hinders [people] from the search of the causes of other things.”116 This
is the role that religion plays in shaping the public mind—a public comprised of people no less
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compelled to find causes, but perhaps, less equipped than the philosophers to find them. As he
explains, the fear that accompanies our Promethean state, “must have needs for object
something.”117 In other words, out of concern for our own fortune, we are compelled to
understand causes and end our ignorance in order to gain control over our lives. But ignorance
cannot be escaped entirely, and its continual presence evokes an ever-present fear—a fear that
we seek to end by properly understanding its causes. Yet seeing nothing that can be identified as
the cause of fear, we turn to invisible agents, and a doctrine that offers certainty at the price of
understanding. This exchange, Hobbes admits, makes civil society possible in so far as religion
makes men “more apt to obedience, laws, peace, [and] charity.”118 However, since religious
acculturation is a human endeavor of unequal power, it is easily manipulated for personal gain,
and he charges “unpleasing priests,” both Catholic and Protestant with engendering an ignorance
that is counterproductive to civil society.119
Though sympathetic to the psychological needs that compel religious belief, Hobbes
finds the total supplanting of material understanding with religious doctrine to have profound
and cascading effects. When superstition replaces reason, people are left ignorant of the “causes,
and original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice,”120 which is why societies so often
follow custom rather than law. The problem, of course, is that customs are completely arbitrary,
lack internal logic, make no universal claims, and therefore require external force to maintain. In
a parallel argument that highlights the paradox of perpetuating ignorance as a means to
preserving power, Hobbes explains that ignorance is also responsible for causing sedition, for
lacking the ability to identify remote or complex causes, “disposeth men to attribute all events, to
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the causes immediate, and instrumental: for these are all the causes they perceive.”121 The
example he offers has striking contemporary resonance—when it comes time for people to pay
for public services, the immediate experience is unpleasant, and causes anger against the person
immediately responsible for the offense, the tax collector. But there is no satisfaction to be found
in this anger, and it grows to indict all public officials and finally the government itself.122
Lacking the ability to identify with the public, maintenance of the public is experienced as
persecution.
Ignorance also functions at the interpersonal level, with important political effects.
Because knowledge of causes allows us to perceive possibility, ignorance makes men gullible,
“being unable to detect impossibility.”123 This inability creates profound problems for the
individual and society. An ignorant person’s gullibility makes her not only passively accept lies,
but also actively create them, owing to an inability to judge. At the aggregate, this creates an
uncritical, superstitious, fearful society, that lacks the tools for any kind of self-governance, and
is therefore perpetually at the mercy of the powerful. And though Hobbes was certainly critical
of the self-governance required by democracy, his political ideas hinged on a framework of
mutual intelligibility that required autonomy. Moreover, his identification of ignorance as an
“inability to detect impossibility” emphasizes the role of temporality in his understanding of
subjectivity and its role in autonomy. As ignorance inhibits a person’s ability to detect causal
relationships, it upsets his ability to interpret experience, which impedes his ability to act. This is
because one of the forces that shapes imagination prior to deliberation is prudence or foresight,
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which “is a presumption of the future, contracted from the experience of time past.”124 Though it
is impossible to observe all circumstances and to predict with certainty, nevertheless, as one
acquires experience and develops prudence, he finds his “expectations the seldomer fail.”125 The
result of which is a kind of “well grounded confidence” that “begetteth attempt.”126 Here,
memory and prudence appear as the reciprocal forces that constitute both subjectivity and
agency; memory is the means by which we access self-understanding, and prudence is the means
by which we engage our agency. One’s own personal history is a source of empowerment, as it
helps sensitize us to possibility. To this end, the inhibition of experiential knowledge under
conditions of acculturated ignorance is also the inhibition of possibility, both individually and
collectively.
There is something strikingly and strangely non-elitist in this summation. For unlike
reason, which requires industry to attain, prudence is “naturally planted” in all and requires
nothing other than “to be born a man, and live with the use of his five senses.”127 Although
Hobbes has made it clear that scientific, political, and philosophic knowledge must be grounded
in reason, he has also consistently offered two methods of validation—one scientific and
grounded in reason, and one experiential and grounded in intersubjectivity. The latter of these
methods is insufficient on its own, but sufficient to develop the kind of understanding required
for citizenship in a civil society. Moreover, he argues that although the combination of prudence
and science produces nearly infallible predictions, if the two must be separated, natural prudence
is more reliable than abstract reasoning, which leads to the creation of “false and absurd general
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rules.”128 From this perspective, prudence acts as the layperson’s reason—it is the faculty by
which the empirical data of experience can be drawn on to help people determine how to act. So
while Hobbes can rightly be criticized for not elevating all to the level of philosopher, and for
constructing metaphors for understanding that do not hold up to scientific scrutiny, these
criticisms tend to overlook how radical his method and message is.
At its most elemental, his argument is that political stability can only be constructed upon
an accurate understanding of the human subject—divorced from speculative, abstract, or
theological considerations. Such analysis reveals human thought, psychology, and action to be
fundamentally temporal and conditioned by the material world. Insecurity is, for Hobbes, the
problem that political institutions must solve, and since the ultimate source of insecurity is
temporal, so too must the solution. Force alone is insufficient to solving insecurity, as we only
feel secure when the safety of the moment is anticipated to continue in the time to come. Political
institutions must therefore replace the temporality of nature marked by an eternity of chaos and
short-term thinking with the temporality of the state, which projects an eternity of order that
makes duration possible. He argues that it is a state’s projection into the future that allows
citizens to feel safe participating in long-term projects that extend over and beyond a single
person’s life— such as city planning, creating a family, or contributing the development of
science and industry. For these activities to be a worthwhile investment of a person’s life, he
needs to feel that the future is secured not only for his lifetime, but for future generations to
come.
Turning to the limitations of Hobbes’s political thought, it is useful to consider the
historical context in which he wrote, as his own consideration of the future became possible only
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as future possibilities expanded in England. As people within his own society began to reject the
rigid hierarchies that had gone unquestioned for so long, Hobbes responds not with a celebration
but with a warning, going so far as to argue against rebellion and for an absolute sovereign. Yet
his criticism of rebellions within England do not stem from a belief in absolute hierarchies, the
divine right of kings, or the inherent intellectual inferiority of the peasants. Rather, he sees these
rebellions as short-sighted because they misjudge what they risk—society itself, and they do not
propose a solution to the central problem of modernity—the insecurity created by an open future.
Ancient and medieval societies did not face this problem, as their futures were closed by eternal
cyclicality or divine eternity, respectively. Disabused of these older concepts of eternity, Hobbes
nevertheless resuscitates the concept of eternity, with one important difference: the creation of
the state marks the conscientious creation of the illusion of eternity. The state itself is a surrogate
for eternity—its continued existence provides the temporal security required for meaningful civic
participation. Moreover, because “felicity…(by which we mean continual delight), consisteth not
in having prospered, but in prospering,”129 the temporal order and stability of the state brings
happiness into the realm of the possible. This is also, incidentally, why he does not extend the
universal, rational consensus beyond the moment of state creation; to alter the state is to
jeopardize the future.
Although offering a state in which human happiness becomes tangible, Hobbes's vision
seriously curtails the depth and meaning of the human experience. Because Hobbes’s solution to
the anxiety caused by an uncertain future is the resurrection of eternity, it is imbued with all the
trappings that previous notions of eternity had. It is inflexible and impermeable, and its expanse
has a similarly stultifying effect. So while he attempts to create a state in which cooperation and
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progress are possible, the rigid, imposed temporality of his state require such force to maintain
that it stifles the very creativity it seeks to engender. Despite attempting to overthrow systems of
knowledge that distort reality and whose power depends on popular ignorance, Hobbes’s
solution is essentially that we agree to trick ourselves—to distort our own reality. Which is, in
the end, a rather unsatisfying proposition.
Moreover, even as possibilities for meaningful action expand in Hobbes’s state, the
actions never move far beyond acquisition and accumulation, and ethical agency is largely
lacking. What meaning there is to be had is found in objects not others. Others do play an
integral, if not instrumental, role in society, however, as they make the development of industry
possible, by which individual can be happy continually satisfying his accumulative desires. As
property itself can only exist in civil society,130 the sovereign is charged not only with the
immanent physical security of citizens, but the protracted security that will allow the
development of industry. Thus, he concludes sovereigns “can confer no more to their civil
happiness than that being preserved from foreign and civil wars, they may quietly enjoy that
wealth which they have purchased by their own industry.”131 In contradistinction to the state of
nature, producing misery due to its lack of commodious buildings, industry, arts, and culture,
civil society creates the structure that affords “commodious living” and “liv[ing] well.”132
Despite mechanisms that carry hints of authoritarianism, the core of Hobbes's philosophy is
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centered on the idea that humans need government, but not one that is forced upon them. Rather,
we can recognize our own tendencies towards rash thinking caused by an uncertain future, and
come together to create institutions that will allow us to feel safe enough to create a civil society
in which our individual power, and therefore our potential for happiness, is multiplied. In this
light, the role of government is to engender trust between people.
Conclusion
There are two important points regarding Hobbes that have hopefully been made
apparent. The first is that we cannot will ourselves to act differently—we must change our
environment. The second is that we cannot will ourselves not to think of the future. Futurity
defines human thought and action, both of which are deeply enmeshed in/determined by a
complex material reality. Later thinkers will rely on more Cartesian models, but will largely keep
these two points. Yet for all the liberating potential of his thought, limitations remain. The most
salient of which is that Hobbes wants the dynamism of collective industry, but creates a society
that cannot truly allow it. His fear leads to a repressive state that is suffocating. It also cannot be
overlooked that Hobbes's state of nature is a vehicle by which common goods are made to appear
as inducing irrational behavior—the violence compelled by mistrust and unknowns of shared
goods, lead men to enter into a civil state where individual property can exist.
By shifting the purpose of philosophy from the question of truth to the question of peace,
Hobbes provides a standard for a framework of mutual intelligibility available to all through the
use of causal reason. This framework empowers people with the ability to confront and
overcome their anxiety, but life is terminally fearful for Hobbes, and it ultimately limits his
political imagination. Creating a political institution that is charged, above all else, with the
construction of an illusion of a secure future is ultimately stultifying, even as it allows for some
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kinds of development, and even if the trust between citizens is created by transferring the fear of
one another to the fear of the sovereign.
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Internalizing the Eternal:
The Moral and Material Temporality of John Locke’s Subject
Introduction
As the progenitor of liberalism, it makes sense to read Locke through the lens of
liberalism—focusing on the abstract individual, self-interest, and limited government. However,
while these are essential components of Locke’s political thought, something is missed in this
approach. Namely, the nature of the self that inhabits his political world. This is not a speculative
question, however, as he develops a complex theory of subjectivity in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. In this work, Locke, like Hobbes, moves against Cartesian conceptions
of the self in which the immaterial agent directs the body through the rational will. And, in fact,
Locke’s project overlaps with Hobbes’s in significant ways, as both offer theories of subjectivity
rooted in the material present, affective theories of behavior, and temporal concepts of freedom.
For both, the future is a source of human liberation, as the ability to bring it under control
radically expands the possibilities of freedom. And both understand such expanded possibility as
potentially destabilizing in a society, which causes both of them to employ the temporal concept
of eternity to bolster security. Yet, whereas Hobbes reinforces the uncertain future with a secular
eternity embodied by the state, Locke maps divine eternity onto the causal, material temporality
of subjectivity. As a result, his theory of subjectivity and agency has a moral dimension that
Hobbes’s lacks. This is important because Locke’s subject reflects tensions that are endemic to
his philosophy, and which have significant repercussions for his political thought.
As such, I argue that the Essay, in which Locke’s unique epistemology and moral
philosophy are brought to bear on human nature, cannot be divorced from his political thought.
For it is here that we find Locke struggling to reconcile an empirically based affective theory of
human behavior with moral rationalism. There is a tension between these dimensions of his
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thought, as human subjectivity cannot be separated from the material context that informs
motivation, yet moral responsibility and judgment is neither reflected in nor affected by material
conditions. Despite the materiality of Locke’s subject, he inscribes his subject with a moral
responsibility that both precludes consideration for a person’s particular material context, and
supersedes material considerations. The net effect of this is that Locke opens subjectivity itself to
moral judgment, which allows him to conclude that because actions reflect a person’s moral
character, the consequences of such actions are deserved, in a moral sense. In this way, I
demonstrate that Locke attempts to bridge the competing material and moral sources of
motivation through temporal concepts. This is important, because it is only through synthesizing
Locke’s work in this way that the inequality that manifests in his egalitarian political imagination
can be properly understood as the result of an inegalitarian theory of subjectivity.
In order to demonstrate this argument, it is necessary to first grapple with the ideal
mechanism of Locke’s ontology and the particular amalgam of empiricism and rationalism that
comprises his empiricism. It is only by understanding these dimensions of his thought that the
significance of their consequences can be grasped. For, Locke’s philosophy undermines nearly
all prevailing approaches to knowledge. He rejects both pure epiricism and rationalism, on the
grounds that they claim to discover ordering systems that are beyond the scope of human
knowledge. We are precluded from knowing the essences or mechanics of things, he argues,
because our knowledge is limited, exclusively and exhaustively, to ideas about things given by
perception. As such, our knowledge relates only to ideas, and does not extend to objects, which
renders any system of categorization or organization fundamentally arbitrary.
Though not immediately obvious, when taken cumulatively, these elements of Locke’s
thought represent a crisis for moral thought, as he rejects the foundation upon which all
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prevailing moral philosophies are based. He denies the possibility of deriving moral truths from
the empirical world, because our knowledge of it is mediated and therefore contingent and
incomplete, and because the systems we develop for organizing it have no ontological truth. In
this way, he undermines traditional conceptions for morality, such as that of Plato’s Forms, in
which universal ideals inscribe moral meaning and purpose into human life. He further rejects
rationalist approaches to moral thought that appeal to innate rational or moral ideas, because, he
maintains, all ideas come from experience. It would therefore seem that Locke, having upended
rational and empirical foundations for moral inquiry, and having limited human knowledge to an
empirical world about which nothing certain can be claimed and in which moral truths are not
revealed, would need resign himself to moral relativism. Yet by taking in the breadth of his
moral criticism, the moral imperative of his thought is illuminated. For Locke is assiduously
committed not just to moral certainty, but moral responsibility—a fact made evident by even a
cursory reading of his Second Treatise.
It is through his theory of subjectivity that Locke attempts to overcome the moral crisis
endemic to his philosophy. Here, he articulates a subject who exercises freedom over the forces
that determine the material present by way of a temporal identity and agency. It is the ability to
suspend the will in the present so that future pleasures may be made to pressure agents as
strongly as present pleasures that allows more rational, long-term desires determine the will. Yet
it is not just the material future that impacts deliberation, for though Locke understands all ideas
to have an empirical source, it is reason that discerns relationships between ideas and thus
produces all knowledge. Because our ideas are not of objects but about objects, our knowledge
of the world remains only probable. However, Locke argued that because moral ideas have no
material corollary, reason can be used to develop certain moral truths, which makes it possible to
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extend deliberation not simply into the material future, but into the divine future. Though
presented as a possibility, it is for Locke, also a mandate. He interprets all actions as conscious
moral choices, and their consequences as reflecting proper moral judgments. With this move,
Locke is able to link social hierarchy to moral hierarchy—social inequality is a manifestation of
unequal subjectivities. It is not a material problem.
Where Hobbes engendered stability by making the state responsible for eternity, Locke
internalizes eternal responsibility. He similarly finds divine eternity to be a source of stability,
insofar as it properly structures the motivations and actions of a moral persons, whose can
consequently form a community in need of no additional security. The divine eternity inscribed
by morality precedes the state and supersedes its authority, and as such there are no grounds for
ethical or temporal interventions by political institutions. They are rather needed when society
develops to the point that the moral, rational pursuit of material gains must be protected from
those whose moral constitution is too weak to resist the pressure of the material present.
Foundations of Locke’s philosophy
Mechanism
A mechanist ontology is often ascribed to Locke. There is good reason for this, as he
frequently offers explanations by way of Robert Boyle’s corpuscularianism—a straightforward
account of mechanical change in the physical world. Yet, as G.A.J. Rogers notes, “To argue, as
many have, that Locke’s epistemology presupposes the truth of mechanism is to entirely
misconstrue the relationship between his philosophy as we have seen it in the Essay and his
wider beliefs about the natural world.”133 Here, Rogers refers to the tendency of scholars to
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simply ascribe Boyle’s corpuscularianism to Locke, owing to Locke’s frequent invocation of
corpuscularian theories in his explanation of various material relationships. However, Locke
does not accept corpuscularianism as true, it is merely the best available hypothesis for
understanding the mechanical world. He writes,
Though the world be full of systems…I cannot say I know any one which can be
taught a young man as a science wherein he may find truth and certainty, …I
think the systems of natural philosophy that have obtained in this part of the
world, are to be read more to know hypothesis…than with hopes to gain thereby
a comprehensive, [scientific] and satisfactory knowledge of the works of nature.
Only this may be said, that the modern Corpuscularians talk in most things more
intelligibly than the Peripateticks who possessed the schools immediately before
them.134
Herein, Locke affirms that the world is indeed ordered by systems, however he challenges our
ability to fully comprehend any of them, let alone develop a comprehensive system capable of
producing certain knowledge. In relation to the nature, structure, and function of the natural
world, Locke argues that human knowledge must therefore remain hypothetical. However,
though Locke’s adoption of corpuscularianism may be tentative, his mechanism is not. There is
no question that the world is mechanically ordered according to laws of matter and motion, the
only question, and it is an unanswerable one, is how. Though incapable of producing
comprehensive knowledge, science is capable of improving hypothesis through investigation.
Locke affirms both his mechanism and the development of knowledge available to science when
he writes,
I have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to
go farthest in an intelligible explication of the qualities of bodies; and I fear the
weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will
afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion, and co-
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existence, of the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of
them.135
Any replacement for corpuscularianism would still have to explain the “necessary connexion” of
bodies. Such a hypothesis would have to better explain the precise relationship between
mechanism and thought. For, that “two bodies at a distance will put one another into motion by
the force of attraction” is certain, and “made evident to us by experience,” yet it is nevertheless
“inexplicable” how the mechanics of thought production operate.136 He argues that the
boundaries of human knowledge provide us with only a glimpse of the true mechanical
operations of the world. As such, we must be content with hypothetical knowledge of the world’s
ordering forces. This means that Locke’s ontology is a mechanist, but his commitment is formal
rather than material—he does not commit to any existing mechanist theory—his position is one
Michael Ayers describes as “pure ideal mechanism.”137 Locke’s insistence that we are limited to
hypothetical ontological claims is quite distinctive of this thought, and results from a position
that fundamentally structures his philosophy. We cannot speak with any certainty regarding the
true nature or mechanics of the world, he argues, on account of our epistemic condition, in which
our experience of the world is mediated by sense perception. Though his understanding of our
epistemic condition is not unique, indeed it is one of the central justifications for rationalism. But
Locke takes the somewhat radical move of developing an empiricist epistemology, while
rejecting the premise that reason or innate ideas can be the source of knowledge. Yet he also
distanced himself from other empiricists, by embracing its limitations and, in fact, using those
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limitations to undermine the ontological claims and ordering systems, be they natural or moral,
in prevailing philosophies.
Empiricism
Locke argues that human knowledge is limited to that which can be derived from
experience through sense perception, in which “external objects furnish the mind with the ideas
of sensible qualities,” and through reflection “the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of
its own operations.”138 And, he explains, “when we have taken a full survey of them, and their
several modes, combinations, and relations,” all our ideas will be accounted for and we will find
“that we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways,” perception
or reflection.139 Although sense perceptions “convinces us, that there are solid extended
substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones,” and experience “every moment
furnishes us with the clear ideas, both of the one and the other,” nevertheless “beyond these
ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach.”140 This means that for
Locke, experience confirms the existence of objects, but our knowledge is limited to ideas about
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an object’s “sensible qualities,” and precludes knowledge of an object’s essence. Our knowledge
therefore pertains only to ideas about things, not to things in themselves.141
Locke argues that our epistemic condition prevents us from having a clear understanding
of the objects in the world, and the mechanical forces that govern them, including how objects
actually stimulate perception or how senses transmit them to the mind. Yet the limitations of
knowledge do not lead Locke to doubt either the existence of mechanical forces or the authority
of sense perception. He is resolute on this point—sense perception and reflection provide the
mind with ideas that accurately capture reality. In this way, Locke distances himself from the
skepticism of Descartes in two ways. In the first, Descartes argued that ideas are only material
for rational judgment because the senses cannot be trusted as they are capable of being
improperly formed. And in the second, Descartes argued that a rational mechanical explanation
for the mechanism of perception is required to affirm the existence of rational objects. These are
important points of distinction between the two thinkers, with repercussions that will be born out
in Locke’s theory of subjectivity, but here it is important only to note that Locke works against
Descartes rationalism to affirm an empirical source of all ideas, and the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the senses that transmit these ideas.
As such, Locke counters Descartes by arguing that “we cannot act any thing, but by our
faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties, which are fitted to
apprehend even what knowledge is.”142 It is, for him, impossible to genuinely doubt perceptual
knowledge at a practical level, and mistrust of the senses is a mistrust of the basic cognitive
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faculty that makes the whole concept of knowledge meaningless. He further rejects the
possibility of perception leading us astray,143 by arguing that senses “do not err in the
information they give us, of the existence of things without them.”144
He thus affords independent authority to perception, as the simple ideas it gives to the
mind,
must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural
way…[they] are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular production
of things without us, really operating on us; and so carry with them all the
conformity which is intended…for they represent to us things under those
appearances.145
Here, Locke affirms a relationship between perception and objects, which consists of the latter
exerting some sort of power over the former, because, “the mind knows not things immediately,
but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them.”146 Moreover, the authenticity of these
ideas is certain for Locke, for our discernment and interaction with the material world would be
impossible if the ideas we had of objects did not in some way confirm to their actuality. Of less
concern for Locke is the actual “how” of this process.147 Unlike Hobbes, who was compelled to
143

Locke demonstrates this by reframing a situation that ostensibly demonstrates the fallibility of
sense. That the same cup of water may feel cold to one hand and warm to the other is not, he
argues, evidence of the improperly formed senses. Rather, both are true, relational perceptions.
The idea of hot or cold produced does not refer to the objective temperature of the water, but
refers to the difference in temperature between the hand and the water. See Ibid., 139 (II.viii.21).
144
Ibid., 631 (IV.xi.3).
145
Ibid., 563–4 (IV.iv.4). Emphasis mine.
146
Ibid., 530 (IV.ii.1).
147
For Lisa Downing, Locke’s refusal to commit to corpuscularianism as a theory rather than a
hypothesis is indicative of ontological commitments that are metaphysical rather than
mechanical, insofar as Locke can be read as vacillating between materialism and a dualism, and
makes ontological claims regarding God that can be difficult to square with materialism.
Downing does not argue that these positions are irreconcilable, and in fact attempts to resolve
Locke’s vacillation in favor of a more skeptical, humble reading. My reading of Locke does not
entail any such contradiction to resolve—any perceived vacillation stems from his formal
mechanism and material skepticism, not hidden metaphysical commitments. See, Downing, Lisa,
“Locke’s Ontology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human
Understanding,” ed. Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 357.
75

develop a mechanist theory of perception, Locke is content to generally affirm the corpuscularian
hypothesis that:
‘Tis evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves…by some
parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our
minds the particular ideas we have of them….[S]ome singly imperceptible bodies
must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion,
which produces these ideas, which we have of them in us.148
Locke subsequently develops a causal theory of representation,149 locating the “power to
produce any idea in our mind” within the “quality” of an object.150 Such qualities may be divided
into two categories, primary and secondary.151 Primary may “be called real qualities,” because
they are “resemblances of [the body]” that are and “utterly inseparable from the body.”152 These
qualities are, for Locke intrinsic, mind-independent, real qualities.153 Secondary qualities, on the
other hand, “have no resemblance of [bodies] at all.”154 They reveal “nothing in the objects
themselves, but [are] powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary
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qualities.”155 These qualities have no objective existence, they are mind-dependent and
relational. One example Locke offers is are the ideas of warmth or pain produced by fire. These
ideas are produced by the secondary qualities, because they are caused by fire but do not
resemble the fire itself. In this way, the mind is given ideas by the external world that have no
objective existence.
Despite refraining from committing to a corpuscularian theory of perception as Hobbes
does, Locke’s description of sense perception broadly resonates with Hobbes’s. Not unlike
Hobbes, the ideas given by sense perception are mediated, the essence, which is “the very being
of any thing, whereby it is, what it is” is also “unknown,” but accessible via their “discoverable
qualities” which depend on the essence.156 Locke also similarly understands perception to
produce the concept of power, not just of the particular power of qualities, but power as such.
Power is not an idea given to the senses immediately, however, but is a function of the
“perception of constant and dependable change in recurrent observable circumstances.”157 That
is, the idea of power is, for Locke, a fundamentally temporal idea. It is an idea only available to a
being whose perception extends over the time in question and who is aware of the temporal
categories of continuity and change. The importance of which will be fully elaborated in the next
section. As it pertains to qualities, however, the relevant aspect is that duration of experience
produces the concept of power that consequently, allows for the distinction primary and
secondary kinds to be recognizable to the human mind. This is true despite the fact that Locke’s
varied use of power in his description of sense perception lack positive content. They are

155

Ibid. (II.viii.14).
Ibid., 417 (III.iii.15).
157
Ayers, Locke, 1993, 1:163.
156

77

placeholders for a mechanical process that Locke understands as necessary, but beyond the realm
of human knowledge.
Nominalism
It is owing to Locke’s understanding of our epistemic condition that he adopts
nominalism—the position that universals are characteristics of ideas, not objects. That is, that
general terms exist, but the objects that seem to correspond to these terms do not. Locke is joined
in his nominalism by Hobbes, who similarly understands human knowledge to be grounded in
experience and consequently limited to particulars. For both, this limitation does not reflect the
inability of the human mind to access universals, but rather the fact that universals do not exist.
Both recognize that the mind cannot help but to establish relationships between ideas and group
them, which gives rise to abstractions that are purely lingual conventions. Yet insofar as such
linguistic constructions can develop the understanding of particulars through the application of
reason, both find nominal universals necessary to both philosophic critique and development.
Locke echoes Hobbes’s critique on the misuse of language, which both believed caused a
lack of clarity in ethical and scientific discourse. The previous chapter described how, for
Hobbes, ideas are produced by experience in a relational, causal context that required nothing but
experience to induce prudence. Science, on the other hand, has the potential to move beyond the
specificity of particular contexts, by joining “names”—words that signify subjects or predicates,
with propositions. Rejecting the concept of universal things or ideas, Hobbes argues the
nominalist position that “there is nothing universal but names,”158 and “this word universal is
never the name of anything existent in nature.”159 Unlike singular names that refer to one thing, a
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universal name applies to multiple things. For example, the universal name “man” is given “to
every particular of mankind,”160 based on some resemblance or equality between them. The
problem for Hobbes, as for Locke, is that the universality of certain names has led some to think
there are universal things:
besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be
in the world, there is yet something else that we call man, viz. man in general,
deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing
it signifieth.161
The concept of man, Hobbes argues, exists subsequent to particular things, yet many invert this
relationship and presume that the universal precedes and therefore informs the particular. But
because universals are purely lingual constructs, they have no objective truth. This is why
Hobbes identifies truth and falsehood as attributes of propositions; when a predicate
comprehends subject it is true. Though a relationship between two particulars may be recognized
in a particular instance,162 universal relationships are a function of language and true only insofar
as a relationship is evident between particular images and concomitant ideas. For Hobbes, it is
language that makes it possible to reason beyond the particular and to extend conclusions
universally.163 However, the fundamentally arbitrary association of words with ideas makes a
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priori reason impossible.164 Like everything else in Hobbes’s philosophy, reason is contextual
and contingent, which means it cannot function as an independent arbiter or authority.
Though unmoved by Hobbes’s preemption of intellect and associationist account of
reasoning, Locke was clearly influenced by Hobbes’s argument regarding universals vis-à-vis
language. For his part, Locke first distinguishes the real existence of particulars from the
ideational existence of universals:
the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but
particulars….So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our
particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of our knowledge. Universality is but
accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular ideas, about which it
is, are such, as more than one particular thing can correspond with, and be
represented by.165
He describes here how experience is constituted exclusively by particulars, and the appearance of
commonality between particulars owes not to the objects themselves but to a purely intellectual
process. It begins with abstraction, “whereby ideas are taken from particular beings” and
separated from their observed context so as to create a principle or “name,” by which to organize
experience. 166 The mind, but more specifically, “the workmanship of understanding,”167 draws
its first abstractions from its simplest ideas, and arrives at notions of space, time, shape,
extension, etc. From these simple abstractions, the mind assembles a type of complex idea Locke
calls “modes.” While modes “are considered as dependences on…substances,”168 and do
describe reality, they are themselves only types of ideas with no ontological existence; they carry
no implication that they even correspond to real objects. Modes are universal insofar as they are
a type of idea that represent particular aspects of objects. These universals are employed by a
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“natural tendency of the mind” towards knowledge. Since dwelling “upon only particular things,
progress…would be very slow,”169 the mind therefore shortens “its way to knowledge…[by
binding] them into bundles, and [ranking] them so into sorts,” so that knowledge of one can
“with assurance extend to all of that sort.”170
In this way, Locke argues that the human tendency to develop classification systems
reveals not a truth about those systems, but a truth about human consciousness. We are
compelled not to discover systems, but to create them. Generalizations relate to real aspects of
things, but we may divide phenomena any number of ways, depending on our needs. This
essentially renders all systems of classification and organization arbitrary. Locke himself views
this not as a loss but as a liberation—philosophers can stop chasing imaginary universals and
begin to construct categories that are flexible and functional. Against the traditional view that
universals exist outside space and time, Locke abstracts from a particular instance. This means
that Locke’s universal is not an atemporal, aspatial concept, but one extended beyond a particular
spatial, temporal representation.
One consequence of Locke’s enmeshing universals in spatio-temporal particulars is that
universal truths are conditional. It is only in this way they can be called eternal:
Not because they are eternal propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the
understanding, that at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the
mind from any patterns, that are anywhere of them out of the mind, and existed
before: but because being once made, about abstract ideas, so as to be true, they
will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to
come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true.171
Neither universal concepts nor universal truths exist. Both are preceded by particulars,
which makes them contingent. They remain valid only so long as the particulars that precede
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them and ideas produced by them remain unchanged. Locke’s conclusion reads quite similarly to
Hobbes’s,172 and does indeed reflect important parallels in their thought, as both develop theories
of abstraction whereby universal, eternal truths can be known without impugning the sensory
character of the ideas before the mind, and without affirming the objective existence of such
truths.
Rationalism
There is at this point little discernable difference between the empiricism of Hobbes and
Locke. However, even as he vigorously defends the authority of perception against Descartes’
skepticism, Locke affords it a far lesser position than his empiricist peers. Unlike Hobbes and
Gassendi, for whom experience provides the acquisition of knowledge, for Locke, experience
provides only for the acquisition of ideas. The acquisition of knowledge, he argues, requires the
application of reason. Much of the uniqueness of Locke’s epistemology stems from his absolute
position that all ideas come from experience independent of reason, and yet all knowledge comes
from reason—two positions that seem almost necessarily in conflict.
Locke reconciles rationalism and empiricism by employing the intuition/deduction thesis,
which claims that some propositions can be known by intuition, and still more by deduction.173
Empiricists generally accept the thesis so long as it is restricted to propositions pertaining to the
relations between concepts or ideas rather than things in themselves. By examining concepts, the
argument goes, we can grasp a relationship between them. For example, we can know by
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intuition that our concept of animal includes the concept of body.174 Prefiguring Hume, Locke
develops his own defense of intuitive knowledge along empiricist lines, arguing that “sometimes
the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves,
without intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge.”175 For
example, “without the intervention of any other ideas,” the “mind perceives, that white is not
black” and that “a circle is not a triangle.”176 Such an immediate perception of a relation is, for
Locke, “the clearest, and most certain”177 knowledge, because there is “no room for hesitation,
doubt, or error.”178
For ideas whose relationship is not immediately perceived, Locke develops a rational
method of demonstration by way of a chain of intuitively perceived steps. Each intermediate
proof “has intuitive certainty,” insofar as “the agreement or disagreement of two ideas under
examination is found.”179 In a particularly sweeping summation, Locke contends that divine
punishment necessarily entails free will:
The mind seeing the connection there is between the idea of men’s punishment in
the other world, and the idea of God punishing, between God punishing, and the
justice of the punishment; between justice of the punishment and guilt, between
guilt and a power to do otherwise, between a power to do otherwise and freedom,
and between freedom and self-determination, sees the connexion between men,
and self-determination.180
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Each idea, from punishment to freedom has, for Locke, an empirical source, yet the relationship
between these ideas is not made apparent by perception but reason. In this way, Locke develops
a philosophy that retains an empirical foothold, while excluding the possibility of substantial
knowledge about the world. It also overcomes the objections he raises to purely rational
deductions while simultaneously elevating reason above perception, because the only knowledge
available to the human mind is the relations between concepts, not substances. Perception gives
us ideas, but only reason can make sense of them. Locke’s coupling of rationalism and
empiricism requires a natural faculty of reason that Hobbes’s materialism does not. For Locke,
sense perception and reason are distinct faculties that produce knowledge by acting in concert:
Sensation furnishing reason with the ideas of particular sense-objects and
supplying the subject-matter of discourse, reason on the other hand guiding the
faculty of sense, and arranging together the images of things derived from senseperception, thence forming others and composing new ones…without reason,
though actuated by our senses we scarcely rise to the standard of nature found in
brute beasts…without help…of the senses, reason can achieve no more than a
laborer working in darkness behind shuttered windows…The foundations…on
which rests the whole of that knowledge that reason builds up are the objects of
sense experience.181
Locke distinguishes himself from the rationalists by granting sense perception independent
authority. However, he distinguishes himself from the empiricists by granting reason this same
independence—it is free from the spatio-temporal context and conditioning that sense perception
is. In this way, Locke weaves together a number of seemingly paradoxical positions—an
empiricism that excludes the possibility of substantial knowledge of the world, and a rationalism
that accesses knowledge not of the world. Locke’s particular combination of empiricism and
rationalism is unique to his thought, and significant. After all, others like Gassendi and Hobbes
had already outlined empiricist or mechanical philosophies that required no such inclusion, and
rationalists like Descartes outlined systems that excluded empirical methods. This suggests that
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Locke’s coupling is not for lack of alternatives, bur rather a deliberate move away from existing
philosophies. So the question then becomes why—what does rationalism afford Locke that pure
empiricism could not, and vice versa?
The answer, in its most simplistic terms, is that Locke sought to develop a philosophy
free from the dogmatism, in the Kantian sense, of both materialists and rationalists. Both of these
approaches employed methods that presumed to uncover the real nature behind sensible
qualities, and assert that a complete and demonstrable mechanics is possible. For Hobbes, since
all knowledge is derived from the senses, and all sensible objects are material, the only
intelligible world available to us is a materialist one. And through analyzing experience, a
complete, scientific, mechanistic understanding of the world is possible. Descartes shares this
understanding, though his method employs pure intellect. Prefiguring Kant, Locke assumes a
much more skeptical position regarding the relationship between our sensible and intellectual
faculties. Though he does not doubt the existence of the world, or that a real relationship exists
between sensible and intellectual faculties, he does doubt the possibility of knowing the true
nature of this relationship. The limitations of human understanding thus make the kind of
systematic claims to certainty that Hobbes and Descartes make impossible. This means that at its
core, Locke’s philosophy is one that accepts a fundamental incompleteness and uncertainty that
is a problematic foundation for moral and political thought, as it seems to necessarily entail
relativism.
Moral implications of Locke’s critiques
One of the most significant challenges Locke’s philosophy poses to traditional concepts
of morality has its origin in his critique of science. He argues that like the Ancient Forms, the
Scholastic concept of species are inherently teleological, dictating the ends of things, and
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consequently infusing the material world with a normative dimension. The organizing principle
of species separates qualities “from the objects they characterize” and mistakes them for
“‘substantial forms’ that inform reality and are intuited by our minds.”182 The problem with
speciation is thus the same as that of the forms: arbitrary distinctions are developed into a
universal schema that does not exist yet is nevertheless ascribed an ontological existence.183 On
Locke’s reading, the implicit logic of speciation is one in which instances of an immaterial form
are brought into existence by formal causes. This essentially renders the study of the natural
world as a process of classifying the material world according to atemporal, rational concepts—a
normative system in so far as particulars are judged by universals. Moreover, since such a
schema would need to not merely accommodate, but account for the change of the natural world,
natural processes are inscribed with purpose insofar as they fulfill the “ideal” or end dictated by
the concept.
Both the ordering and the normativity of this are problematic for Locke. The ascription of
order reflects the same tendency to assume ontological truth is reflected in systems humans
develop, and he further rejects the possibility of finding moral truths in the material world. In the
classification of man, the moral implication of is perhaps most evident. As Forde describes it,
“[t]he purpose, and duty, of individual men was to work toward the perfection implicit in the
form man. The metaphysics of form imbued the human world, along with the cosmos as a whole,
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with purpose.”184 In declaring the species “human” an arbitrary distinction, Locke displaces the
idea of perfection that anchors traditional concepts of human duty. Moreover, it effectively
eliminates the possibility of establishing a new one—if there is no universal concept of man, how
could a universal morality possibly exist? Initially, at least, Locke’s philosophy appears to offer
no solutions, and in fact only deepens the crisis.
For, if Locke perceived a significant threat to philosophy stemming from nativist claims
regarding the natural world, he found a still greater danger in nativist claims regarding the moral
realm. And, in the case of moral nativists, the feeling was mutual, for they “held that knowledge
of our duties is founded on innate ‘practical’ axioms, the absence of which seemed to make room
for moral disagreement or relativism profound enough to destabilize societies.”185 Locke shared
this concern, but rejected the idea that relativism could only be avoided through nativism. To the
contrary, his position is that claims of innate moral ideas are, “built on unverifiable claims
regarding the content of those ideas, claims that were asserted and defended dogmatically,” that
ultimately result in “a philosophy, and an education, based on little more than appeals to
authority, clothed in unintelligible jargon.”186 Locke recognizes the risks posed by moral
relativism, yet nevertheless insists that prevailing systems of moral thought rely on abstract
universals and innate moral ideas that are fundamentally arbitrary. The arbitrary nature of such
systems paradoxically engenders that which they fear, he argues, as they are fundamentally
unstable and therefore “constitute a danger to political stability and order.”187 At the same time,
however, he is sensitive to the danger that may come from disrupting traditional moral and social
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order. The task Locke therefore sets himself, is to develop a theory of knowledge that not merely
resists both unverifiable knowledge claims and moral relativism, but also inculcates existing
value systems, albeit on firmer philosophic grounds.
This predicament was not unique to Locke, indeed it was one of the defining features of
17th century European thought. The empirical, material turn in philosophy marked a crisis in
moral authority, and philosophers took care to develop their ideas with an eye towards the
ethical, sketching out new frontiers for the relationship between God and humans.188 Each is
essentially contending with the looming threat of social collapse and moral relativism that
seemed to necessarily flow from a challenge to universal order generally, and particularly from a
philosophy such as Locke’s that precluded the existence of universal order or certain knowledge.
Descartes’ answer to the problem of moral authority is an ontological proof of a
voluntarist God, who ordered the human mind with a capacity to reason that allows it to
understand the ordering of the natural world, and correct ethical behavior. Hobbes’s answer is
that though natural philosophy is perfectly agnostic, it nevertheless produces universal ethical
truths insofar as all human life is served by peace. As Schneewind takes care to note, however,
“[t]here is a tendency to assume that metaphysical or epistemological philosophic frameworks
are first established, then ethics derived. This isn’t particularly helpful or true when tracking
moral thought. There are different relationships between theories of knowledge and theories of
morality.”189 This is nowhere more clear, perhaps, than in the philosophy of Locke, and it would
be a mischaracterization to portray the normative dimensions of his thought as somehow
ancillary to his natural philosophy. Though both his natural and moral philosophy can, and
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should be read together, it is important to recognize that Locke brings to his moral theory a need
for certainty and divinity that precede his epistemological framing. That is, if Locke’s moral
thought were truly derived from his natural philosophy, it would indeed be relative. He goes to
great and obvious pains to prevent this, however, by fusing reason with the divine law, and
reincorporating it into his natural and political philosophy as natural law. In effect, combining
reason with divine law allow Locke to shield morality from the destabilizing effects of his
empirical rationalism. In this way, Locke presents a singular philosophy that produces a
bifurcated system of knowledge—probable scientific knowledge and certain moral knowledge.
Science, history, morality: Locke’s modern temporalities
Probability and Certainty
Locke is a realist insofar as he claims it is possible to know that the material world exists.
It is further possible to know that there is a mechanical structure to the world; in some instances,
it is immediately intelligible to us in some instances, such as when we can discern which key will
turn a lock.190 However, because the knowledge given by the senses is limited to qualities, and
does not reveal the real nature of things, we have “no knowledge of real existence at all.”191 And
because “we are destitute of senses acute enough” to discover the particles which would “give us
ideas of their mechanical affections,” we therefore remain ignorant of “the particular mechanical
affections of the minute parts of the bodies.”192 Consequently, “we are not capable of scientifical
knowledge; nor shall [we] ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths.”193
And so,
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we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation; nor
can we be assured about them any farther, than some few trials we make, are able
to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain.
This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies:
and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact.194
Collectively, the mediated nature of sensory knowledge and definitions that are based on
incomplete information, allow us to observe a chain of events and make predictions, but we can
never be certain that we will obtain the same results in the future. Though our ideas are
connected to the material in a real way, because we cannot permeate the nominal boundaries of
human understanding to see how, scientific knowledge is terminally probable.
The inability of achieving certain scientific knowledge does not deter Locke from
advocating for the development of less than certain science. His position is consistent with other
early moderns, who established a new category in which a sufficiently high degree of probability
can be called knowledge.195 Empirical conclusions, Locke argues, will never be certain, but they
can provide “an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge,”196 to which no rational person
can refuse “assent.”197 Lucky, though certain knowledge is in short supply, we “have light
enough,”198 and “insight enough,”199 to determine the “probability suitable”200 for general
guidance through life. In short, probability is very often good enough.
There are real benefits to such a modest position. For one, by resisting the urge to make
systematic, speculative claims, he is saved from the kinds of scientific refutations that often serve
as the grounds for excluding other early moderns like Hobbes from contemporary discourse.
However, a philosophy of probable knowledge creates additional trouble for moral
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understanding. Since Locke has continually affirmed that all knowledge is empirically derived,
and has undermined all other modes of moral understanding for their non-empirical foundations,
it would seem that to follow that for him morality must also be empirically derived, and therefore
incapable of certainty. However, while Locke affirms the empirical source of moral ideas, he
nevertheless claims that it is possible to establish certain knowledge in some instances.
Locke begins this line of argument by first distinguishing between “general and
particular”201 knowledge. Particular knowledge is founded upon “matter of fact, or history,”
while “general knowledge is founded only upon true ideas.”202 All knowledge of the material
world is particular, and since our epistemic condition prevents “knowledge of natural bodies and
their operations [from] reaching little further than bare matter of fact,”203 neither history nor
science is “capable of demonstration.”204 In these arenas, prudence and probability are the best
we can achieve. For Locke, facts, history, and science are collapsed into the probable realm, with
only general ideas are affording certainty—a position is quite distinct from Hobbes, who
distinguishes prudential history from predictive science.
As for general knowledge, Locke begins from the rather innocuous position that
mathematical proofs demonstrate that “true ideas” are those that provide “certain knowledge.”205
He first contemplates mathematical and geometric proofs such as Euclid’s, which are generally
considered paradigms of demonstrative knowledge. For Descartes and other rationalists,
certainty in the empirical world can be attained by reconstructing reality on the basis of
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geometrical forms. Locke rejects this argument because it relies on innate knowledge206 and
presumes a connection between ideas and the world.207 In fact, Locke counters that it is precisely
because mathematics is concerned with relations among abstract ideas, or modes that it is
capable of certainty—nothing that is of the empirical world may be certain. Only relations
between ideas, and then only relations that can be demonstrated. As such, the certainty of general
knowledge remains in the world of ideas, having no implications for the particular.
Consequently, the certainty it provides is purely rational, not predictive. The certainty of
mathematics is guaranteed by the fact that it consists of ideal models into which other things
must fit, rather than some external archetype that we can only grasp inadequately.
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It is here that Locke’s philosophy takes a moral turn, as he argues that all mathematical
proofs are certain knowledge, but certain knowledge is not exhausted by mathematical proofs:
It has been generally taken for granted, that mathematics alone are capable of
demonstrative certainty: But…it may possibly be the want of due method, and
application in us…that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in
other parts of knowledge.208
He further elaborates that where the mind is “capable of intuitive knowledge…there the mind is
capable of demonstration, which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure, number, and their
modes.”209 As these are the defining qualities of mathematics, what Locke is contending is that
certain knowledge beyond mathematics is possible. This mere possibility becomes realized only
a few pages later when he asserts that a “morality amongst our sciences capable of
demonstration” is possible.210 The moral certainty Locke proposes is a function of morality’s
status as a “mixed mode.”
For Locke, perception begets a mental process of abstraction that produces simple
concepts or “modes,” which are intellectual constructs imposed by intellect and not inherent in
nature. Locke enumerates space, time, shape, and unity among the first modes of consciousness.
Modes describe reality, but they do exist. Combining simple modes yields the more complex
“mixed modes.” Bowling is one such mixed mode—it confers meaning onto specifics actions
that they otherwise would not have. It also directs the actions of those engaged in pursuit of the
concept. Like simple modes, mixed modes are social constructs that exist by convention, not
nature—the actions that comprise bowling have no intrinsic significance. It therefore might seem
strange that Locke determines moral ideas to be mixed modes. If mixed modes are free creations,
how is morality not relative?
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Part of the answer lies in the fact that unlike simple modes that describe reality, mixed
modes are prescriptive; they are imposed by intelligence on nature as law. The authority of the
human legislator transforms the actions of bowling into a concept. The concept remains relative
and arbitrary, however, on account of the specificity of one person’s temporary existence in time
and space. To prevent arbitrary moral reasoning, such as that which would occur if each intellect
were imposing moral law, a universal lawgiver is required. The universal authority of the divine
legislator transforms moral concepts into eternal measures. This means that unlike popular
interpretations of Locke’s theory in which his religious language is dismissed as a rhetorical ploy
necessary to advance a political agenda, his appeals to God are sincere.211 His moral claims
require a divine legislator. This is quite distinct from Hobbes, who also constructs universal
moral principles, but does not need God because all maxims are derived from the universally
beneficial mandate to live peaceably together. Locke’s morality is neither practical nor
materially conditioned in this way. For Hobbes, all moral truths are evident in, and derived from
experience. For Locke, mechanism precludes moral meaning, as there is no metaphysical
structure by which moral meaning an be made intelligible in the natural world. The amateriality
of his morality mirrors the amorality of his materialism—quite a predicament for creatures both
moral and material.
It is precisely by removing morality from a material foundation that Locke is capable of
locating the certainty he is looking for. For, even as he restricts human authority over moral law,
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he expands access to moral knowledge by determining morality to be, like mathematics, capable
of rational demonstration. This is because the divine will legislates what is knowable by
reason.212 From the “idea of a supreme being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose
workmanship we are, and on whom we depend” and the “idea of our selves, as understanding
rational beings,” moral demonstration is possible “wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident
propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics.”213 He then
offers two examples of certain moral truths, which of all moral truths one could possibly wish to
demonstrate are striking for their overt political resonance. It can be demonstrated, he argues,
that “where there is no property, there is no injustice” and that “No government allows absolute
liberty.”214
These examples are striking, but also easy to miss in a work largely preoccupied with
systematically undermining prevailing philosophic assumptions and methodologies, in favor of
far more limited framework of human understanding. Locke’s overt and extensive focus on
natural philosophy can be somewhat misleading, however, as his limited musings on certain
moral truths reveal that his moral understandings are quite political. Moreover, even as he asserts
the practical equality of general and particular knowledge, much as he had asserted the
independent authority of reason and sense, it is clear that Locke holds general knowledge in far
greater esteem. His discussion of the pursuit of matters of fact are peppered with the terms
“opinion,” “fact,” “history,” “confused,” “imperfect,” “lazy talking,” “prudence,” and
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“predictability.”215 On the other hand, he describes certain knowledge, in terms of “justice,”
“true,” “moral,” “happiness,” “mind,” “mathematics,” and “settled ideas.”216
James Tully argues that Locke’s word choice reflects a conscientious attempt to establish
the “epistemological superiority [of normative thought] over the natural sciences,” which forces
Locke to “place the knowledge of empirical correlations and analogies amongst contextual and
historical social actions and states of affairs in an epistemologically inferior, yet practically
equal, position.”217 In so doing, he offers a modern twist on Plato’s superiority of reason. For
Plato, what we know by reason alone is superior on the basis of its eternal, unchanging, perfect
nature. Locke, rejects the metaphysical primacy of reason, but does view it as superior to
empirical knowledge on account of its certainty. What is consistent across both his and Plato’s
perspectives are that reason serves as tool for judgment. That is, the function of the Forms was
not to predict the outcome, but to dictate an ought whereby the particulars could be judged.
Similarly, Locke inscribes natural law with reason as means by which oughts could be deduced
and outcomes judged. For both, reason it is prescriptive rather than predictive.
Another possible explanation for Locke’s elevation of general knowledge over particular
knowledge comes from Charles Tarlton, who argues that Locke is at least partially compelled by
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the English political tradition of grounding arguments in historical precedents.218 For example,
Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, to which Locke’s Second Treatise is a response, is a defense of the
divine right of kings offered in biblical and historical terms. Folding history into empirical
knowledge allows Locke to undermine its authority and make political arguments in purely
rationalist terms. In so doing, Locke replaces the moral authority of history (conceived biblically
or traditionally) with a moral authority that is universal, atemporal, and rational.
Moral Disjuncture
Questions of how morality can be constituted in a mechanistic system, and of the extent
to which practical action can be imbued with meaning is a more significant problem for Locke
than it was for Hobbes. For Hobbes, reason cannot be divorced from its material context, and
since space is always accompanied by time, and neither have an objective existence, temporality
and reason are always linked. Additionally, because the certainty of reason and science are
united in Hobbes’s thought, the laws of nature that circumscribe human experience, much like
laws of physics, have a predictive quality. Consequently, the break from history he seeks is not
an absolute one, but a means to create a new historical arc—one made possible by quelling the
futural anxieties inherent to human thinking bodies. As bold as Hobbes’s temporal subject is, the
means by which he proposes quelling anxiety harkens back to a very old idea of time. The
political institutions charged with securing peace must be as impervious to change as the natural
laws that compel people to seek peace. He thus resurrects the eternal politically—the Leviathan
is conceptually eternal, outlasting any particular ruler. Moreover, it is through political
participation, in the form of recognizing the political imperative of peace and forging its
foundation, that individuals achieve well-being, though not perfection. In this way, Hobbes
218

Charles D. Tarlton, “Reason and History in Locke’s Second Treatise,” Philosophy 79, no. 02
(April 2004), http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819104000257.
97

straddles the temporalities of the old and new epoch. Politics does create a permanent, timeless
social order, but individuals do not forego their personal future for the sake of the transcendental.
Rather, political permanence makes a personal future possible, albeit a potentially limited one.
As such, Hobbes is the first to articulate a futural subjectivity that will become a standard feature
of all modern notions, but the last to maintain a political space shielded from that time.219
For Locke, reason certainly plays a role in scientific discovery, but such knowledge
possesses neither certain nor ethical content. Cleaving morality from the natural world allows
Locke to retain a universal morality that is specifically Christian, and which subsequently
reinforces traditional social norms. However, it also creates a significant hurdle, as he must then
find a way for atemporal, rational morality to compel, without force, temporal, material
creatures. Locke’s solution to this problem, explored below, ultimately creates another—he folds
moral reasoning into temporal reasoning, which results in an inegalitarian conception of
subjectivity.
Subjectivity: The time of personhood
Locke’s relationship to Descartes is less contentious than Hobbes’s, though both reject
Descartes’ claim that introspection guides understanding. Locke also rejects Descartes dualism,
but on different grounds than Hobbes. As explained in the previous chapter, Hobbes rejects
Cartesian dualism because he rejects the possibility of an immaterial substance and instead
introduces a kind of substance dualism that conceives of the mind as a distinct kind of thinking,
acting matter. Locke’s position can seem more ambiguous—he generally adopts dualist rhetoric,
though he entertains the possibility of a material agency akin to Hobbes, and occasionally
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declares either impossible. This has led to some interpretational confusion and disagreement
regarding which position, if any, Locke truly holds, or if his philosophy is irreconcilable
contradictory. However, as Han-Kyul Kim demonstrates, the problem stems from confusing
Locke’s nominalism with his realism. Locke is a dualist, but nominally—he understands things
to be mentally and materially describable, not mentally and materially constituted.220 In Locke’s
words, we know only “that we have in us something that thinks,…though we must content
ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is.”221 He effectively postulates that the mindbody problem is an effect of our epistemological perspective—the unique structure of our
perceptual faculties categorize ideas according to their perceived materiality and mentality. The
error we make is assuming that a thesis of consciousness “must be true with regard to mentality
and materiality, one way or the other.”222 His rejection of both Descartes’ immaterial subject as
well as Hobbes’s material subject is more accurately presented as a rejection of the possibility of
knowing whether either of these accurately reflect reality. The task then becomes how to
understand Locke’s subject in his own terms.
Much like Descartes, Locke understands the self in terms of consciousness. Yet Locke
challenged Descartes’ claim that “thought [is] nothing else but thinking substance itself,”223
because it “[begs] what is in question” rather than “prove it by reason.”224 The fact of the matter,
Locke argues, is that, “thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul.”225 He accuses
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Descartes of mistaking a perception with essence, which necessarily ties it to a particular
conception of substance, which, in this case, is immaterial. Rather than understanding thought as
what consciousness is, Locke proposes that we consider thought as what consciousness does.
Approaching thought as the action rather than the essence of consciousness has at least two
important implications. Namely, it allows him to postulate a dynamic, reflexive theory of
consciousness and a temporal theory of personal identity.
Identity
Descartes’ theory of identity centers on consciousness relating each thought to the thing
that thinks—to the “I.” Etienne Balibar argues that this theory is problematic, because it is not
capable of “establishing a program of reflexive inquiry within this ‘consciousness’ in order to
discover the faculties of the soul or to analyze its logical operations.”226 That is, Descartes’
consciousness is relentlessly and personally affirmative—I think, I am; I think, I am. It consists
of a continual reiteration of the first moment of certainty, which allows no means of investigation
into consciousness itself. Locke, on the other hand, does offer an avenue for investigating
consciousness itself. He stipulates that all ideas have their origin in either sensation or
reflection.227 Where reflection refers not to the ideas of sensation, but on the mind itself. It is the
“notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them.”228 Such reflexivity
represents the identity of consciousness with itself, and forms the basis for Locke’s identification
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of consciousness with “the self,” insofar as consciousness is identity with itself as consciousness
of thinking.229
Though Locke understands sensation and reflection to give ideas to the mind
immediately, his understanding of consciousness always exists in the present moment, it “has no
essential relation to memory and thus does not…constitute any psychological unity over
time.”230 An immediate and introspective consciousness lacks distance, perspective, history, or
futurity, which raises serious questions for how such an atemporally conceived self could
rightfully exercise agency. Against the atemporal sameness that typifies a Cartesian self, Locke
posits a temporal self, understood in terms of distinction.
Locke’s theory of identity first appears in his theory of ideas, in which he describes the
faculties of minds that produce new ideas. He identifies discerning as the “faculty of
distinguishing one thing from another,” in which two ideas are perceived to be the same or
different.231 The faculty of “comparing” is the means by which we acquire our ideas of
relations.232 By comparing, for example, the idea of plate and the idea of a table, a new idea is
generated that represents their relation—the plate is on the table. Through comparison, a specific
relationship between particulars or a non-representational relationship between abstractions can
be deduced. Each of these faculties produce ideas that are either atemporal because they lack a
material dimension or are functionally atemporal because they relate only to a present moment,
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without any connection to a past or future. However, Locke then introduces a special faculty of
comparison that produces a special kind of idea. He writes,
Another occasion, the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things,
when considering any thing as existing at any determined time and place, we
compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of
identity and diversity.233
In order to acquire the idea of identity, we must compare it not to itself, but to a distinct instance
of the same thing at another time. This means that not only is Locke’s concept of identity
relational and temporal, but it is therefore also a concept available only to kinds of consciousness
that are themselves relationally and temporally constituted. That is, it is a temporal faculty of
consciousness that makes the recognition of the temporal concept of identity possible.
Locke describes identity as resulting from considering a “former existence” and
comparing it to “the present.”234 Practically speaking, whenever we encounter an object, we
implicitly ask if it is the same as an object that existed at an earlier point in time, and that was
“certain, at that instant, [to be] the same with itself as no other.”235 To even ask the question of
sameness requires a determinate answer—the earlier instance must be singular. For example, in
order to establish that this cake that has been knocked on the floor is that cake that was brought
to the party, there must have only been one cake of a similar type brought to the party. If two
visually identical cakes were brought and now one cake is on the floor, its identity is
indeterminate. The question becomes, “which cake?” rather than “same cake?” Conversely, if
one were to encounter a table with two cakes where there had been one, the identity of both visà-vis the former would be indeterminate. Thus Locke concludes that identity entails the principle
that “one thing cannot have two beginnings,” nor conversely can “two things have one
233
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beginning” because it is “impossible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same
instant, in the very same place.”236 Locke’s inclusion of the qualifier “kind” is important, as it
simultaneously leaves open the possibility of the mind and body, or God and the soul, to be
present in an identical time and space, while rendering questions of how or why besides the
point.
This is an important point of distinction in Locke’s theory of identity. Where other
theories were stymied by the nature of human dualism, the location of the soul, and the essence
of man, Locke is able to sidestep these problems by retaining a nominal understanding of
classification, and the position that particular conditions of existence are varied.237 That is, the
criteria for determining identity vary, such that those that determine the identity of matter are
different from, say, those necessary to determine the identity of an organism. Since we are
without access to the essences of things, we are unable to consider any property to be essential to
any category of idea. As such, when we are considering whether this cake is the same, we are
not, Locke would say, appealing to essential properties of cake generally, but rather comparing
previous particular qualities of existence to the present. Gideon Yaffe elaborates that for Locke,
“to know what it is that makes a thing the particular individual it is at a time is to know what
makes it capable of excluding others of its kind from its location; and to know that is to know
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what makes it the same individual later.”238 Identity is established by a sameness over time of
particular qualities.
Locke enumerates the conditions of existence required to establish the identity of various
ideas, from a single atom to masses of matter to organisms. This progression reveals an
important difference from others. He argues that identity can be constituted in matter only
insofar as that matter is not identifiable as an idea that encompasses qualities beyond those of
matter. That is, atoms joined together may be considered “the same mass” so long as they consist
of “the same atoms,” and have no qualities beyond this.239 How the atoms are “jumbled” together
may change, but “if one of these atoms be taken away, or a new one added, it is no longer the
same mass.”240 In the case of organisms, however, though they may be comprised of matter, the
identity of “a living body” is not “the same thing” as “a mass of matter.”241 Presuming, therefore,
that an organism will not possess a sameness of matter, Locke considers an oak tree and asks
how “an oak differs from a mass of matter,” in order to establish what has to remain the same in
order for that tree to remain the same.242 Locke surveys what an oak tree at a particular time is—
a complex system comprised of various parts, that act in concert to “distribute nourishment, so as
to continue…vegetable life;” and it remains the same so long as it “[partakes] in the same
life.”243 He thus concludes that the identity of an organism is not established by its atoms but by
its organization. The difference between how the identity of matter and the identity of an
organism is established does not, for Locke, stem from any real difference between the two, but
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rather stems from a difference in our ideas. According to Yaffe, “since the ideas of the two kinds
of things differ, so do the identity conditions for particulars falling under the respective ideas.”244
In other words, the ideas by which we seek to determine identity reflect categories that have been
arbitrarily drawn according to certain qualities, and those qualities determine identity particular
to that idea. The same thing may or may not be the same depending on the parameters of identity
applied to it. As such, the tree in question has identity as an organism, but not as matter.
Insofar as a human is a biological organism like that of an oak tree, it too possesses an
identity understood in terms of physiological organization—“in nothing but a participation in the
same continued life.”245 Of course, biological identity does not, for Locke, exhaust the possible
terms of identity for understanding a human being. He thus introduces the concept of personal
identity. Like substance identity or organism identity, he establishes personal identity by
considering the conditions for existence at two different times, and determining which are
particular to personal sameness. Locke determines these qualities to be:
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself
as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only
by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me
essential to it.246
One thing made immediately apparent by this definition is that unlike the concepts of identity
ascribed to things, personhood entails self identity. Locke argues that because identity is a
temporal concept, it requires a consciousness of a higher order to perceive any kind of identity.
To recognize personal identity requires a still more sophisticated kind of consciousness. In order
to discern personal identity, a consciousness must recognize itself as a self, insofar as it
“distinguishes [itself] from all other thinking things” and establishes a “sameness of rational
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being.”247 The sameness Locke describes differs from Cartesian sameness, because it consists not
of a continual reiteration of affirmation. Rather it is a “self-identity that is…reiterated through
difference.”248 It is by dint of the variation between sensations and reflections, activity and
passivity, past and present, that the self is able to recognize and articulate itself.
After stipulating the nature of personal identity, Locke engages in a number of thought
experiments, from which a few key elements are revealed. First, Locke asserts the question of
“what makes the same person, and whether it be the same identical substance…matters not at
all.”249 Considering his previous differentiation between the identity of matter and of organisms,
this declaration may seem unremarkable—a person is the same regardless of any physical
changes to mass and matter. However, by “identical substance” Locke refers not only to material
substance, but immaterial as well. By this, Locke means to establish that the immaterial
substance of the soul factors not in the establishment of personal identity. He concludes that
because souls are completely detached from the material world, it is possible to conceive of one
soul inhabiting two bodies over time, or one body being inhabited by two souls over time. Either
could be true or false, and neither would violate the principle of unity, insofar as two substances
(souls) could conceivably occupy the same place at different times (body), or one substance
could occupy two places at different times. Yet because we are precluded from knowing whether
or how the souls occupy bodies, considerations of their immaterial substance cannot inform our
judgments regarding personhood.
Having thus established that identity pertains only to objects that exist in both space and
time, yet having rejected that the notion that it is constituted by a unity of substance (whether
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material or immaterial), Locke concludes that personal identity is instead constituted by unity in
time:
’tis plain [that] consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to
ages past, unites existences, and actions, very remote in time, into the same
person, as well as it does the existence and actions of the immediately preceding
moment: so that whatever as the consciousness of present and past actions, is the
same person to whom they belong.250
Ayers notes that because temporal unity is a perception at the phenomenal level, it is a nominal
idea from which no conclusions regarding substances can be drawn.251 Yet it is precisely because
Locke’s unity does not pertain to essence that it can glide over gaps in temporality and changes
in physicality that mire theories substantialist theories of consciousness. For these theories,
mundane features of human life such as sleeping and aging, represent significant challenges to
theories of consciousness and identity, to mention nothing of more esoteric questions like the
immortality of the soul. The metaphysical essence of thinking substances is irrelevant to Locke’s
theory of personal identity, which is constituted only by a person’s perceived unity in time.
Though the time of Locke’s personhood is subjectively constituted, it indirectly relates to
objective time. The problem, he argues, is that unlike space, where standard measurements such
as “inches, feet, yards, etc.” can be “marked out in permanent parcels of matter,” “no two
different parts” of time “can be put together to measure one another.”252 There is no “convenient
measure of time” but rather arbitrary divisions of “apparently equal portions.”253 The sun and
moon generally help to divide time, but other cultures “count their years by the coming of certain
birds.”254 Because “two successive lengths of [time], however measured, can never be
demonstrated to be equal,” it is important to “carefully distinguish betwixt [time] itself, and the
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measurements used to judge its length.”255 The same epistemological position that prevents
access to the essence of objects also prevents access to time. This means that Locke accepts the
ontological existence of time, and does, in fact, assert that thought it cannot be directly accessed,
time itself is “one constant, equal, uniform course.”
It is the inaccessibility of real time to the human mind that allows Locke to postulate a
temporal identity that is not contiguous. For, objective time necessarily entails contiguity, a
feature the time of consciousness lacks. Its temporal unity entails the subjective act of a
consciousness that “unites existences, and actions, very remote in time into the same person.”256
Two successive existing thinking substances are part of the same person if and only if the second
is aware of the first. In light of Locke’s position regarding the changing bodies and subjective
time of persons,257 Christopher Hughes Conn concludes that Locke, “does not think persons need
to exhibit spatio-temporal continuity, the way atoms and organisms (including men) do.”258
When I ask if this cake on the floor is the same cake as the one I had placed on the table earlier, I
am seeking to determine an identity that necessarily entails dimensions both spatial and
temporal. However, because they are external to, and consequently determinate of, the thing in
question, they require spatio-temporal continuity. The time and space of a person entails no such
continuum and, in fact, Locke understands identity to be extended spatially and temporally in
two distinct ways. Through memory, a person is extended backwards in time, and by sense
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perception a person is extended spatially in the material present. In this way, a self unites the
history of a particular body with the space of the material present.
All of which lead to Locke’s most thorough summation:
Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever substance, made up of whether
spiritual, or material, simple, or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or
conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is
concerned for it self as far as that consciousness extends…that with which the
consciousness of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same
person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it self,
and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness
reaches, and no farther.259
Here it is most apparent that while identity is “an essentially temporal concept,”260 what it
actually unites across time, and is distinctive of personhood, is the capacity to recognize which
parts of the present world, as well as the world of the future and past, are parts of oneself. Such
consciousness makes possible the affirmation of self, and the ownership of actions. This faculty
is guided not only by an awareness of one’s body and one’s desire, but also by an emotional or
psychological relationship to oneself. We are “concerned” for the self, particularly regarding “the
actions and states of future and past persons whom we take to be identical to ourselves.”261 At
the most basic level, Locke links concern to the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, though he
immediately links such sensory states to the psychological ones of happiness and misery. Beyond
merely uniting sensory experiences and memory, consciousness exhibits an emotional
attachment to itself, with a concern that signifies a care that goes beyond mere survival. Locke
argues that “a concern for happiness [is] the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, [as] that
which is conscious of pleasure and pain, [desires] that the self, that is conscious, should be
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happy.”262 Moreover, as a person extends herself into the past, she does not only identify her past
actions but “becomes concerned and accountable” for them.263 In other words, a self is not
merely constituted by actions but responsible for them. Unlike mere existence, the responsibility
Locke outlines entails ethical or moral commitments. Such commitments are capable of
judgment, and Locke subsequently outlines just such a method of judging a person’s actions in
terms of duty to oneself and others.
Hobbes and Locke on Animal and Human Identity
How Locke understands the relationship between identity, action, and morality as well as
its political implications will be unpacked momentarily. First, it is helpful to pause and consider
a few similarities between his and Hobbes’s theory of consciousness, as well as a few important
points of distinction. What is perhaps the most striking similarity is that both offer theories of
consciousness that are explicit rejections of the Cartesian subject. Both reject an immaterial
concept of self, and conceive of a self whose identity stems from variation over time rather than
sameness. Both postulate a kind of temporal consciousness that enables a subject to understand
the present in relation to the past. And both of their theories have arguably been stymied by a
kind of reflexive Cartesian bias—Hobbes’s substance dualism is overlooked and his materialism
is often interpreted through a Cartesian lens that results in a determined subject without agency,
and the nominal dualism of Locke’s substance is similarly interpreted as Cartesian dualism,
which ascribes to him an immaterial theory of agency. In both cases, their theories of agency are
rendered irreconcilably contradictory, owing to a failure to interrogate the presumption that
freedom requires an immaterial agent.
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Despite the significant overlap in their intellectual projects and subsequent philosophy, a
few key points of difference emerge from apparent similarities. One such difference is evident in
their considerations of animals. Initially, it seems that Locke and Hobbes draw a similar
conclusion regarding the possibility of animal subjectivity. Both ascribe cognitive functions to
animals, and find them capable of some forms of thoughts, deliberation, and memory. However,
they ultimately conclude that these faculties are insufficient to produce a self, because animals
are incapable of recognizing concepts like causality. As Locke’s explains, “[t]he other power of
comparing, which may be observed in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to
abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.”264 Because animals lack
reason, they lack the ability to create general ideas or to compare them; the world of animals is
limited to particulars. A limited faculty of comparing likewise prevents the kind of comparison
necessary to recognize identity generally, let alone personally. Moreover, Locke asserts that
“[p]erson…is a forensick term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to
intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery.”265 Here, he distinguishes the
temporality of the animal mind from the temporality of the self. For though both may entail
memory, animals are incapable of consciously living under law; because they cannot appropriate
their memories or recognize them as their own. To appropriate an action requires more than
simply remembering an action, it requires recognizing that you performed it. Such recognition
constitutes the appropriation of an action, and makes accountability possible. In the animal mind,
however, memory does not animate the present in a way that makes the recognition of self
possible. This is why for Locke, as for Hobbes, animal life occurs entirely in the present, and
why animals are largely unaware of time or its passage at all.
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It is at this point that, Locke departs from Hobbes, as he asserts human identity to entail
mere animal identity, and to be completely independent from personal identity, much the same as
substantial identity is independent from physiological identity. For Locke, “the idea of man” is
exhausted by a concept of identity that is “nothing else but an animal of such a certain form.”266
This means that Locke’s theory of personal identity functions independently of the physiological
identity of humans; to have personal identity one must not be human, but to be a person. A
human can exist where a person does not, and vice versa. Human and personal identity are not
mutually exclusive, but neither are they in any way co-dependent. Locke demonstrates this point
by explicitly decoupling personhood from man and theorizing the possibility of a parrot as
person:
…whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no
more reason all its life, than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or
whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would
call or think it nothing but a cat or parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational
man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot.267
According to Locke, a human whose mental life is akin to a parrot is a mere human, not a
person; likewise, he entertains the possibility of a parrot possessing the sort of intelligence that
would qualify it as person. The implications of Locke’s position cannot be understated. Their
gravity lies not in the theoretical possibilities of elevating animals to personhood, but in the very
real consequences of categorically denying personhood to some humans, especially considering
that political rights and protections are limited to persons. The crux of the distinction between
animal and personal identity lies in the ability to appropriate past actions. But this is only one
half of the equation. To fully grapple with the consequences of Locke’s concept of personal
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identity, his theory of agency—the performance of present actions and appropriation of future
consequences, must also be examined.
Power: The time of agency
In his chapter on identity, Locke identifies the self as an entity whose spatial and
temporal extension is explicitly tied to appropriated past actions. His theory of agency—the
relationship between the self, will, and action, is found in his chapter on power. Locke’s
understanding of power is manifold, but Locke argues that we come to the idea of power itself by
dint of sensation and reflection, whereby we observe that the qualities we perceive in objects
change with some regularity, “and so come by that idea which we call power.”268 Once we have
the idea of power, we are consequently capable of recognizing at least three kinds of powers:
those qualities of material substances, mental operations or faculties, and the power of willing
and acting freely. Locke umbrellas each of these kinds of powers under a single definition, as a
thing “able to make, or able to receive any change.”269 This definition actually comprises two
distinct kinds of power: the former, “able to make…any change,” are active powers, and the
later, “able to receive any change,” are passive powers. Locke further clarifies that active powers
entail not merely the power to act, but to do so “by its own power.”270 So while all power can be
understood in terms of causality, as Vere Chappell explains, “causing is built into the idea of
active power, but causation is only implied in passive power.”271 In other words, though all
power entails causation, not all powers are causal.
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Locke argues that by the “continual flux” of experience, we are “abundantly furnished”
with ideas of power.272 These ideas are, however, nearly entirely of passive power, because the
actions of natural bodies are not self-initiated. When, for example, we witness a pool ball strikes
another ball, the striking ball “receives the impression, whereby it is put into action, purely from
without….[It] acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some
external agent.”273 As such it does not “produce” motion, but rather “transfers” or
“communicates” the motion it has “received” from something else.274 On Locke’s telling, this
scenario effectively describes the entire world of sensible things, which is a world of changes
received from without. The motion that typifies this world reflects “a mere passive capacity
in”275 the bodies that populate it, and consequently none of the objects that populate the world
may rightly be called agents.
The only substances that may be called agents are those that can initiate change “by
[their] own power.”276 Locke stipulates that there are only two such substances in the world: God
and “finite spirits,” or persons. Our own power to initiate change is the power we have to move
our own bodies or direct our own thoughts, “barely by a thought of the mind.”277 Locke identifies
this power to direct our own minds and bodies as the will. Yet even as he understands the will as
an expression of agency, he assumes a position similar to Hobbes regarding the possibility of
freedom for the will. Locke deems the “question itself all together improper,” as asking “whether
a man’s will be free” is like asking if “his virtue square,”278 for liberty, and will are powers that
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“belongs only to agents,”279 not to one another. To ask whether the will is free is tantamount to
asking the “absurd” question, “whether one power has another power.”280 In other words, to
ascribe liberty to the will is to ascribe it an agency that would necessitate a real existence
independent of the person whose power it is. This common error stems, on Locke’s view, from a
tendency to describe mental powers, such as “the understanding” or “the will” as “clear and
distinct” “real beings,” which as consequently led to “a confused notion of so many distinct
agents in us.”281 Freedom and the will are, he argues, not agents themselves, but the powers of
agents. It is therefore not a contradiction to stipulate that a person may be free though his will is
determined. And this is precisely Locke’s argument, the will, which constitutes the active power
of selves, is nevertheless determined by something without ourselves—a position that requires
some unpacking.
Determining the will
Despite his assertion that the will is determined, Locke initially describes the will in
almost Cartesian terms. He poses the question, “what determines the will?” and provides an
uncharacteristically brief answer, “the mind.”282 This certainly resonates with a conception of
immediate, immaterial agency that simply directs the mind rather than a retrospective, material
agency Hobbes describes. Yet Locke quickly acknowledges that he has not addressed the real
question, which is “what moves the mind” and therefore “[determines] its general power of
directing.”283
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The answer to this question lies in the distinction Locke makes between willing, and acts
of willing or volitions, which he describes as the acts “of the mind directing its thought to the
production of any action.”284 For Locke, every volition is a volition to act in some way, which
means that every act of willing has an object that is also an action. For example, when I will
myself to stand up, the act of standing up is the object of my volition. My volition is not itself the
act of standing up, but rather precedes it. At the time when volition occurs, its object does not
exist, it is present to the mind only as a projection into the future. I will myself to bring into
existence the previously non-existent act of my standing up, and in so doing, I act as causal
agent. The question then becomes, what determines the object of a volition, and Locke’s answer
is that it is simply preference—“it is nothing but the being pleased more with the one, than the
other.”285 We do not choose to prefer one thing over another, we simply do; I do not choose to
prefer standing up to sitting down, I simply do. Locke thus determines that “preference is
determined by something without the self.”286 In broad terms, Locke’s will operates much like
Hobbes’s—both agree that agents cannot help but to will, and that willing entails acting for a
future object, and bringing a desired future into existence. Despite these general overlaps, the
role of preference in Locke’s argument creates a challenge that Hobbes avoids. For Hobbes,
variations in preferences are attributable to the uniqueness of each person’s spatial-temporal
existence. They are absolutely not determined without, but by and through oneself.
Locke’s material skepticism prevents him from ascribing a causal theory of preference
such as Hobbes’s. Yet he does understand the determination of the will in causal terms—to
determine the will of an agent is to cause the will be exercised and to cause the agent to perform
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a volition with a specific object or intent.287 However, if the will were entirely determined by
preference, which is itself entirely random, Locke’s theory of agency would ultimately be quite
hollow—a self who merely executes preferences that are not self-legislated is quite an
unsatisfying conclusion. The task before him then is to develop a theory of agency in which the
will is determined though the agent responsible.
Locke reworks his theory of agency over many years before developing a means by
which an agent may affect the determination of the will that fully coheres with his broader
philosophy. In the first edition of the Essay, he argues that the “good alone determines the
will.”288 But by “the good” he refers not to an abstract or ideal notion, but to “what we call
good,” which is that which “pleases us best,” as opposed to that which causes pain, which is
what we call evil.289 As such, the will is determined by a preference for pleasure. However,
though we all desire happiness, which he defines as “the utmost pleasure we are capable of,”290
the good that determines preference may or may not yield happiness. This is because it is
actually the “appearance of good” that determines preference. 291 The qualifier “appearance”
allows Locke to account for the ways in which temporal proximity shapes perception and
preference. In “the present,” he explains, the “good or evil is really so much as it appears,”292 and
consequently, in regards to “present pain or pleasure…a man never chooses amiss: he knows
what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.”293 This is why Locke argues that men may
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choose different things, and yet “all choose right,”294 and if actions had no consequences, we
would “always infallibly prefer the best.”295 In the immediacy of a suspended present, absent
consequences and therefore judgment, pure instinctive preference is revealed and cannot err. But
of course, actions do have consequences, and any apparent good thus “carries with it the
expectation of addition to our happiness.”296 In the context of expectation, we judge the present
in terms of the future, and here, Locke argues, we may “err in choice.”297 With this initial
explanation of the will, Locke validates the variability of preference, while denying a relativity
of judgment regarding outcomes of preference. He accomplishes this by essentially arguing that
what really determines the will is not an unbidden preference, but a temporal judgment of
expectation regarding apparent goods and anticipated pleasures. Though we have no control over
what brings us pleasure, which renders our preferences imposed to a certain degree, we have
many preferences and agency intercedes in the determination of the will by making a calculation
to determine the full potential of pleasure for any particular preference.
In the “Epistle to the Reader,” Locke penned as a preface to subsequent editions, he
concedes that he “found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that,
which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions.”298 He finds judgment to
be an inadequate determinate of the will for two primary reasons. The first was pointed out to
him in a correspondence with Molyneux and well-summarized by Chappell as essentially a
problem of Locke’s “overintellectualizing motivation, of making an agent’s volitions depend too
heavily on his judgments regarding the truth of certain propositions, even though these
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propositions concern the agent’s own pleasure and pain.”299 Molyneux did not question Locke’s
assertion that there is an objectively good course of action for each individual, but rather
questioned whether attributing evil to ignorance or error lets wrongdoers off the hook a little too
easily—how can we reasonably be held responsible for ignorance?
Beyond this, a perhaps even more compelling criticism is that a will determined by
judgment is inconsistent with Locke’s broader philosophy. One of Locke’s arguments against
theologians and idealists is that ideas do not compel action. Knowing the good does not in any
way entail doing the good, as there is no internal mechanism for moral enforcement. This
criticism is just as applicable to Locke’s first theory of action. Arguing that judgment determines
the will entails that a person always chooses what she believes to be the good, and that wrong
choices are the results of mistakes in judgment. Of course, one need not look very far to see that
people very often make poor decisions despite correctly judging better ones. Locke only has to
look as far as the tavern, where he contemplates the “drunkard” who “has in his view the loss of
health and plenty.”300 That is, the will to drink in excess is not the result of a failure of judgment
vis-à-vis the good, “for he sees it and acknowledges it, and, in the intervals of his drinking hours,
will take resolutions to pursue the greater good.”301 The problem, is that resolutions, like
judgments, do not oblige us. In subsequent editions therefore, Locke concedes that “upon stricter
enquiry, I am forced to conclude that good,…though apprehended and acknowledged to be so,
does not determine the will.”302
After reconsideration, Locke concludes, that it is not judgments regarding the future that
determines action, but the experience of the present, and more specifically, uneasiness.
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The motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present
satisfaction in it; the motive of change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting
us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness.303
The will, as Locke now describes it, is determined by an affective rather than a cognitive
state. The uneasiness that determines the will is the feeling of discomfort that accompanies desire
for some absent pleasure or pain. He takes the man in the tavern to correctly judge the
consequences of his actions and to knowingly choose wrong, which is possible because it is not
cognitive judgment but affective uneasiness that determines preference. What Locke essentially
argues is that the man drinks because his desire for a drink now makes him more uncomfortable
than his desire for a future in which he is not compelled to drink. This means he is not ignorant;
he is weak. And, not inconsequentially, so is the man who knows “that plenty has its advantages
over poverty” yet he remains in “nasty penury” so long as he “finds no uneasiness” in it.304 Not
to put too fine a point on it, if the idea of the good or contemplation of the good were sufficient
for determining the will, everyone would “constantly and steadily” direct their course “towards
heaven.”305
Locke maintains that though “we constantly desire happiness,”306 it is the experience of
present uneasiness rather than judgment of the future that prevents its realization. He explains
that “whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy.”307
Consequently, the “removing of pain” and uneasiness is “the first and necessary [but insufficient]
step towards happiness.”308 However, though uneasiness determines all actions, and uneasiness is
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“inconsistent with happiness,”309 yet not all actions yield happiness. One reason for this is the
rather tortuous experience of the present in which we are “pressed with” a “constant succession
of uneasinesses” so “that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses.”310
Moreover, our manifold passions, such as “aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, etc.”311 all entail a
desire for some object, and hence, produce uneasiness. Not only does this bombardment prevent
us our will from moving beyond the fulfillment of the desires caused by the “ordinary necessities
of our lives” such as hunger, thirst, or tiredness,312 but it also prevents happiness. Since,
the first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the
confines of misery… the will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every
uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed: which in the multitude of wants, and
desires, we are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed
from in this world.313
Where Hobbes invoked Prometheus to illuminate the modern paradox of empowerment
and anxiety, Locke’s description of human experience conjures a Sisyphean existence—under
the constant pressure of uneasinesses, we face an uphill struggle to free ourselves. But any
reprieve, should we find it, is fleeting. We, like Sisyphus, find ourselves in an “imperfect state,”
bound to a hillside existence. Finding ourselves “beset with sundry uneasiness,”314 all vying to
determine the will, Locke finds that what finally spurs action is the “most important and urgent
uneasiness.”315 The prevailing uneasiness is simply that which makes us most uncomfortable,
which is often not the action that is most conducive to happiness. This reflects a temporal
problem, as endeavors for happiness are best served by long-term considerations. And although
an “absent good” can be “made present” through contemplation, “the object of bare unactive
309

Ibid., 254 (I.xxi.36).
Ibid., 261–2 (II.xxi.45).
311
Ibid., 257 (II.xxi.39).
312
Ibid., 261 (II.xxi.45).
313
Ibid., 263 (II.xxi.263).
314
Ibid., 257 (II.xxi.39).
315
Ibid., 258 (II.xxi.40).
310

121

speculation…operates not on the will, nor sets us on work” unless “it raises our desire,” to the
point that it becomes the “prevailing uneasiness.”316 Consequently, the will tends to be
dominated by the present, for the proximity of its pleasures and pains make them more acutely
felt than greater futural pleasures or pains. 317
So far, Locke’s revised theory of agency, seems to possess little agency at all. Though we
may see greater goods on the horizon, the relentless pressures of the present prevent acting for
them. The situation he describes in fact looks strikingly similar to the passive, reactive actions
that typify other forms of animal life. The only difference is that our experience of the present is
made miserable by dint of the fact that we are aware that we are inhibited from executing
meaningful agency. In his attempts to overcome the problems of an intellectually determined
will, Locke confronts new problems born of the constraints imposed by a material present. He
must, therefore, conceive of some way for a person to somehow intervene in the present—to
stave of its pressures so that we may be left “free to the attraction of a remoter absent good.”318
Reason and the Suspension of Will
Locke identifies two faculties of consciousness that make such intervention in the present
possible. Together, reason and the ability to suspend the will are able to affect the will by
expanding the temporal horizon of judgment beyond the present, and by temporarily escaping the
urgency of the material present. At its most basic level, reason makes free action possible for
Locke. He determines all minds to have some basic powers that allow the perception of ideas,
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and the retention of them, independent of reason.319 Beyond the knowledge given by perception,
the powers of “discerning” or “distinguishing” one idea from another, of “combining [simple
ideas] into complex ones,”320 of determining the relations between ideas, and of abstracting
“general signs for universal ideas”321 are faculties that belong only to beings that can both direct
and recognize their own thoughts.322 The ideas produced by sensation are given to the mind
independent of consciousness, and are thus not subject to judgment. However, each of the other
faculties are acts of consciousness that produce new ideas, which are subject to investigation and
judgment, which is guided by reason. Having the capacity to guide thought and evaluate
knowledge, the mind is free. Locke identifies reason as a necessary condition for free agency.
However reason alone is insufficient because reason does not direct the will, nor do rational
judgments compel it.
Because the will is determined by uneasiness, Locke argues that if left unattended, it will
be dominated by the present. This is because the will is not moved by the greatest pleasure or
pain, but the nearest. The mind is equipped with a faculty that temporarily allows us to escape
this condition, however, and that is the “power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any
of its desires.”323 During such a state of suspension, we are “at liberty to consider the objects of
[desire]; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others.”324 Suspending the will
effectively arrests the present moment such that the mind is shielded from its urgency, which
creates the space for contemplation. In such a suspended state, reason does not direct the will,
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but can indirectly affect it. For when temporarily guarded against the necessity of the present,
reason restructures the temporality that determines behavior.
By bringing distant pleasures “nearer to our mind,”325 we can deliberate on “true
happiness,” and “judge…the good or evil of what we are going to do” objectively.326 Through
contemplation, they are “made part of our present,”327 which mitigates the advantage that other,
lesser pleasures had by virtue of their proximity. On this more level playing field, these greater,
distant pleasures may “[raise] in us some desire,” and become “a part of our present
uneasiness.”328 In other words, the deliberation and judgment that occurs when our wills are
suspended changes desires because they create the space for cognitive states to influence
affective ones. As such, we cannot change our wills by changing our opinions, but we can
change our wills by deliberating our desires; by suspending our will, we create the possibility of
being made uneasy by absent goods. This is why Locke identifies freedom not in willing, which
is relentless and unending, but in its suspension. It creates the space to consider whether a
“particular thing” is a means to the end of happiness—whether it makes “a real part of that which
is their greatest good.”329 Locke concludes that the suspension of will and reason are thus, “the
source of all liberty…which is (as I think improperly) call’d free will.”330
Here, Locke’s triangulation between Hobbes and Descartes’ models of agency come
more into focus. Like Hobbes, Locke understands the agent to be constantly compelled to action
by his material existence, and incapable of the kind of immediate, rational direction of action of
the Cartesian model. Yet whereas Hobbes’s conception of reason is inextricably conditioned by
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our material and temporal existence, Locke’s conception of reason as an independent, a priori
faculty, more closely tracts with Descartes and echoes Plato insofar as both identify appetites and
reason as distinct determinates of the will.331 In relation to freedom, however, Locke departs
from the Cartesian and Platonic model in which the exercise of freedom equates to reason’s
forsaking of appetite, precisely because he recognizes the determinate nature of the material
present. The exercise of freedom, he essentially argues, requires protection from other causal
forces. For Hobbes, freedom happens through time and space. For Descartes, freedom happens
regardless of time and space. For Locke, freedom happens when time and space are momentarily
escaped.
Freedom: Practical and Moral
Prior to his discussion of freedom in terms of reason and suspension of the will, Locke
declares that in “so far as a man has power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move,
according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is he a free man.”332 Here, he
seeks to distinguish practical freedom, referring the possibility of self-directed action, from
necessity, referring to compelled actions. He stipulates that the requirements for such freedom
are two-fold: the power to act and not to act must both be possibilities, regardless of what the
agent wills. This is why, he argues, that a man who wakes to find himself in a locked room, yet
prefers to stay in that room is not free. He wills himself to stay, but because he cannot will
himself to leave, it is “evident he is not at liberty to stay, he has not freedom to be gone.”333 In
this initial description freedom is presented as “a man’s power” to do or not do that which is “the
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preference of his mind,” and lacks any reference to the reason and suspension he subsequently
identifies with freedom. 334
Locke’s subsequent inclusion of these factors owes to the fact that his conception of
agency couples practical freedom with moral responsibility. Though his initial description of
“active powers” lacks an explicit normative dimension, he reserves these powers for God and
persons—beings distinct from others in their ability to assume responsibility for their actions.
Moreover, his theory of personal identity entails a subject whose recognition of responsibility
yields concepts of duty to oneself and others. As such, the will Locke seeks to understand is not
merely that which leads to free action, but to free moral action. Moral agency is similar to
practical freedom, insofar as it entails the power to act or not act in some way. However,
practical freedom requires the actual presence of two opposing possibilities—the present
moment must not compel (or must allow) either action or inaction. To be a free agent in the
moral sense is to merely possess the capacities of reason and suspension of the will—their latent
potential sufficiently establishes responsibility for their proper exercise and the consequences for
any action.
Morality and Happiness
Though the relationship between the responsibility agents have to moral action and the
happiness that motivates action has not been fully developed as of yet, a few parallels can be
drawn. Regarding morality, Lock has overcome relativist objections, arguing that a universal,
legislating moral paradigm exists, and is knowable by reason. He argues along similar lines that
all rational consciousness is concerned with its own happiness. Initially he concedes that people
engage in a “variety of pursuits” that reveals “that every one does not place his happiness in the
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same thing, or chuse the same way to it.”335 Yet while Locke accepts the relativity of desire, he
draws a distinction between the “imaginary” happiness of raw appetite and “true and solid
happiness.”336 In order to pursue “real bliss,” men must “chuse right” by following “a chain of
consequences linked to one another.”337 Just as for morality, Locke asserts that reason reveals a
singular, correct path towards happiness. There is a potential conflict between these imperatives,
however, if what is morally legislated conflicts with that which constitutes true happiness. This is
an impossibility for Locke, however, because pursuing true happiness and acting morally are one
in the same for him. The same reason that allows us to know and to be brought under moral law
compels us to exercise rational discernment in our pursuit of happiness.
In the American imagination, the “pursuit of happiness” is often identified as a right. This
is likely due, in no small part, to Jefferson’s assertion in the Declaration of Independence that all
are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, and that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”338 Yet Locke himself understands this pursuit as a duty—
as a duty to suspend appetites. He argues that “we have done our duty” when “in pursuit of our
happiness,” we conduct a “fair examination” into what constitutes true happiness and then
choose that path.339 Thus, though all humans endeavor for happiness, moral responsibility is
constituted by our duty to pursue happiness aright. 340 When someone fails to “to examine what
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would really and truly make for [ones] happiness,” the consequences suffered are not only
deserved, but chosen.341
Hence, when the “drunkard” returns to the tavern, he is acting in pursuit of happiness, yet
not in the pursuit of real happiness. He is nevertheless fully responsible for his choices, and
subsequently deserving of any rewards or punishment. On this, Locke is unequivocal:
And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a man may justly incur
punishment, though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he
does, and necessarily does will that, which he then judges to be good. For though
his will be always determined by that, which is judged good by his understanding,
yet it excuses him not: because by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has
imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil.342
Since, for Locke, we all equally have the capacity, and capacity implies ability, to
suspend our wills, and particular material conditions are relevant only insofar as they allow or
preclude freedom, the individual is singularly and ultimately responsible for neglecting to
“examine what would really and truly make for his happiness.”343
Choosing wrong
Locke discerns two possible causes for choosing wrong in our endeavors for happiness.
The first occurs on account of “pains of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries,” that
“when present, and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will.”344 Locke concedes
that when possessed by such “bodily torments,” it becomes nearly impossible “to keep [the] will
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steady in the choice of those actions, which lead to future happiness.”345 Nevertheless, though
the causes be out of our control, the inability to overcome their determinism on our wills is a
personal failing—it is due to either “disuse” of reason or to an inability to reason that a person is
unable to “raise in himself desires…strong enough to counter-balance the uneasiness” of the
present.346 So while acknowledging that extenuating material circumstance like injury or penury
may cause, through no fault of one’s own, a present that is exceptionally dominating, and
therefore, unequal conditions for agency, there is no room in Locke’s theory of agency to
accommodate, offset, or overcome this unevenness. Each person is responsible for overcoming
the present, which Locke presents as universally dominating and therefore an effectively equal
condition. This buttresses his argument that the outcomes of a person’s attempts to overcome the
present are deserved and one’s relative social position is not merely an accurate reflection of
one’s effort, but because he links material outcomes with moral character, social position is
imbued with moral judgment.
Aside from the mistakes we make under duress, Locke argues that we choose wrong on
account of errors in judgment. The essential problem he pinpoints, is that we err when we fail to
recognize the dual, temporal nature of judgment. “We must remember,” he explains, “that things
are judged good or bad in a double sense.”347 The first sense is the sense of the present, and
regards mere pleasure or pain. We do not err in this sense, because “the greater pleasure, or the
greater pain, is really just as it appears,”348 and so we make no mistakes in our judgment. The
second sense of judgment regards the future, and accounts for the consequences that any present
pleasure or pain will produce. And, since “every intelligent being really seeks happiness,” a
345
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person fails in their endeavor “only by a wrong judgment” in this second sense.349 One problem
is that “when we compare present pleasure or pain with the future,” we often fail to account for
their “different positions of distance,” and we are consequently “apt to judge a little in the hand
better than a great deal to come.”350 Yet though the future may seem small in the distance, Locke
is clear that “that which is the future, will certainly come to be the present.”351 Though the
consequences that may follow particular actions are in the realm of probable knowledge, the
passage of time and the necessity of acting beyond the present are rational certainties. Thus,
when a person cannot raise in themselves a feeling of uneasiness regarding the future greater
than those in the present, it indicates intellectual laziness or willful ignorance—both choices
open to moral judgment.
Unlike Hobbes, whose material subject cannot help but to continually seek the future,
Locke presents a subject with a much more ambivalent relationship to the future. Though he
recognizes our existence to be undeniably and inextricably tied to a future both material and
immaterial,352 he understands human behavior to be determined more by the present than the
future. In the event that the present is pleasurable, “what is present, obtains the preference as
greater”353 good than that which is absent, even if the absent good is objectively more conducive
to ultimate happiness. Yet at the same time, we have so great an abhorrence of pain,” that “the
pain that anyone actually feels,” is the worst, and “nothing can be so intolerable” as present
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pain.354 Locke acknowledges that the tendency to prioritize the present and pursue short-term
pleasures likely results from the fact that it can be difficult to endure pain in pursuit of a greater
happiness. He attempts to soften the blow a bit by asserting that it is possible to make unpleasant
things more pleasing to oneself through habit. Yet he is unwavering in his assertion that agency
entails the execution of correct futural judgment, and wrong errors are symptomatic of a “weak
and narrow”355 mental constitution. Unlike Hobbes, for whom long-term action was prevented by
external conditions, Locke locates such inhibiting conditions internally.
This distinction between Locke and Hobbes, regarding whether agency is inhibited by
external or internal conditions, is paralleled by their location of certain knowledge. For both,
certainty plays a central role in agency. Hobbes maintains that material causality can yield such a
certainty, and agency cannot be divorced from external conditions. Locke, however, he finds
material causality to be merely probable. Certain knowledge can be produced only through
rational logic, which operates in the realm of abstraction, independent of the material world.
Certain knowledge is produced independently of the material world, in the realm of reason and
morality. Consequently, certain knowledge relates to the world only obliquely. Morality is not
affected by material conditions, but moral agency exercised in the pursuit of happiness has
consequences in the world. Locke maps the divine temporality of morality onto the finite
temporality of the agent so that the temporal judgment that determines the will extends not just to
considerations of rewards and punishments in this life, but the afterlife. Such considerations will
ostensibly curtails the unbridled hedonism of the pursuit of pleasure—a position not easily
reconciled with Locke’s conclusion that social status reflects moral character.
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Morality and Politics
Though Locke provides notoriously few elaborations regarding examples of moral
certainty, he does offer a few suggestions, interestingly enough, in the Second Treatise. Therein,
he describes our imperfect knowledge of God, which is formed by abstraction and extrapolation
from certain observed qualities. Our observed relationship to God is one of dependency—he is
our creator; we are his “workmanship.” This relationship entails moral duties, which can be
known via our status as “rational beings,” and it is only such beings that are consequently subject
to God’s law. Moral agency entails, for Locke, the ability to know the duty to which one is
bound, and is not entailed by the categories “natural being” or even “human being.” Here, the
distinction between man and person fully takes shape. For, while rational capacity sufficiently
establishes moral responsibility, it is only those who have developed this capacity to become
rational beings who are capable of recognizing the nature of one’s duty to God and oneself. This
duty is the duty to pursuit happiness, which constitutes the “perfection of our nature.”356 This
view—that the purpose of human appetites is perfection rather than preservation—not only
distinguishes him from Hobbes, but from other liberal thinkers insofar as it reinscribes a
fundamentally teleological morality into the sphere of human action.357
By fusing morality with happiness and the futurity of human thought, Locke attempts to
preserve both traditional concepts of morality and burgeoning possibilities of modern science. In
fact, he argues, the two are mutually reinforcing, as it is precisely the radically limited nature of
our empirical knowledge that turns us to the pursuit of moral science, which is where our
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summum bonum is discovered.358 Though Locke’s morality is inflected with ancient teleology,
his is distinct and utterly modern on account of its end being simultaneously moral and material.
By fulfilling our duty to pursue happiness, we fulfill our moral duty to ourselves and to God.359
This, of course, creates a division between those who perform this duty adequately, and those
who do not. Locke’s infusion of morality with human appetites has a number of important
consequences. Not only is morality inescapably tied to the acquisition and accumulation of
objects (however rationally sought), but the successes of one’s pursuits come to symbolize moral
agency to others. Locke does not merely introduce the concept of ascribing personal moral
success or failure to one’s social or material position. Atop a pre-existing moral, economic,
social hierarchy he overlays an egalitarian political vision that reinforces social inequality as a
consequence of personal failure.
Chappell notes that Locke agrees with the rather common sentiment that “agents cannot
be held morally responsible for their actions unless those actions are free.” To the extent that
there is a material dimension to Locke’s conception of freedom, it is narrowly defined in terms
of practical freedom—to be capable of doing or not doing some thing. Beyond this binary,
material conditions are irrelevant. The exercise of free agency occurs in a suspended time and
space outside material existence. In this realm, freedom consists of the “power to do otherwise,”
which is sufficiently established by being in possession of the capacities of reason and
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suspension of the will. Thus, when it comes to moral responsibility, Locke determines that if a
man “could have done otherwise,” then “he did what he did freely” and is thus “guilty of that
action” and “justly punished.” 360 Though Hobbes and Locke similarly conclude that an affective
state determines the will, for Hobbes that state is produced by the interdependent material
context of human life, and thus requires material interventions to facilitate it. For Locke, the
psychological relationship to the material world is oblique, and the ability to alter the affective
state that determines the will comes not from without, but from within. Material interventions are
thus not only unnecessary, but material conditions are irrelevant to moral responsibility.
Consequently, Locke is not concerned with structuring a material environment conducive to
moral action. Rather, he is concerned with protecting persons—those who suspend their wills
and act morally—from humans who choose not to, or are simply unable.
Unlike Hobbes for whom rights precede duties,361 Locke understands rights as derivative
from law. For Locke, the “state all men are naturally in” is one of “perfect freedom to order their
actions…within the bounds of the law of nature,” and everyone subject to the law has the right to
enforce the law by “punish[ing] transgressors.”362 He thus argues that it is only those who are
subject to law who are entitled to rights. That is, rights are only extended to moral beings.
Further, Locke’s state of nature precedes his political imaginary, in that an individual is not
entitled to political rights unless they are subject to moral law. When combined with the
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divisions between those who perform these duties adequately, the principles of equality he
espouses in both the Essay and the Second Treatise can be called into question. When Locke
asserts that, “we are born free, as we are born rational,” he does not describe an existing equality,
but an existing potential—as we are born potentially rational, we are born potentially equal.
Through the development of rationality, equality is earned. It is the objective rewards of
rationality, visible to others, that divides the “industrious and rational” from the “quarrelsome
and contentious,”363 and is a litmus test for whom is entitled to political rights.
Of the many aspects of Locke’s philosophy that profoundly shape subsequent modern
thinkers, it is his conception of moral duty as prior to, and determinate of political rights that
perhaps casts the longest shadow. By reimagining Ancient and Christian notions of morality in
materialist, futural terms, Locke imbues acquisition with personal meaning and social judgment.
Understanding all human action to be motivated by future rewards or punishment, when people
will for the pleasure physically nearest rather than greatest, they reveal an inability to act for the
more distant, more rational future. They reveal a weak will that manifests itself in a social
position that precedes government. He thus intends inequality not to be ameliorated by
government, but rather reinforced by it, as “it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a
disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth…out of the bounds of society” and the role
of government is but to create “laws [to] regulate it.”364 Though reading Locke’s Second Treatise
alone makes clear that he understands inequality to precede government, his defense of
inequality remains shallow and superficial absent the moral philosophy of the Essay. Only
together can we see Locke grappling with the old and the new, fearful of loss and emboldened by
possibilities. Searching for new ways to preserve old ideas, he offers the beginnings of one of the
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single most impactful political ideas of modernity. Yet as history makes apparent, his ideas do
not merely preserve existing inequality, but serve to exacerbate and expand it. Moreover, he
offers very little by way of correcting these problems, as he understands political power through
the narrow lens of the “right of making laws with penalties of death.”365
This chapter has attempted to reconcile Locke’s ethical philosophy, specifically his
ethical temporality, with his political philosophy, in order to complicate his political vision. It
has also situated his ideas in the context of his predecessor Hobbes, in order to demonstrate how
early modern philosophers struggled to reimagine human subjectivity and agency in material
futural terms, and attempted to engage the successes and shortcomings of these theories and their
political consequences. The following chapter will investigate the philosophy of Adam Smith
along similar lines. What is perhaps most compelling about Smith’s philosophy is that he writes
after considerable development of both liberalism and capitalism, which allows him to respond
to realities Locke could only speculate about. Principle among these developments is the
invention of the corporation, which poses a fundamental challenge to Locke’s conception of
morality in terms of individual material acquisition. It is the rise of the corporation, and the
subsequent offsetting of risk and punishment to the public, that causes Smith to reconsider the
ethical temporality appropriate to the political realm.

365

Locke, Two Treatises of Government (II.ii.3).
136

Adam Smith’s “Circles of Sympathy” and “Dangerous Disorders”:
Virtue, Vice, and Timescales of Interaction
Introduction
There is a particular understanding of human nature in which all behavior is understood
in terms of self-interest. This conception dominates the liberal tradition, to a number of effects.
By interpreting human behavior through the narrow lens of self-interest, other dimensions of the
human experience such as feelings, judgments, morality, and social and historical context are
rendered subsidiary or irrelevant. This approach takes self-interest to be an objective fact,
representing something that is rationally true, independent of affect or context. Divorced, as this
concept is, from human experience, it lends itself to analysis of abstract individuals in ahistorical
societies, and consequently traffics in abstract concepts like freedom and markets that bear little
resemblance to the lived present. Until recently, Adam Smith has been interpreted through this
lens, yet as we have seen in previous chapters, this conception of human nature that is so
identifiably liberal is at odds with theories of subjectivity articulated by the progenitors of liberal
thought. For if we read Smith against the grain, we find that rather than defining the liberal
tradition, it is the liberal tradition that has largely defined him. The major intervention of this
chapter is to liberate Smith from this interpretation, by showing how he liberates his subject
through time—a time that is lived, social, and moral. He offers a theory of subjectivity that is
rooted in a social reality, a conception of freedom rooted in moral and temporal imagination, and
a theory of agency that is affective rather than cognitive. In short, what Smith actually presents
us with is not an individual understood in terms of rational self-interest, but one whose selfinterest is a product of sentiments and moral judgments, both of which are formed in a social
context. In other words, context matters—social organization matters, and historical
development matters, because interests and agency appear to oneself not in the abstract but in the
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time of the present. As material beings with finite existence, our actions are motivated by
perceptions of possibility; we cannot help but to think through time, and what we think about the
future is shaped by social context. In this way, this chapter demonstrates that Smith offers us a
way to think through how society structures the time that is the context for both moral judgment
and agency. It further shows that even as he understands the social future to be a source of
liberation, he also finds it to be a source of domination. For, he discerns the ideas of the future
that shape human behavior to be neither singular nor abstract, but created by manifold ways
individuals are organized in society. And here he finds material inequality to lend itself to the
creation of temporal inequalities. Particularly in the case of economic relations, he finds the
powerful to use their power to affect timescales of interaction in ways that allow private
individuals to offset risk to the public, while limiting the future possibilities of the less powerful.
The net effect of this power to affect timescales of interaction is the creation of social
relationships that pervert moral judgment and incentivizes socially destabilizing behaviors.
Opening Smith’s thought in this way challenges traditional interpretations of his work by
uncovering a heretofore underdeveloped dimension of his political thought. Far from advocating
for the kind of laissez-fair policies often ascribed to him, I find him to instead advance an
interventionist role for the state. It is the duty of political institutions to intervene into timescales
of social interaction to both expand the horizons of possibility for the less powerful, while
preventing private attempts to offset future risks to the public.
This argument is demonstrated by first situating Smith within the context of the Scottish
Enlightenment, highlighting the important differences between this philosophic movement and
the rationalism and empiricism of their English contemporaries. It is by way of sentimentalism
and sympathy that Smith develops a concept of agency that, like Hobbes and Locke, is grounded
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in the material world, but unlike them is necessarily social. This social context is then revealed to
allow Smith to develop a theory of subjectivity that is not only temporal but moral, and uniquely
capable of self-judgment through the impartial spectator. He employs the impartial spectator to
illustrate, in particular, the virtues of prudence and justice—both of which are principally
concerned with a social future. These are not theories he develops in abstraction, but something
he finds to be universally and historically evident. He then turns his attention to his own
historical present and analyzes features of his own society. This investigation leads him to
conclude that social organization to shape timescales of interaction, and certain forms of
organization can pervert moral judgment and engender vice rather than virtue.
The Case for Re-Reading Smith
In the past forty years, a number of historical events have renewed interest in Smith’s
work by economists and policy-makers alike, who, for whatever differences they might hold,
converge on the conclusion that Adam Smith is an, if not the first, economic liberal. Keith Tribe
charts some of these events, beginning with the bicentennial publication of the Glasgow Edition
of the Works of Adam Smith, the collapse of communism in the 1980s, and the deregulation and
privatization of the 1990s that seemed to vindicate Smith’s arguments in favor of natural liberty,
self-interest, and positive outcomes of market forces.366 These events have served to cement his
reputation as a “prophet of economic liberalism and of free trade” being internationally well
established by the early nineteenth century367—a reputation that can be traced, as Teichgraeber
argues, back to the initial reception of the Wealth of Nations in Britain in 1776,368 and that led to
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Smith’s legacy being largely determined by orthodox economists, for whom Smith is a harbinger
and defender of neo-classical economics.369
One way that Adam Smith’s decided status as a classical economist has impacted
interpretations of his work is typified in what has come to be called, “Das Adam Smith
problem.” This problem was first identified by German economists who were critical of classical
economics, and turned to Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments looking to find some relevance, or
perhaps grounds for critique, for Wealth of Nations.370 What they found was an apparent
inconsistency in the psychological assumptions of the two book, as the former identifies
“altruistic sympathy as the motive virtuous action, while The Wealth of Nations regards selfinterest as the motive of all human action.”371 This framing reflects a two-fold misunderstanding.
The first stems from the prevailing interpretation of Smith as economic liberal, and The Wealth
of Nations as, according to George Stigler, “a stupendous palace erected upon the granite of selfinterest.”372 The second misunderstanding suggests an instrumental and philosophically careless
reading of Theory of Moral Sentiments. The crucial point missed by these first economic
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commentators, and those who continue to work in the shadow of the so-called Adam Smith
problem, is that the subject matter of Theory of Moral Sentiments was not merely a passing fancy
for Smith, or reflective of youthful naïveté. Rather, it is the very foundation of his thought, and
one he continued to work on for his entire life, publishing the sixth volume in 1790, well after
Wealth of Nations.373 What this means, as Alexander Broadie explains, is that Smith’s “economic
theory was developed therefore within the context of a moral theory that goes wide and deep, a
context that carries the message that an economic theory has to be developed within a moral
framework.”374 Essentially, “The Adam Smith Problem” stems from a failure to recognize the
mutual moral symmetry between Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Despite the deeply entrenched misinterpretations and characterizations that have long
plagued interpretations of Smith’s work,375 recent scholarship indicates new interpretational
directions. One reason for this is that the textual foundation for analysis of Smith has greatly
expanded in the past forty years. The same bicentennial publication that renewed interest in
Smith as an economic theorist, also introduced scholars access to writing beyond his two seminal
books. These works, particularly Lectures in Jurisprudence, partially published in 1896, and
fully only in 1978, made new connections in his work apparent for the first time. Chief among
these was the systematic nature of Smith’s thought, and the role of history in it. New
interpretations of Smith’s work were made possible not only by this expanded access, but by a
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parallel development in the methods of intellectual historians. Specifically, scholars like Pocock,
Skinner, Dunn, and Tuck of the Cambridge school began rereading early modern thought paying
close attention to language in order to avoid imposing modern understandings on distant
context376—such as that of the anachronistic ascription of political liberalism to Smith.
Collectively, these developments laid the groundwork for emerging trends in Smithian
scholarship, as they revealed that not only is history central to Smith’s thought, it is also crucial
to our reading of him. That is to say, one of the central problems of economically driven
interpretations of Smith’s work is that they tend to be radically ahistorical, engaging Smith only
to the extent that his arguments retain their validity.377
It is within these emerging trends of reinterpretation that this chapter is situated, as it
seeks both to reveal a new connection between Smith’s moral and political thought, and to
demonstrate the relevance his insights have for thinking about our political present. Specifically,
it argues that Smith develops his moral thought by way of empirical and social conceptions of
time in fundamentally new ways. Moreover, it is by way of these temporal concepts that he
identifies tensions within and between individuals, and economic and political institutions. As
such, this chapter argues that Smith’s political thought is not merely constructed in the context of
his moral thought, but specifically in response to the temporal tensions inherent to moral and
social life. This is an endeavor with contemporary relevance, as a number of central problems
Smith identifies in modern society are not only fundamentally temporal, but have continued
historically to threaten stability, security, and satisfaction—in some cases on an even greater and
more accelerated scale.
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Contextualizing Smith: Empiricism, Sentimentalism, and Historicism
The most significant influences on Smith’s work reflect the development of three
important features of modern thought: empiricism, sentimentalism, and historicism. Philosophic
empiricism as one of the central developments that established modernity as a distinct epoch, and
focused on developing knowledge through causal explanations of the material world. These
developments reverberated through moral and political thought, and are evident in Hobbes’s
tight focus on developing a mechanist theory of human behavior and morality, and Locke’s
attempts to reconcile scientific and divine causality within an empirically grounded inquiry.
These developments were ultimately adopted by the Scottish University system in which Smith
was educated, and which sought to employ scientific principles in the service of social science.378
This is an important development, because unlike Locke and Hobbes, whose empirical
investigation is rooted in the natural world, and which therefore produces a theory of human
nature that necessitates a bridge to civil society, the site of Smith’s investigation is society itself.
Although Smith shares with Locke and Hobbes the epistemological belief that causal
explanations of the material world constitute human knowledge, his understanding of the human
world as one that is inexorably social creates an important point of distinction. It further helps to
illuminate the Smith’s sharp departure from Locke regarding the source of moral knowledge.379
The central animating fear of Locke’s work is the risk of nihilism and relativism that are
seemingly inherent to non-theologically grounded ethics. This is why, John Dunn argues,
Locke’s “purpose in setting himself up to vindicate epistemologically the theocentric framework
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of his thought was precisely to uphold practical reason against the contingencies of society.”380
Though Locke certainly recognizes that social processes cause human belief, he rejects any
conception which grants authority to such beliefs. Society is, for Locke, the site of moral
corruption, a fact complicated by his affective moral psychology. Acknowledging that reason
cannot compel action, he concludes that the feeling of uneasiness is the well-spring of human
action. Yet though the will be determined by affect, Locke argues that actions are nevertheless
inscribed with individual moral responsibility, insofar as every person has the cognitive ability to
suspend the will, giving reason the ability to supplant the uneasiness of the present with an
uneasiness that is rational, futural, and divine. As such, moral responsibility is arrayed against
society, which is responsible for creating the paralyzing uneasiness that gives rise to the false
beliefs that he nevertheless holds individuals responsible for holding. Whereas Locke’s moral
philosophy employs empiricism to transcend society, because Smith understands society to
produce morality, he employs empiricism to reveal it. Because he denies the independent
existence of moral truths, whether discovered through reason or revealed by God, he seeks to
uncover the social source of moral thought. This leads him to identify and explain the causal
forces not of nature, but of society—to reveal not the what, but the how and why of morality.
This is an important point of distinction between Smith, Hobbes, and Locke. For although
Hobbes and Smith bookend an era of British moral questioning aimed at wresting moral
authority from political and religious leaders, and establishing an independent framework for
determining right and wrong, English and Scottish philosophers approached this project very
differently. English philosophers primarily pursued this end by way of rationalism or empiricism.
Thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, however, most prominently Francis Hutcheson, David
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Hume, and Adam Smith, rejected both approaches on a number of grounds. The first is an
ontological critique, insofar as rationalist and empiricist philosophies purport to reveal
independent, universal governing system. For his part, Smith finds the “cobweb science of
ontology” 381 problematic because its primary motivation is to create comprehensive systems of
order. Despite the explicitly moral subject matter of such philosophies, he views their moral
concern as secondary to their ordering motive, which has significant consequences for the nature
of the moral philosophy they produce. In the case of rationalist moral philosophy, this manifests
itself as the belief that “the original judgments of mankind with regard to right and wrong were
formed like the decisions of a court of judiciary, by considering first the general rule, and then,
secondly, whether the particular action under consideration fell properly within its
comprehension.”382 Smith’s position here is that general rules proceed from initial particular
judgments, but rationalist philosophers are “misled” when they ascribe a truth value independent
of, and in judgment of, the particular. It is, for him, the belief in the truth of any system of
thought that leads to rigid doctrines of behavior and philosophies that do little to actually explain
the process of human judgment or to illuminate the human experience, but do much to restrict it.
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers also argue that rationalism misidentifies the governing
force of human life as cognitive rather than affective.383 Against this position, Smith posits that it
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is “altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong
can be derived from reason,”384 because they are rather the object “of immediate sense and
feeling.”385 Though “reason may show that this object is the means of obtaining some other
which is naturally either pleasing or displeasing,” it “cannot render any particular object either
agreeable or disagreeable for its own sake.”386 And, in fact, “nothing can be agreeable or
disagreeable for its own sake, which is not rendered such by immediate sense and feeling.”387
Finally, thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment find that these feelings have a
fundamentally social source, which renders the individualism that is foundational to both
rationalist and empiricist philosophies problematic. Rationalist theories begin from the
standpoint of the moral agent, and empiricist theories presuppose an egoistic psychology.388 Such
individualism, they argued, led to moral theories grounded in self-interest, particularly that of
Bernard Mandeville, who argued in Fable of Bees that all that is known as virtue arose from selfinterest, and that all public benefits arose from vices. Further, these philosophers argue that
whether rational or egoistic, the moral agent at the heart of English theories do not capture or
reflect lived experience, and as such, lack an explanatory value. In response, they developed
sentimentalism, a theory of moral sense rooted not in reason but feeling, and spectatorship, a
necessarily social theory of moral judgment. In this way, they sought to both explain moral
behavior and locate moral obligation within a necessarily social context.
Hobbes than it does for Smith, for whom it acts more as a springboard for the imagination, with
good and ill effects.
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Collectively, the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment is less concerned with
explaining why an action is right, and more with showing how in a world that has dispensed with
external moral authority, we come to feel that they are so. These thinkers by and large assume
Hobbes’s “practical atheism,”389 the position that God’s existence, such as it may or may not be,
makes no practical difference in the conduct of human life. However, unlike Hobbes, for whom
practical atheism was supplanted with a binding external source of obligation, they sought to
establish a dependable source of obligation internal to society, and to show that even without a
rational justification, “morality has a motivational hold on us…because it is tied to our nature—
not our supposed nature as rational pursuers of the good, but to our nature as moved by nonrational Lockean desires,”390 which simply urge us towards pleasure and away from pain.
Smith’s sentimentalist predecessors significantly inform his thought, so it is worthwhile
to briefly summarize their contributions to the philosophic movement. Hutcheson was a disciple
of the English moralist Lord Shaftesbury, whom Locke responded to in his Second Treatise.391
Hutcheson argues that emotions, or sentiments, are a more plausible source of action than reason,
and more solid items of experience. As such, against moral theories rooted rational self-interest
or logic, he theorizes that there is an innate moral sense that infallibly distinguishes good and
evil. This moral sense does not contain innate ideas, knowledge, or propositions, but is rather an
innate sensation of finding pleasure in things that are not necessarily to our advantage, such as
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benevolence, beauty, or harmony.392 Hutcheson also offers an account of moral judgment that
allows the moral agent to judge from an impersonal standpoint. Though he was not the first
empiricist to question egoistic psychology, he was the first to reframe moral judgment in terms
of a disinterested spectator rather than in terms of the reason or psychology of the agent. On
account of one’s moral sense, he argues, when we come across the disinterested motive of
benevolence, a disinterested feeling of approval for such actions are naturally evoked,
uninfluenced by any thought of benefit to oneself.393 It is the reaction of the disinterested
spectator that is essential and novel to his thought.
Hume further develops the concept of the disinterested spectator, by delving into the
nature of the moral sense’s capacity to feel approval or disapproval. The nature of approval, he
argues, arises from the feeling of sympathy with the pleasure or pain of the person that is
affected by the action being judged. The value of a disinterested moral theory, Hume argues, is
that it allows a person to,
depart from his private and particular situation [because] he must choose a point
of view, common to him and others: He must move some universal principle of
the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and
symphony.394
Together, Hutcheson and Hume established the Scottish Enlightenment not as an age of reason,
but an age of feeling—a philosophy in which moral motive and judgment are determined by
affect rather than cognition, yet are nevertheless also impartial on account of disinterest, and
rational on account of their universality. Unlike morality derived from reason that relies on
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logical agreement, they argue that moral approval relies on an agreement of experience, which
makes it necessarily relational and experiential.
Smith’s application of the scientific method to uncover sociological truths means that the
time, not just of science, but of society becomes relevant. That is, it is because he takes society to
be the site of causal analysis that history plays a necessary and central role in his thought. In so
far as causes precede effects, tracing a chain of causes and effects necessarily entails a temporal
aspect, and when those causes are social, the temporality is historical. The scientific,
sociological, and historical dimensions of Smith’s thought are vividly apparent in his early essay,
“The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophic Enquiries: Illustrated by the History of
Astronomy.”395 He seeks to uncover the “nature and causes”396 of the sentiments that prompt
scientific inquiry in the first place, and to deduce a connection between disparate appearances by
some principle itself derived from particulars.397 He examines the processes by which
cosmological systems are developed, and the processes by which one is replaced with another,
and concludes the process to be driven by the mind’s desire to find tranquility amid the chaos of
nature. As such, science and philosophy actually represent,
the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to
introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this
tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions
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of the universe, to that tone of tranquility and composure, which is both most
agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its nature.398
It is, he finds, the experience of incoherence, which prompts the postulation of connecting
principles that link together disjointed appearances, bridging one object to another. Smith
determines imagination alone to insufficiently explain the emergence and development of
philosophy, however, because though particular minds may be compelled to develop theories,
individuals cannot be divorced from their social contexts. As such, Smith couples his
psychological analysis with a sociological one. Seeking to determine a cause that made the
emergence of a philosophic age from a pre-philosophic age possible, he argues that, only “when
law has established order and security, and subsistence ceases to be precarious, the curiosity of
mankind is increased, and their fears are diminished.” 399 In short, it is only a particular social
context, one of security and leisure, that enables individuals to engage in projects of human
knowledge; society is necessarily prior to philosophy and determinative to some extent.
Smith proceeds to trace a chain of causes and effects that directly connects the emergence
of Greek philosophy to Newton, an approach that also plays a role in his moral philosophy. Since
the object of Smith’s concern is feelings, the site of his empirical investigation is the source of
feelings—the material and social conditions of human life. Further, for Smith, society is not only
the source and site of moral feelings; it is the source of self. This point will be elaborated more
fully, but it is sufficient here to simply note his postulation that a human who grew to adulthood
devoid of contact with other humans “could no more think of his own character, of the propriety
or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face.”400 The self and
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morality mutually and necessarily develop, he argues, in the context of society—a system both
material and causal, which may therefore be subject to empirical study. He thus commits himself
to just such an analysis of society, developing a socially grounded theory of practical reason. The
consequence of a scientific approach to a social context is that the time, not just of science, but of
society becomes relevant.
Smith’s interest in history also reflects a broader reevaluation of the nature, meaning, and
value of history.401 In the 18th century, causal analyses of society combined with an incredible
expansion of historical artifacts, which led to inquiries that sought to understand the past causes
of the present, an inquiry from which the concept of historical development emerged.402 Previous
understandings of history were largely instrumental insofar as they were narrative in nature,
focusing on the exemplary actions of a single figure and designed to illuminate a moral truth.403
Such was the concept of history known to Hobbes and Locke, and one reason both thinkers
rejected it—narrative history is capable of producing prudence not prediction, and both
prioritized the predictive nature of causal analysis. Despite his early fascination with history,
Hobbes ultimately rejects it for a scientific approach, which simultaneously could bring the
future under control and establish a new historical trajectory. Locke goes even further, offering a
thoroughly ahistorical argument, and a moral philosophy that prioritizes divine temporality to
guard against the material present. Both thinkers jettison the past and turn to the future. In
comparison, Smith’s commitment to a causal, systemic analysis of society renders the present
understandable by virtue of its relationship to the past.
401

For an excellent summary of the transition from narrative history to erudition history and the
implications for 18th century philosophy see: J. G. A. Pocock, “Adam Smith and History,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge Companions to
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
402
Buchan, The Authentic Adam Smith, 34–6.
403
Pocock, “Adam Smith and History,” 271–2.
151

Smith brings empirical analysis to bear not on the chaos of nature, but on industry and
institutions, which necessarily entails a human temporality distinct from nature. Such a historical
analysis reveals, he argues, patterns and guiding principles that render human behavior and
social organizations intelligible. He is particularly interested in the nature of moral personality,
which he defines as “those features of the human mind and those modes of interaction between
several minds which gave rise to moral practices in the human species.”404 As such, he traces the
patterns its practices assume in different social, economic, and political circumstances, and
identifies universal, though historically variable, features of morality. Moreover, he finds
morality to be not merely a universal feature of human society, but the ultimate causal force of
historical organization.405
Smith departs from Hobbes and Locke, not only in his engagement with the past, but also
in his evaluation of the future. This is due, in part, to the fact that the 18th century saw not only
an intellectual reevaluation of history, but widespread changes to the experience of time—to how
people understood their relationship to the past and expectations of the future. Jürgen Habermas
describes this period as one in which the present is characterized “as a transition that is
consumed in the consciousness of a speeding up and in the expectation of the differentness of the
future.”406 Reinhart Koselleck argues that spreading understandings of time as progress created a
sense of acceleration that made it difficult for people to imagine the future because the “space of
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experience” no longer matched the “horizon of expectation.”407 Pocock posits that “the growth of
public credit obliged capitalist society to develop as an ideology something society had never
possessed before, the image of a secular and historical future.”408
The new and generalized anxiety regarding the future these three ascribe to Smith’s
historical time, combined with his own theory of moral causation help to flesh out the more
ambiguous relationship to the future he has in comparison to Hobbes and Locke. For, whereas
Hobbes argued that society salves the individual’s anxiety for the unknown future, 18th century
society was itself permeated with anxiety. Smith does not share in this anxiety wholeheartedly,
but neither does he embrace the future uncritically as Locke does.409 For although, dynamics of
human nature, are presupposed in his theory of moral causation, unlike the hard determinism of
physical causation, moral causes operate through habituation or socialization, and can
accommodate change or variation. This is why, he argues, that though sociality is true of all
humans, institutional expression is not uniform, but neither is it random. Rather, its particular
expression results from the relation between the fixed principles of human nature and variable
external circumstances. Smith’s historical analysis is primarily an attempt to reduce this variation
to an intelligible pattern. The most essential manifestation of Smith’s analysis is the “four-stages
theory” in which Smith maps Locke’s model of cognitive development (from infancy to
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maturity) on to society (from simple to complex) to explain the development from
hunter/gatherer to commercial societies. A hard determinism or necessity is often ascribed to this
theory, but a close reading of Smith reveals these stages to be independent from one another.
Smith’s more general point seems to be that the level of abstraction in society is reflected in
social structures in predictable ways. For example, the inability to think of property in the
abstract or distinct from oneself informs economic, political, aesthetic, and social
arrangements.410
This essentially means that although he identifies morality as causal, its value is more
explanatory than predictive. Morality is only predictive insofar as it can be predicted that
different social experiences produce different social characters. Because the context in which
morality expresses itself is a series of complex, overlapping systems that can never be
thoroughly grasped in the present, its usefulness lies more in retrospective explanation rather
than prospective prediction. Though greater understanding can aid in the further development of
moral personality, Smith understands social change to largely be the result of unintended
consequences rather than deliberate action. It is for this reason that he is particularly weary of
deliberate attempts to produce specific futures, especially, as will be elaborated more fully, by
politicians.
Taken collectively, Smith’s thought reflects a number of intersecting ideas about time.
His scientific approach necessarily entails a conception of time that is causal, empirical, and
linear. This is in part why he rejects rationalism, which produces truths abstracted from material
existence that are consequently atemporal. He further rejects eternal conceptions, be they framed
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theologically in divine right or class privilege, because they are similarly incommensurate with a
materially grounded temporality. Thus far, the time of Smith’s thought is quite resonate with
Hobbes’s. They divert, however, on the question of time itself. For Hobbes, time is subjectively
constituted. Self-consciousness is, for him, a unique and distinct temporal landscape of memory
and imagination. Time has no objective existence, and we do not inhabit or share a singular
temporal experience. We also appear this way to one another—unique and indecipherable
temporal trajectories, which leaves us anxious and engenders violence. For Smith, time is
constituted socially—it is society that gives birth to the self which means both that we cannot
help but to see ourselves through the eyes of others and to consider our past and future in terms
of a shared temporality. Though Smith finds this temporal mapping of the self to society to be a
largely positive phenomenon, it also produces tensions, and for Smith, as for Locke and Hobbes,
political institutions appear as a means of temporal intervention. For Smith’s analysis
demonstrates how social institutions affect the perception of time. People do not blindly act for
the future, they act for the future that is possible, and that perception of possibility is shaped by
the way institutions of power, be they political or economic, orchestrate human interaction.
Though not an unqualified good, Smith views political institutions as singularly capable of
beneficial tinkering with temporal perceptions, of preventing the immediacy of the present from
becoming a source of domination, and of protecting the public from the tendency of the
economically powerful to offset future risks to them. The foundation upon which Smith makes
this argument is a dialectic relationship between subjectivity and society, and it is here that we
now turn.
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Theory of Consciousness
Imagination
Like Hobbes and Locke, imagination is foundational to Smith’s theory of consciousness.
It is for him what distinguishes the human mind from other minds, and he finds the work of
imagination is the necessary condition for the development of subjectivity. He argues that it is
imagination that allows people to create a distinctly human sphere within the natural world, for it
is only by way of imagination that we are capable of interpreting the chaotic nature of our
experience. Our material existence, he writes,
seems to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent with all that go
before them, which therefore disturb the easy movement of the imagination…and
which thus tend, in some measure, to introduce…confusions and distractions.411
Frustrated by the incoherence, confusion, and distraction of the events in the material world,
imagination seeks to be soothed; it seeks tranquility. 412 He argues that such a motivation for
tranquility prompts the primary activity of imagination—the spontaneous search for order,
coherence, and agreement in the world. However, Smith is clear that it is the perception of order,
the mere fact of order, that is inherently pleasurable and brings tranquility to the mind. The
utility of order or the specific content of any particular system, is largely irrelevant. Smith
develops this argument in “History of Astronomy,” which focuses neither the “absurdity or
probability,” of particular cosmological systems, nor “their agreement or inconsistency with truth
and reality.”413 He is rather interested in determining “how far each [system] was fitted to sooth
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the imagination,” by rendering “nature more coherent” than it previously appeared to be.414
Smith further argues that although each cosmological system is identified with an individual—be
it Copernicus or Newton, the conception of a system is a fundamentally social phenomenon, for
no system, no matter how well supported, will fail “gain any general credit in the world,” if its
“connecting principles were not such as were familiar to all mankind.”415 He chooses an
explicitly scientific subject matter, and engages in causal analysis, but what he uncovers is not
the nature of the material world, but the relationship between the material and social world. In
this way, he aims to demonstrates that philosophy does not reveal the systems that order the
world, but rather reveals the nature of human sentiments that give rise to systems of order.416
Smith begins “History of Astronomy” by identifying the three sentiments that prompt
imagination to action. An encounter with the “unexpected” excites surprise, the “new and
singular” stimulates wonder, and the “great and beautiful” rouse admiration.417 The discontinuity
and differentiation Hobbes, Locke, and Smith identify with idea generation are temporal
concepts, as they entail both a general comparison of before and after, but also rely on personal
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memory and anticipation. However, where Hobbes and Locke describe this process as rather
neutral, for Smith it is a profound source of anxiety, because it is temporally arresting. For when
we encounter two objects or events that have an unexpected relationship, the “progress of
imagination”418 is interrupted. It “pauses on the brink,” 419 unable to move forward. Fixated on
filling the “interval betwixt the two immediately succeeding objects” with “some chain of
intermediate events,”420 the imagination is unable to move beyond the present. Such an arresting
state induces “uncertainty and anxious curiosity.”421 Here, Smith rejoins Hobbes and Locke in
determining anxiety to be the underlying cause of all action. It is the anxiety of wonder that spurs
the imagination into action, because it is a state one wants to “get rid of.”422
Smith then divides the work of imagination into two categories, theoretical and practical.
The theoretical work of imagination is concerned with creating harmony between things and
events, and culminates in intellectual systems of aesthetics, sciences, and philosophy.423 A
system produced by the intellectual work of imagination, he argues, “is an imaginary machine
invented to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are
already in reality performed.”424 This is an important admission, because it affirms the reality of
objective phenomenon, even as it denies philosophy the ability to accurately represent them.
Hume’s influence on Smith is clear here, as Hume first proposed that reality is not nature, but
418
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fashioned by imaginations within nature.425 However, Smith’s position is neither that
imagination creates the world, nor that philosophy is arbitrary; he argues that the world is made
into a unified, coherent, intelligible whole by imagination, but not out of thin air. Smith’s view
regarding the relationship between philosophy and the mind-independent world parallels Locke’s
agnosticism regarding the true nature of things, given the mediated nature of perception. Yet,
despite the importance Smith clearly ascribes to the production and evolution of the theoretical
work of imagination, he is also clear that such work is secondary to its practical work, for it is
epistemologically prior and experientially dominant.
Practical Imagination: Spectatorship and Sympathy
Smith views the practical work of imagination as primary and prior to the theoretical,
because it is compelled by the pressing nature of our social existence. Where intellectual work is
concerned with creating harmony between objects by way of theoretical systems, the practical
work of imagination is concerned with creating harmony through agreement. This means the
practical work of imagination is moral in nature, and entails the development of moral judgment,
which Smith develops by way of sentimentalist theories of spectatorship and sympathy.
For Smith, spectatorship results from the imagination’s need to satisfy its desire for order.
Unlike our experience of events that compels the theoretical work of imagination, however, we
spontaneously see people as responsible for making some change in the environment. That is, we
spontaneously ascribe actions to people, which allows us both to see them as coherent and
identical over time, and to see them as purposeful agents. The agreement the imagination seeks
therefore entails not objects or events, but others. However, without access into the interior
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world of others, the imagination uses the empirical data available—the other person’s observable
circumstances and behavior, to create order in the observer’s perception by way of an imagined
rational for behavior.426 This is not a subject-object relationship, on account of Smith’s theory on
the social origin and nature of consciousness and subjectivity, which makes our imagination of
others sympathetic and self-reflective. He further develops his theory in order to expand the
sphere of moral judgment to include oneself, which makes reciprocity between equals possible,
thereby allowing him to overcome the limitations of Hutcheson and Hume’s sentimentalism, in
which moral judgment is a purely disinterested or intellectual endeavor from an impersonal
standpoint associated with agent neutrality.427 Smith makes moral judgment an activity of the
lived, moral present.
It is sympathetic imagination that allows us to bridge the gap between ourselves and
others, a point he initially illustrates by evoking the traumatic witnessing of physical violence—
“our brother upon the rack” or “a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of
another person.”428 While sympathy is perhaps most obviously felt when witnessing another’s
pain or sorrow, it is not limited to pity or compassion, but rather denotes “our fellow-feeling with
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any passion whatever.”429 While our senses can never “carry us beyond our own person…by the
imagination we place ourselves” in another’s situation and “thence form some idea” of what
another may feel, and “though weaker in degree, [it] is not altogether unlike them.”430 With this
clarification, Smith distances himself from Hume’s conception of sympathy, in which the
observer naturally feels identically to the observed. For Smith, the spectator often does not
naturally sympathize with the agent, and his seeking to iron out the disagreement is actually an
act of will.431 Moreover, sympathy is not about getting “out” of oneself and “into” another. This
common portrayal of Smith’s thought ascribes a Cartesian framing that Smith’s thought does not
have, for it presumes selves to be isolated and independent units, whereas for Smith, we
necessarily see ourselves through the eyes of others, and vice versa.
It is because Smith does not understand selves to be isolated monads that he understands
sympathy not to join us with others’ minds but to others’ worlds. That is, sympathy seeks to
render the point of view of the agent comprehensible, by evaluating and contextualizing a
person’s circumstances and motivations. Because sympathy “does not arise so much from the
view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it,”432 sympathy moves beyond
representation or reproduction and allows us to comprehend the agent’s story and perspective,
but in a way that is not limited to that perspective. It is precisely because sympathy bridges the
gap between the agent and the spectator, while retaining the fundamental separateness between
the two that judgment is made possible. However, though sympathy is an essential component of
judgment, it is not in itself, judgment. We cannot get to the stage of judgment, of approving or
disapproving a point of view, until we can see that it is a point of view. As such, sympathetic
429
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imagination is the necessary condition of assessment, and one intentionally cultivated by the
spectator, who is not passive but active, engaged, and critical of the social world. It is the
material stage of sympathetic imagination that produces moral judgments that must account for
the causality and temporality of the world.
Judgment
Because Smith understands judgment to be made possible by the exercise of sympathetic
imagination, the primary form of judgment he identifies is that performed by a spectator on the
motivations for action of another. He explains,
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect
concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to
this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when,
upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with
what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable
to the causes which excite them.433
Here, he reaffirms that the exercise of sympathy is one in which the spectator imagines herself in
the agent’s place, in order to understand the relational tableau of emotions and the objects they
are tied to that form the context for the agent’s actions. Imagining herself in the agent’s place,
the spectator compares the motivations and feelings of the agent with the feelings she would
have in that same situation. The nature of the judgment made possible by this exercise is the
propriety or impropriety of an action—where the spectator finds an agreement of feelings, there
is a judgment of approval, where not, disapproval.
The relationship between sympathy and judgment is not one of identity, but of causality.
Sympathy necessarily causes and determines judgments insofar as the spectator “must allow” or
“cannot deny” their own agreement or disagreement with the sentiments of others.434 This means
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that the development of judgment relies, not on the act of judging itself, for this is a process in
which the spectator has little if any control. Rather, it is through the willful development of the
sympathetic imagination that a person may in turn develop a more sophisticated moral sense.
Because judgment is always derived from an exercise in perspective, not from a universal
maxim, Smith’s moral agent develops in the lived present.
One of the most significant implications of locating moral judgment in the lived,
personal, social present, is that temporality of action uniquely factors into Smith’s theory of
judgment. He directly criticizes philosophers who “have, of late years, considered chiefly the
tendency of affections, and given little attention to the relation which they stand in to the cause
which excites them.”435 That is, he finds the moral theories of his contemporaries to contemplate
moral judgment in a vacuum without considering the material and relational context that shapes
motivation. Such an approach focuses on judging the consequences of actions, which is a
problem because it neglects the motives that cause action. As a corrective, Smith argues that
moral judgment entails a two-fold process of imagination—sympathizing with the agent to
determine the propriety of his motive (the cause) and sympathizing with the recipient to
determine the merit of the action (the effect).436 In this way, sympathy constructs a complicated
web of relations between agents and objects in the material world, and between the present and
435
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the future. It further enables the creation of a spectator who, unlike actual spectators in society,
can bridge the multiple perspectives and multiple temporalities necessary to make a judgment
that is truly impartial. And, it is this work of imagination, Smith argues, that allows us to develop
an impartial spectator, which ultimately allows us to judge, and correct, our own motives.
The Impartial Spectator
Contrary to Hume and Hutcheson, who posit that humans have a natural disposition of
care, Smith argues that all feelings result from socialization, and that these feelings are only
apparent to us through mediation of the other. Not only is our own consciousness is not
transparent to us, but as Griswold notes, “we have no determinate moral selves ‘there’ waiting to
be made transparent.” Smith illustrates this point by way of a thought experiment in which he
supposes “a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any
communication with his own species.”437 He concludes that,
To a man who from his birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions,
the external bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole
attention. The passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows,
which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately present to
him, could scarce ever be the objects of this thoughts.438
For a truly isolated being, Smith argues, passions cannot become objects of reflection, but when
brought into society, “he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted
before…Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of
new passions.”439 On becoming a spectator, the imagination is compelled to fill in the gap of
understanding constituted by the purposeful agents it witnesses. Its first creation is thus the
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creation of the idea of others, followed shortly by the idea of others’ feelings, then the
recognition of our own feelings, and finally reflection on them.
It is society alone that makes it possible for us to have a reflective relationship with
ourselves, but what we realize in that reflection is that our desires and feelings, which are now
apparent to ourselves, remain inextricably linked to society. We become aware that we are
observers, but also observed—that we judge, but also are judged. And it is the effect on the agent
of the reactions of the spectators that give rise to the impartial spectator. It is our twin
recognition both of our own spectatorship of others’ actions and others’ spectatorship of our
actions that lead us to imagine how a spectator with all the relevant information would judge us.
The imagination of impartiality on our own behalf leads to the creation of the impartial spectator,
who allows us to impartially judge ourselves, and the only position from which we can
impartially judge ourselves, is from a distance. The imagination’s ability to adopt a position free
from particular desires is akin to Locke’s insofar as both essentially argue that we are able to
affect our own desires to the extent that we can temporarily escape the pressing experience of the
present and the desires it necessarily compels. The difference for Smith, however, is that such
imaginative acts retain their fundamentally social character.
The spectator Smith describes is impartial because he has no particular perspective, but is
able to access any. He illustrates this point from the perspective of his own writing desk, which
distorts “an immense landscape of lawns, and woods, and distant mountains,” making them
appear to “do no more than cover the little window” nearby. In order to “form some judgment”
of the “real proportions” of the “great objects” in the distance as compared to the “little objects”
close at hand, it is necessary, he writes, to transport “myself at least in fancy, to a different
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station, from whence I can survey both at nearly equal distance.”440 However, the impartial
spectator allows us to assume not only a perspective of equidistance in space, but also in time.
For, judgment is not limited to present motives, but future consequences, and the impartial
spectator thus assumes a position equidistant from both. In this way, we are freed not merely
from the biases of society, but crucially, our present interests, whose proximity often
overshadows the distant future. Adopting the disinterested perspective of the impartial spectator
allows us to view our own motivations neutrally, and thus to judge them correctly. Moreover, it
is because we desire to have desires the impartial spectator would approve of that gives our
emotions the structure they need to change in response to these judgments.441
For Smith, the normative force of the impartial spectator stems from the fact that it
defines an already latent moral point of view. The standards for impartial spectatorship are not
independent of the impartial spectator, there is no further searching for spectator independent
standards, no Platonic forms or independent moral order to which the impartial spectator’s
judgments must cohere. The impartial spectator is the “natural and original measure”442 of virtue,
and its judgments are, themselves, morally defining. However, Smith understands the impartial
spectator as superior to the actual spectators of society, because it is necessarily created in the
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context of a particular society, is not bound by pure reason, and does not correspond to any
independent moral order. This is one of the most controversial dimensions of his thought.
A point modern commentators often miss,443 however, is that Smith himself was quite
sensitive to the relative nature of spectatorship, and the impartial spectator emerges in his work
as a deliberate attempt to overcome the individual tendency to mirror social judgments. In fact,
his early lectures on ethics that were the original source material for The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, lack any reference to an impartial spectator.444 On its first publication, Sir Gilbert
Elliot set Smith the task of explaining how moral judgment can ever go against popular opinion
if its ultimate foundation is actual social attitudes. In response, Smith develops his theory of the
impartial spectator and includes it in subsequent editions. Though society first informs moral
judgment, the apparent partiality and ignorance of actual spectators compels the imagination to
conceive of “a person quite candid and equitable, of one who has no particular relation…an
impartial spectator who considers” conduct with “indifference.”445 It is the work of imagination,
that allows for the development of a perspective of impartiality that ultimately frees the impartial
spectator from whatever social biases it may initially possess, and which thus makes it a superior
arbiter.
A similar, if not more forceful criticism of the impartial spectator is aimed at the structure
of Smith’s theory. It interrogates whether the impartial spectator allows us to evaluate our
443
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conduct from the perspective of any human being, as Smith would have us do. Using sentiments
rather than reason as the basis for judgment, Smith wants us to be free not from all feelings nor
to reach for a principle derived from reason independent from feeling. Rather, he wants us to be
free of partial feelings, and feelings are inextricably shaped by societies.446 Here, the absence of
Kantian transcendental principles in favor of judgments rooted in everyday sentiments are made
apparent—how can the impartial spectator judge differently from neighbors, let alone correct for
systematic bias? Yet Smith says that we must “endeavor to examine our own conduct as we
imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would imagine it,”447 which, Amartya Sen, argues
implies that the impartial spectator encompasses views outside of our own cultural context, and
“is a requirement that can bring in judgments that would be made by disinterested people from
other societies as well.”448 Smith’s own work demonstrates his interest in moving beyond his
particular social context, as he explicitly sought to bring non-Christian and non-Western ethical
viewpoints into his thought. He incorporates examples from Ancient Grecian and Roman
societies, and anthropological reports from around the world, particularly the indigenous
inhabitants of North America, in the service of demonstrating a matter of empirical fact—that
morality may simply be a human construct,449 but it is universal insofar as it is the product of
empirically observable generality. Though it is not reflective of independent truth, he finds that
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constructing morality is natural to mankind;450 there are no conditions in which people do not
generate moral conventions.
Moreover, he finds that human morality has hitherto had certain stable features that
persist, because as Haakonssen and Winch argue, there is an “underlying pattern of reasoning” to
them, namely, that “groups of people have found it difficult to avoid if they are to have a chance
of remaining in a community.”451 This is why although Smith concedes that “established
custom” does potentially distort moral judgment, and “can give sanction” to dreadful violations
of humanity,452 he nevertheless argues that “the sentiments of moral approbation and
disapprobation are founded on the strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature; and
though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted.”453 This reflects a concern
Smith reinforces elsewhere, for the equal worth of every human being,454 which is the ultimate
basis of moral sentiments for “a man of humanity.”455 And, it is through the imaginative capacity
that produces the impartial spectator, that makes it possible to expand our sympathy, and the
sympathy of the impartial spectator, beyond our own particular individual and social context.

450

By arguing that morality is a kind of natural artifice, Smith offers a resolution to a central
debate between the Stoics and Epicureans that had been vigorously revived in early modern
philosophy. Stoics argued that people have the capacity to govern their lives according to the
orderliness that objectively structures the world. Epicureans argued that people are self-interested
and morality is invented to regulate self-interest. Early moderns revived this debate, mostly by
reviving the Stoic idea that morality is natural (also through Plato and Aristotle), but
Christianized so morality is a divine gift, such is the case with the Cambridge Platonists and
ethical rationalists. For Neo-Epicureans, like Hume, Hobbes, and Mandeville, morality is a
contrivance and political institutions are necessary to reinforce rules. See Schneewind, The
Invention of Autonomy.
451
Haakonssen and Winch, “The Legacy of Adam Smith,” 387.
452
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 210 (V.2.15).
453
Ibid., (V.2.1).
454
For more on Smith’s theory of human dignity see Remy Debes, “Adam Smith on Dignity and
Equality,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012): 109–40; Darwall,
“Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith.”
455
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 90 (II.ii.3.II), also 137 (III.3.5).
169

The novelty and appeal of Smith’s theory of impartial spectatorship is that it is rooted in
empathetic view of existing society, but compelled both to extend that empathy beyond the
familiar in ways that make critique of the familiar possible. In this way, moral judgment appears
in his thought not simply as a faculty, but as a process that enables correction and development,
both individually and historically. Smith is seeking to illuminate not only a process of personal
development, but a possibility of social progress. At the individual level, he argues,
there exists in the mind of every man, an idea [of exact propriety and perfection]
gradually formed from his observations upon the character and conduct both of
himself and of other people. It is the slow, gradual, and progressive work of the
great demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct.456
Yet while an individual’s relationship to the impartial spectator may be motivated by an idea of
perfect judgment, collective moral development is itself a process with no determined end. The
goal of history is therefore progress, not perfection. Though Smith identifies stable features of
morality, and evidence of moral progress, such progress is in no way necessary. The uncertainty
and contingency of life renders predictions or planning for the future a fools’ errand for Smith,
and this is precisely where the urgency in his theory lies. The past can reveal gaps in our
understanding, which can sharpen the critical inquiry of the impartial spectator in the present, but
this is productive only insofar as the present remains the context for judgment, and the future,
undeterminable as it is, is approached with caution.
One important consequence of Smith’s approach is that unlike Hobbes and Locke, who
are led to speculate about the emergence of consciousness in the abstract or pre-societal
individual, Smith understands human nature to be not merely naturally social, but necessarily
social. Thus, there is no need to create a bridge between man and society, historically or
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conceptually, as they do. Since, there is no gap between natural society and artificial society,
there is no need for a bridge such as the social contract Hobbes and Locke propose.
Another consequence of Smith’s thought is that he makes the social present the actual
context for moral life, and the actual context for moral judgment. This is a significant
development in sentimentalist philosophy, as both Hume and Hutcheson theorize moral
judgment abstractly in terms of an impersonal standpoint that is neither personally reflective nor
practically actionable. Despite the social context that grounds spectatorship, it is not a theory that
necessarily requires reciprocity or accountability in one’s own life. As a theory of judgment
rooted in observation, it is naturally suited to the judgment of others’ actions, or past actions.
Judging in the case of the first person, or in the present are much more difficult, and Smith’s
most significant contribution is developing spectatorship such that a person can judge her own
actions, in a social context of equals, thereby making the lived present the domain of moral
judgment.
Theory of Action
Morality and Motivation
Like Hobbes and Locke, Smith locates the cause of human action in motivation. Smith’s
theory is unique, however, in that he stresses that human motivations are heterogeneous, shaped
by external factors that principally include the judgments of others, institutional organization,
and incentives, and by internal forces of self-love, self-interest, and moral personality.
The final edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, includes an entirely new section,
Part IV, in which he fully develops the relationship between morality and motivation. He
contends that the standard of judgment employed by the impartial spectator is virtue. Though
actual spectators often judge by a standard of “approximation,” the impartial spectator’s standard
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is “exact propriety and perfection.”457 He then identifies four primary virtues by which moral
personality is developed: self-command,458 benevolence,459 justice, and prudence. Of these,
justice and prudence are most important and germane to this inquiry, as they are fundamentally
temporal, and because Smith identifies them as the foundation of social institutions.
Prudence consists of a union of two temporal qualities. Regarding the future, it entails
“superior reason and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote
consequences of all our actions, and of foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to
result from them.”460 It is bolstered by the virtue of self-command, which enables us to “abstain
from present pleasure or endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a
greater pain in some future time.”461 Such actions will always be “supported and rewarded” by
the impartial spectator because its judgment collapses the distance between the present and the
future, standing equidistant from both. To the impartial spectator, an agent’s
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present, and what is likely to be [his] future are very nearly the same: he sees
them nearly at the same distance, and is affected by them nearly at the same
distance, and is affected by them very nearly in the same manner.462
Yet the impartial spectator also knows that “the persons principally concerned, they are very far
from being the same,” because they are far more strongly influenced by the present, and he
therefore approves the ability “to act as if their present and their future situation affected them
nearly in the same manner in which they affect him.”463
Though Smith concedes that prudence expresses itself in “the practice of frugality,
industry, and application…directed to no other purpose than the acquisition of fortune,” he
nevertheless argues that it is “the resolute firmness of the person who…in order to obtain a great
though remote advantage, not only gives up all present pleasures, but endures the greatest labour
both of mind and body” that “necessarily commands our approbation.”464 Smith’s point here, is
that it is not the material gains that the impartial spectator values, but what the physical and
mental labor of deferment symbolize; it is the endurance that symbolizes praiseworthiness and
commands approbation. In this way, prudence links the moral philosophic concept of self-love
with the practical philosophic of self-interest, in a way that deters greed and selfishness. For
prudent self-interest, concerned as it is with the approval of the impartial spectator, refuses to be
“hurried…by any necessity, but has always time and leisure to deliberate soberly and coolly
concerning what are likely to be”465 the consequences of any decision. It is the approval of
endurance and sacrifice that prevents an agent from succumbing to the pressures or incentives of
the present. A person so oriented, Smith argues, is “rather cautious than enterprising, and more
anxious to preserve the advantages which we already possess, than forward to prompt us to the
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acquisition of still greater advantages.”466 This means, Tribe argues, that a “Smithian conception
of self-interest is not an injunction to act egoistically and without moral scruple,” but it is rather
“embedded within a framework of social reciprocity that allows for the formation of moral
judgment.”467 In other words, self-interest, properly considered, is not free from moral judgment;
is a product of it.
As for the virtue of justice, Smith argues that it entails the avoidance of injury to
interests, and is unique among virtues because its violation causes a sharper reaction among
spectators. Unlike benevolence, whose failure does “no real positive evil,” and consequently
produces mere “dislike” or “disapprobation,” a failure of justice “does a real and positive hurt to
some particular persons.”468 As such, it is “the proper object of resentment,” among spectators,
“and of punishment, which is the natural consequence of resentment.”469 Like prudence, justice
works against myopic self-interest, but whereas prudence helps an agent to overcome a
perspective limited to the present, justice helps an agent overcome a failure to consider others.
Smith writes that to the spectators, injustice is,
a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every
respect, as good as he: they do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers
himself so much to this other, and cannot go along with the motive from which he
hurt them. They readily, therefore sympathize with the natural resentment of the
injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and indignation.470
The spectator’s rebuke stems from a violation of a sense of fairness that includes a notion of
equality between people, and an excessive or imprudent self-love that is insufficiently limited.
To the extent that an agent is able to internalize the impartial spectator, who similarly affirms
these values, he is able to properly direct self-interest in consideration of equals. Because
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violations of justice prompt a particular and atypically forceful moral reaction, it demands a
more stringent obligation to conform than other virtues. This negative incentive thus compels the
agent to judge not only her motivations, but their probable consequences more attentively.
Justice and Politics
The four moral virtues Smith identifies are not only inherent to personal moral character,
but are reflected socially as well. In the case of justice and prudence, they are not merely
reflected, but are the very foundation of social institutions. Because Smith’s conception of justice
is “a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour,”471it is unique in two
respects. First, it is the very foundation of all social life, as no society could “subsist among those
who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another.”472 Justice is primary because it
provides the security that is foundational to any other political, social, or economic dimension of
human life. This is an important point, as the primacy of security is often overlooked in
traditional interpretations of Smith’s thought that focus on The Wealth of Nations, which portray
economic freedom as primary in his thought. Yet Smith is clear that justice “is the main pillar
that upholds the whole edifice [of society]. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of
human society,…must in a moment crumble into atoms.”473
Secondly, the specificity of conduct required by justice make it uniquely capable of
forming a body of general laws. The action guiding power of positive virtues like prudence or
benevolence is much more uncertain than that of justice, making them an improper foundation
for regulating moral conduct.474 The requirements of justice, on the other hand, are precise,
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insofar as injury is considered an evil in any type of life. As such it can be the basis for law,
regulating behavior between strangers who know nothing of one another other than they are
capable of injuring and being injured. Smith thus concludes it is the negative character of virtue
that allows it to be the subject of systematic treatment that can produce a “science of
jurisprudence” or “natural jurisprudence.”
In Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, the impartial spectator appears not to aid
individual moral development, but rather serves a public facing role. In addition to instances in
which the impartial spectator makes personal judgments pertaining to a particular situation, the
standpoint of the impartial spectator can also judge society’s laws. In the case of justice, Smith
argues that it “is violated whenever one is deprived of what he had a right to and could justly
demand from others.”475 Because the injury of injustice is a violation of rights, he employs the
impartial spectator to develop conventional categories of rights in new ways, particularly in the
case of property, contract, and delinquency, by recasting them in a relational, temporal
framework.
Of the four appearances of the impartial spectator in Lectures on Jurisprudence, two of
them appear in a discussion of property rights, and Smith invokes the impartial spectator to judge
claims of occupation—the first instance of taking possession not previously privately owned, and
prescription—exclusive usage for a long time. In both of these instances, the approval of the
impartial spectator is gained insofar as the expectation of the right-holder is reasonable. Smith
does not ground rights in the judgment of the spectator, but rather argues that the spectator
confirms or disconfirms the judgment of the right holder vis-à-vis a particular, material context.
them dogmatic, arbitrary, and repressive. Smith takes particular aim at Christian casuistry, which
attempts “to lay down exact and precise rules for the direction of every circumstance of our
behavior.” Ibid., 329 (VII.iv.7).
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He elaborates this point by way of an example that echoes Locke: gathering apples. Smith
affirms that a person, “by pulling an apple” may be judged to correctly claim a right of
occupation when, for example, another person can “go to the forest…and pull another”476—an
argument that resonates with the “enough and as good” clause of Locke’s labor theory.477 Unlike
Locke, however, whose natural law results from amalgamating reason, divine law, and property
rights, and whose state of nature is animated by abstract individuals, Smith is interested in how
rights claims are judged in society. He consequently dispenses with Locke’s argument in which
picking the apple is justified because “every man has a property in his own person,” the “labour
of his body, and the work of his hands…are properly his.”478 Smith rather begins by asking,
How is it that a man by pulling an apple should be imagined to have a right to that
apple and a power of excluding all others from it—and that an injury should be
conceived to be done when such a subject is taken [from] the possessor.479
In other words, why do others accept this property claim?
The answer, Smith argues, lies in the sympathetic imagination of the spectator, whose
judgment hinges on the possessor’s “reasonable expectation.”480 In the case of the apple, such an
expectation is reasonable because “I have gone already and bestowed my time and pains in
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procuring the fruit.”481 Here Smith incorporates a temporal metric of judgment. It is not an
abstract concepts of rights I appeal to when making a property claim, but my future expectations
regarding a particular object. The reasonableness of these expectations is a function of my
expenditures of time and labor. In other words, Smith argues that it the expenditure of one’s own
time in the past or present that is the grounds for property claims. Such claims are affirmed and
judged reasonable when expectations regarding the future are properly grounded in time spent.
With this move, Smith offers a labor theory that parallels Locke’s, yet is explanatory rather than
analytical, relational rather than ideational, causal rather than rational, and judged from the
standpoint of a social rather than divine future.
Smith similarly develops the juridical concepts of contract and delinquency along
temporal lines. The binding force of a contract, he argues, cannot come from a mere declaration
of will. Such a declaration “means no more than that it is the present design of the person…to do
so…and all that is required of him to make such a declaration be lawfull is…that it be really his
intention at that time to do as he said.”482 But sincerity regarding a present intention is an
insufficient grounds for obligation because a person may “be induced by circumstances to alter
his intention.”483 In other words, though intention references the future, there is no necessary
relationship between it and the present moment. Intentions are produced by and limited to the
present moment; they express a sincere desire to some action, but do not entail a commitment.
As such, Smith argues that obligation is rather established by promise, whereby another person is
entreated to depend on the agent to produce what is promised at some future point. The impartial
spectator enters to approve of contracts in which the expectations of both the promiser and the
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promisee are reasonably set. Here again Smith is attentive to the social and temporal realities of
human life, and is careful to theorize in terms of them. The essence of a contract, he reveals, is
not an agreement between two people, but a commitment to produce a particular future shared by
two people. It is time, but more specifically, appropriating ownership of time, that makes a
contract more than wishful thinking or fleeting preference.
The temporality of delinquency, which Smith describes as the culpable causing of injury
to another, is partially the inverse of contract. The injured party has resentment in the present,
regarding the person who caused their injury in the past. The retaliatory impulse of the injured
will only dissipate when their injury is somehow repaid. The impartial spectator is thus called
upon not to judge expectations regarding the future, but resentment regarding the past. “Injury
naturaly excites the resentment of the spectator,” he argues, “and the punishment of the offender
is reasonable as far as the indifferent spectator can go along with it.”484 However, Smith also
explores crimes that “do not immediately or directly hurt any particular person,” such as when a
sentinel falls asleep on his watch.485 Such delinquency is unique in that it does not relate to a past
instance of injury, but is a crime of “remote consequence” that “produce a great disorder in the
society.”486 In such cases, real spectators find no injured party with which to sympathize, and
may be inclined to forgive the crime. Alternatively, they may be compelled to condone harsh
punishment on account of fear of the risk or severity of future danger. Neither of these affects the
impartial spectator, who can adopt the perspective of the past and future, the individual and
society. In this way, and in each instance of his appearance in Smith’s treatment of natural
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jurisprudence, the impartial spectator serves as a means by which naturally occurring juridical
practices can be corrected.
Justice is not only a necessarily temporal concept for Smith, but one changes over time.
That is, he argues that history reveals not only how various institutional and social arrangements
lend themselves to certain justifications for practices, but also how these justifications become
untenable as those conditions change. This is one of the central arguments of Smith’s “four
stage” theory. In the area of property rights, for example, he argues that their variation is in part
due to the fact that though justice is universally concerned with the prevention of injury, what
constitutes injury is socially determined. However, he finds social change to often outpace
juridical practices, which can lead to the enforcement of a concept of injury no longer relevant to
society. For instance, he argues that the conditions of modern society have eroded the
justification for primogeniture under allodial and feudal governments, which rendered their
enforcement unjust and led to change, even if delayed.487 Turning to his historical present, Smith
argues that the foundation for certain regulations such as “exclusive privilegs of corporation”
have their basis in practices that were at the time of their introduction “necessary,” yet are
nevertheless “detrimentall to the community” as it now exists.488 In so doing, he employs history
to make the lived present the site of judgment and critique, thereby making a critical stance
towards the future possible.
Prudence and Politics
Where Smith understands justice as the foundation for the primary objective of security
in society, he determines prudence to be the basis for political economy. The link between
Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations is most evident in Smith’s treatment of
487
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prudence. Like justice, “the first and the principle object if prudence” is security.489 This end is
attained through the proper exercise of self-love and self-interest, which orients a person to the
present, making her anxious to preserve the present rather than grasp for a future of possible
rewards. The prudent person is therefore fundamentally frugal and risk averse, not on account of
fear, but as a function of “real knowledge and skill” and “assiduity and industry in the exercise of
it,”490 that results in careful calculations of the probability of success. Prudence nevertheless is
drawn towards wealth, not for the sake of its utility, but because wealth constitutes a system of
order appealing to the imagination.491 The imagination attracts us to order, and for material
creatures, that order is represented, at least partially, in objects. Thus, we labor not for objects as
ends, but because objects are the means by which we can create environments that are soothing
to the imagination. Prudence is the virtue that guides this pursuit.
Smith’s identification of imagination rather than self-interest as the well-spring of human
action is important, because it allows him to argue that labor is an expression of will, which
means it not only does not require coercion,492 but is an expression of freedom.493 However, even
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if labor is an essential part of freedom, it is also necessarily expressed within the confines of
social arrangements. How relationships are structured fundamentally affects how prudence
manifests itself, because human interactions are temporal. This is particularly true for economic
relationships, in which contracts, labor, and wages all entail negotiations between the present and
the future. Smith finds nothing inherently problematic such relations, and in fact one he views as
mutually beneficial and socially productive. However, he acknowledges that power imbalances
between the classes disrupt this reciprocity and produce an antagonism he frames in temporal
terms. The problem, he explains, is that the interests of employers and labor align only in the
abstract, or to be more precise, in the long term. “In the long-run,” he explains, “the workman
may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so
immediate.”494 In the present, where power is exercised, the relative power of the employer is
always greater than the employed, which functionally arrests workers in the present, thereby
largely certainly their ability to prudently pursue the future. However, the relative physical size
of the labor force helps to conceal the temporal power held by employers, which helps to make
employers seem vulnerable and, when workers begin to organize, in need of legal protection.
Smith argues that it is at this point that employers will “call aloud for the assistance of the civil
magistrate” to execute laws that prohibit labor organizing.495 These laws and others that attempt
“to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen” further demonstrate employers’
and idleness, arguing that labor naturally results from imagination, as labor’s very process
satisfies the imagination’s desire for order.
493
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power, as the legislature’s “counselors are always the masters,”496 owing both to their social
esteem and the social obscurity of workers.497 Cumulatively, the combination of the power of
employers, the intervention of the state on behalf of employers, and the necessity of “submitting
for the sake of present subsistence,” culminate in labor’s capitulation.498 Yet despite
understanding legislatures to often act in ways that perpetuate an inequality of interests, Smith is
also clear that these interventions merely exacerbate an inherent imbalance of power. Addressing
this imbalance, paradoxically, requires political intervention into the temporality of economic
relations.
At this point it is useful to bring Locke in as a point of comparison, as Smith shares with
him two central positions regarding the economy and politics. Both understand society and
economy to precede government, with Smith buttressing this position with historical and
anthropological investigation. Both also understand government to emerge from the conflicts
engendered by economic inequality. “Civil government,” Smith writes, “so far as it is instituted
for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or
of those who have some property against those who have none at all.”499 For Locke, economic
inequality reflects a real moral inequality among people, which makes government protection of
it noble, or at least, positive. On this point, Smith emphatically disagrees, arguing that “the
difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less than we are aware of,” and
the difference “between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise
not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education.”500
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Understanding inequality to have a principally social rather than moral cause, his critique
is informed by a care for the poor. At many points, Smith argues against poverty in the absolute
sense, by way of a keen understanding of the relationship between labor and wages. Because “a
man must always live by his work,” he explains,
his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most
occasions be somewhat more…in order to bring up a family, the labour of the
husband and wife together must, even in the lowest species of labour, be able to
earn something more than what is precisely necessary for their own
maintenance.501
His concern is not limited to absolute poverty, however, and he develops arguments for
decreasing relative poverty as well. He directly challenges those who deny that laborers need not
enjoy an elevated standard of living as the society in which they live becomes more wealthy—an
argument that strikes the contemporary reader as quite akin to those who point to the common
ownership of “luxuries” like televisions to deny the existence, or to downplay the burden, of
poverty in industrial economies. Yet Smith argues that
no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the
members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed,
cloth and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the
produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed, and
lodged.502
In this argument, made by way of considerations of collective happiness and equity, the moral
dimensions of Smith’s economic thought come more sharply into focus. His concern for
inequality is not fundamentally economic. It is not efficiency or sustainability that drives his
argument, but a moral concern for human dignity, freedom, and equality in the context of social
relations that collectively create greater possibilities for self-determination and happiness, while
simultaneously and paradoxically undermining these same possibilities for most individuals.
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Despite attesting to a natural economic distribution that is illustrated in the most wellknown appearance of the invisible hand,503 Smith nevertheless concedes that moral sentiments
are often dissatisfied with natural distribution, and “man is by nature directed to correct, in some
measure, that distribution of things which she herself would otherwise have made.”504 This
means, Raphael argues, that because both economic tendencies and common moral sentiments
are products of nature, “nature is inconsistent.”505 For his part, Smith is not perplexed by this
tension, as he posits that distribution, whether natural or augmented, “are calculated to promote
the same great end, the order of the world, and the perfection and happiness of human nature.”506
However, despite this stated parity, Smith clearly sees moral sentiments as a potentially positive
corrective, to natural distribution. The problem, as he sees it, is that such interventions also have
the potential to do more harm than good.
Nature, Smith posits, “bestows upon every virtue, and upon every vice, that precise
reward or punishment which is best fitted to encourage the one, or to restrain the other.”507 This
is why naturally occurring economic distribution is just—outcomes are not random, but reflect a
proper judgment of the virtue of any action. Human judgment is more complicated, however,
because it considers not just propriety (intent), but merit (consequence), which brings a relational
framework into judgment that nature lacks. This is why though nature would decide the
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“industrious knave” that cultivates the harvest should reap the harvest, while the “indolent good
man” who leaves it uncultivated should starve, human judgment may conclude that,
the good qualities of the one are greatly over-recompensed by those advantages
which they procure him, and that the omissions of the other are by far too severely
punished by the distress which they natural bring upon him.508
This inconsistency between the rewards and punishments of nature and moral sentiments leads to
the creation of laws, the merit of which, for Smith, depends on whether they are motivated by
virtue or by its corrupt counterpart, vice. And, unfortunately, he finds vice a far more prevalent
motive.
One reason for this is explored by Nathan Rosenberg, who explains that in addition to
articulating the conflicting forces that motive human behavior, Smith also ascribes an underlying
unscrupulousness to human personality that will “quite willingly employ predatory practices so
long as such practices are available to him.”509 If left unattended, prudent self-interest is easily
distorted into avarice, and the wealthy employ government to extend and protect their power.
This is the tendency Smith diagnoses in his critique of modern government, which is a relatively
new phenomenon, not open to pre-commercial societies. On the one hand, the loss of
dependency relationships that typified traditional societies opens new horizons of freedom.
However, this loss parallels a loss of a moral community of spectators, as commercial society is
fluidly organized by the anonymity of wages. If moral theory depends on spectatorship, such
anonymity poses a real challenge to moral action.
What this means is that in a commercial society, not only is the natural economic
distribution is inconsistent with moral judgment, but the mere absence of external restraints is
insufficient to achieving a morally just distribution because of the human tendency towards
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predatory behavior that is exacerbated by anonymity. So, however just the natural distribution
Smith refers to is, it is a fundamentally theoretical notion, as actual humans are motivated to alter
relationships and outcomes according to public or private interests. And, it is because private
interests are socially esteemed and powerful that public institutions are routinely employed to
protect private interests. The remedy for this problem is not less government per se, however, but
correctly motivated institutional mechanisms and policies.
What is needed is institutional mechanisms that counteract the avarice of the rich and
remedy the corruption of the poor, by, deterring actions that “hurt in any degree the interest of
any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but to promote that of some other” and to instead
promote “an equality of treatment” that respects interests equally.510 This entails, for example,
preventing regulations that curtail the power of labor511 and fighting the enervation of workers
through public education. In this way, laws that reflect the virtues of justice and benevolence can
create the framework for an equality of interests that produces a just distribution of wealth that is
different from that of the invisible hand, but no less natural and no less just. To the contrary, to
the extent that moral spectators judge from the standpoint of the impartial spectator, they have
the potential to create a system that is more just insofar as it expands the possibilities for
happiness across all sectors of society.
As surprising as it may be to discover a positive role for government in economic
relations, given Smith’s reputation attesting to the contrary, what is most fascinating about his
thought is revealed by exploring the relationship between institutions and human behavior.
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Unlike Locke, for whom moral sufficiency depended on individual internal reason, Smith
understands human reason, morality, and psychology to be inexorably conditioned by society. In
short, how societies are organized affect how people act in them, and to this end, large portions
of The Wealth of Nations are dedicated to analyzing various institutional frameworks. What this
treatment reveals is that the real power of institutions lie in their ability to shape temporal
perceptions. He consequently defends the importance of governing for public rather than private
interest not for the sake of an abstract commitment to virtue or concept of morality. Rather, these
interventions are virtuous because they structure relationships in ways that expand and stabilize
the horizon of the future in such a way that encourages virtuous behavior from members of
society.
These are the three primary ways Smith understands institutions to intervene in temporal
perceptions: they give to structure the future, expand its horizon, and stabilize it. Institutions give
structure to the future through incentives, by creating a framework of rewards and punishments
that shape motivation. He explains that if a society wishes to cultivate the prudent pursuit of selfinterest, an institutional order is required in which rewards for effort are neither too little nor too
great. He illustrates this point with examples at both extremes—under conditions of slavery, in
which labor is entirely severed from its rewards, Smith writes,
A person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as
much, and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is
sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by
violence only, and not by any interest of his own.512
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At the other extreme, if “a man of large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he
ought…to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation.”513 Recall that
for Smith, humans are compelled of their own volition to labor, for the order found in the
process, and the object thereby produced. Moreover, he finds a causal relationship between labor
and property, in which the time and effort of the former creates the latter, which means that ideas
of the future inform labor in the present. The problem, as he sees it, is that institutions can
disrupt or even severe this relationship. By arguing that indolence is a rational response to a
context of either excessive reward or excessive punishment, Smith seeks to illuminate how the
outcomes of one’s personal effort depend on the context in which they are expended, which
reflexively shapes motivation. By structuring incentives, institutions structure the future in a way
that informs the present—we act in the present on consideration of possible futures, and these
futures are structured by social institutions in a very concrete way. It is therefore necessary to
carefully consider how institutions implicitly and explicitly structure ideas about the future.
The determining factor for whether future incentives limit or expand possibilities in the
future, for Smith, is whether they are structured in private or public interest. He illustrates the
former by analyzing the history of apprenticeships, which he finds to be the necessary
consequence of the European policy dividing skilled and common labor.514 Though once an
appropriate division, Smith argues that the system does not cohere with commercial society and
can only be preserved by regulations that emerge from a mutually beneficial financial
relationship between corporations and kingdoms.515 He then analyzes these regulations in order
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to undermine defenses of apprenticeships. Smith’s preoccupation in this discussion is the affect
of the apprenticeship on the apprentice, and more specifically, the negative impacts of its
duration. For the years spent as an apprentice, one’s labor and wages belong to the master,
disconnecting the expense of time in the present from future rewards. It is this separation, he
argues that causes an apprentice to “likely be idle…because he has no immediate interest to be
otherwise.”516 Because present interest is informed by ideas of the future, when the future is not
one’s own, the present is stultifying. Moreover, preserving such lengthy durations in a society in
which innovation and change cause timescales to decrease only exacerbates this effect. Though
designed to preserve past methods and averse to change, in a modern economy, the apprentice
system is revealed to be one that forecloses or limits futures rather than expand them. This is
why if they were removed, “the publick would be a gainer.”517
Where Smith identifies the extended duration of apprenticeships to limit future
possibilities, however, he identifies the emergence of extended lease durations with expanded
future possibilities. This is because when “farmers have a lease for a term of years, they may
sometimes find it in their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the
farm; because they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration
of the lease.”518 Unlike the duration of apprenticeships, in this case increased timescale makes it
possible to endeavor for remote possibilities otherwise impossible. Moreover, Smith shows that
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though longer leases first emerged as a concession from landlord’s demanding higher rents, 519
they subsequently became regulated in ways that provided greater security to tenants. This
security came with the invention of ejectment that entitled damages and possessions to the
tenant, in order to curtail eviction, and by protecting the validity of leases “against every future
purchaser or proprietor of the land.”520 England offered more robust rights still, stipulating life
long leases521 and entitling every “lessee to vote for a member of parliament.”522 This is why, he
argues, in England, the “security of the tenant is equal to that of the proprietor."523 And, he
concludes, it is the laws granting security, personal freedom, and equality to the less powerful
class of tenants that “have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England than all
their boasted regulations of commerce taken together."524
Smith further argues that these laws benefit both tenants and landlords in the long run,
and that the landlord’s impulse to implement laws “calculated for what they supposed the interest
of the proprietor,” such as a preference for short leases that allow landlords to have full use of
their land,525 are misguided because they reflect a narrow conception of self-interest that fails to
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consider one’s own position socially and impartially. As such, he argues, what the landlord’s
take to be their own self-interest is actually motivated by “avarice and injustice,” which is
problematic because they “are always short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this
regulation must obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt in the long-run the real interest of the
landlord.”526
Rosenberg argues that Smith is seeking an institutional arrangement that will “cut off all
avenues (and they are many) along which wealth may be pursued without contributing to the
welfare of society…and to make possible the pursuit of self-interest only in a socially beneficial
fashion.”527 However, what is revealed in Smith’s analysis of various institutional arrangements,
is not so much the organization per se, but how organization shapes time perception, because it is
temporal ideas that primarily incentivize short or long term, risk averse or risk-seeking behavior.
By increasing the timescale of one’s personal future and simultaneously securing that future,
long leases expand the horizon of both the individual and the society. It is therefore emblematic
of the kinds of policies that contribute to the common good, as it protects individual and
collective long-term interests against individual short-term interests. Without such protections,
the unknown future and present inequality would nearly always incentivize the kind of
exploitative, short-term thinking that has, to Smith’s mind, typified much of pre-commercial
history, and continues to threaten commercial society. Smith’s position here, in many ways
echoes Hobbes—it is not personal moral failure that causes bad behavior, but uncertainty and
526
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insecurity, and it is only once security extends beyond the night that long-term communal
activities like agriculture become possible.
In addition to constructing incentives, and establishing an equality of interests, which
respectively structure the future and expand its horizon, Smith also charged government
institutions with aiding progress by stabilizing the present through public institutions. He
determines the institution most essential to this goal to be a system of public schooling. Viewing
education not as a source of social disorder but of stabilization, Smith argued strongly in favor of
compulsory general education for all children. Education helps ameliorate the debilitating effects
the division of labor, the specialization of which “confines the views of men,” and which must be
much more the case when a person’s whole attention is bestowed on the 17th part of a pin or the
80th part of a button” and is why “in every commercial nation the low people are exceedingly
stupid.”528 We get hints of Smith’s ambivalence about capitalism here—the division of labor is
essential to the development of industry that expands the possibilities of human existence. Yet,
the increasing tedium of its specialization creates workers who are “mutilated and deformed” in
their intellectual faculties.529 Education is thus a moral good, insofar as education helps workers
better understand their own interests. It is simultaneously a social good, for though the state,
derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction…the more they are
instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and
superstition….In free countries, where the safety of government depends very
much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it
must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge
rashly or capriciously concerning it.530
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Here again, Smith illustrates how policies designed to create greater social equality and power,
though they may first appear as anathema to the interest of the powerful, in truth simply
contextualize self-interest in a social reality on a longer timescale.
Social Corruption and Political Salvation
Smith identifies a dialectic relationship between moral development and economic
progress that is historically evident, but not necessary due to corruption that stymies this
progress. One of these is innate, stemming from the very foundation of human subjectivity,
imagination. For although Smith understands imagination to make moral experience possible, its
primary motivation is not to seek morality but order. The imagination’s powerful drive for
harmony entails the possibility of moral and political corruption, as it creates systems of order
that imposes a sense of realism. The love of system thus opens us to the possibility of deception,
for when imagination finds order it tends to produce moral or political conviction rooted in our
mistaken belief in the objective validity or truth of a given system. This deception carries with it
the risk of becoming a “man of system,” who believes that adhering to the principles of a
particular concept of order will make its latent truth manifest. This is problematic, Smith argues,
as it often leads to attempts to wield this knowledge as power to bring the human world under
control. Religiously, it manifests as an attempt to overly control others through the exaltation of
precise systems of duty, that are a “perversion of our natural sentiments” and produce an
“erroneous conscience.”531
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“The same principle, the same love of system,” is also politically dangerous to “those
institutions which tend to promote the public welfare.”532 It is natural, Smith argues, to
contemplate the “perfection” of a “great system of government,” because it “pleases us” to
imagine “the wheels of the political machine” moving with “harmony and ease,” and “we are
uneasy to remove any obstruction that can in the least disturb or encumber the regularity of its
motions.”533 Moreover, this “spirit of system” can help to rouse the “public spirit” in legislators
who are otherwise unmoved by sympathy for humanity, and this is why “the study of politics”
and “systems of government,” have a “useful” role in “promoting the happiness of society.”534
Despite the positive role that a “spirit of system” may play in politics, Smith nevertheless
cautions against becoming a “man of system” who’s object of motivation is the system rather
than the state.535 Unlike the person of “public spirit,” who is motivated to “promote the
happiness of our fellow-creatures” and whose behavior arises from “fellow-feeling” and “pure
sympathy,”536 the,
man of system…is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal
plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of
it….He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great
society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chessboard. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other
principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in
the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle motion
of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to
impress upon it.537
Emboldened by a belief that his system is universal and complete, the man of system attempts to
overly control the future. But, Smith argues, the future cannot be meticulously planned in this
532
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way because though the world be a world of systems, it is a world of fundamental uncertainty,
because these systems are complicated, overlapping, and often produce unintended
consequences. Further, the causal force of history is neither ideational or material, but moral, and
moral personality, which is materially and ideationally mediated, can be shaped, but not
determined. This reflects Smith’s position that history is a story of the unintended consequences
of moral freedom, that are apparent only after the fact, which helps to illuminate the present, but
offers no clear path to the future.
This is why he cautions against refusing to relinquish an ideal plan and adapt to reality—
a criticism he brings directly to bear on Great Britain, the rulers of which “have, for more than a
century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the
west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only.”538 It is
time, he continues, to awake from this “golden dream…and endeavor to accommodate her future
views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.”539 Though imagination may
compel us to act for an idea that appears as real, this “intoxicated” impulse must be curbed, in
favor of thinking that is rooted in the social and material present and which expands the
timescale of assessment. In this way, both atemporal idealism, and short-term mercurial thinking
can be guarded against.
The ordering imperative of the imagination also leads to another prevalent source of
corruption, the love of wealth. Smith argues that “if we consider the real satisfaction” of any
object “by itself and separated from the beauty of that arrangement which is fitted to promote it,
it will always appear in the highest degree contemptible and trifling.”540 Unfortunately,
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we rarely view it in this abstract and philosophical light. We naturally confound it
in our imagination with the order, the regular and harmonious movement of the
system…of which it is produced.541
This “confounding” occurs because we confuse the beauty of the system with the reality of
things. In other words, we mistake our imagination’s satisfaction in the order of things for
satisfaction found in objects themselves and are therefore driven towards accumulation. This
mistake is compounded by our desire for the approval others, and spectators sympathize with the
wealthy and powerful.542 Consequently, we think a life filled with beautiful things will make us
happy both because objects are personally satisfying and because others will approve of our
beautifully ordered collection.
Unfortunately, though the “pleasures of wealth” may strike the imagination as “well
worth all the toil and anxiety” required to attain them, Smith nevertheless concludes that this is a
“deception,”543 and one that leaves us “constantly dissatisfied.”544 In contemplation of “the poor
man son, whom heaven in its anger visited with ambition,” Smith writes that,
When he begins to look around him, admires the condition of the rich…He thinks
if he had attained all these, he would sit still contentedly, and be quiet, enjoying
himself in the thought of the happiness and tranquillity of his situation. He is
enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity…to obtain the conveniences which
these afford, he submits in the first year, nay in the first month of his application,
to more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered
through the whole of his life from the want of them…For this purpose he makes
his court to all mankind; he serves those whom he hates, and is obsequious to
those whom he despises. Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a
certain artificial and elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he
sacrifices a real tranquillity that is at all times in his power, and if in the extremity
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of old age he should at last attain to it, he will find it to be in no respect preferable
to that humble security and contentment which he had abandoned for it.545
Though the happiness wealth promises is both impossibly distant and illusory, its deception is
nevertheless so great that we plunge ourselves into a world of unceasing work to obtain a “few
trifling conveniences” that require “the labour of a life to raise” yet “which threaten every
moment to overwhelm” a person and expose her to constant anxiety, fear, sorrow, disease,
danger, and death.546 The picture Smith paints is a bleak one, though one he is ambivalent about,
as “it is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind.”547
This deception encourages the expenditure of more effort than necessary for satisfying our needs,
induces us towards accumulation and drives the economy towards complexity. Thus, for Smith it
is the context of our deception that leads to the creation of conditions that make possible the
kinds of social and political improvements he seeks to promote.
The modern redemption of accumulation—what was then referred to as luxury,548 was
already well-established by Smith’s time. Earlier philosophers like Mandeville, were
“experimenting with a new way of seeing things, where the limitlessness of desire, far from
being the destruction of the world, is its salvation: the very force that runs through history and
makes it intelligible.”549 Though lacking this celebratory optimism, Smith could not fail to
recognize that held a certain amount of truth—for better or for worse we are compelled to
accumulate what we view as the means to happiness in a process that stunts our own happiness
yet nevertheless leads to the general benefit of society. Smith was not oblivious to the potentially
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damaging consequences of advancing commercial society, yet he argues that internal
mechanisms exist that promote rather than undermine virtuous conduct.550 This does not allow
him to resolve the paradox he identifies, however it does salve it—as with the “spirit of
systems,” the personally damaging and socially destabilizing tendencies prompted by the
illusions of imagination can be restrained through moral development.
Aside of the corruption stemming from the innate human tendencies to seek order and
approval, both of which are combatted through personal moral development, Smith finds the
greatest source of corruption to have a social cause. In tracing historical development, he finds
the changing nature of economic relationships to alter the meaning of injury, which results in
legislative changes. But this process is not synchronous, and political institutions are slow to
respond. This results in the enforcement of outdated rules that no longer correspond to present
conditions, and a political failure to consider the future consequences of social reorganization. It
is the latter of these that Smith finds most troubling, as he finds emerging, and historically
unprecedented forms of economic organization to engender the corruption of prudence in a way
that is socially dangerous. In particular, he finds the organization of the corporation to affect the
temporal calculation of prudence, by both severing cause from effect and by shrinking the
timescale of calculation.
It is well-known that Smith was a critic of mercantilist and monopolistic policies, but
these criticisms are often characterized as either being representative of his anti-statist, economic
individualism, or rather made irrelevant by the supersession of late stage capitalism.551 Though it
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may be true that the joint stock companies that drew Smith’s sustained reproach are a feature of
an obsolete economy, they are not, as Muthu demonstrates, “simply subunits of states,” because
“in Smith’s view, joint stock companies concentrated, exercised, and abused their institutional
power in unique ways.”552 And indeed, one of the most salient features of these companies is an
organization structure that was fundamentally new in Smith’s day, and archetypical in ours—the
corporation. Though Smith is critical of state institutions and interventions, the driving force of
his critique is rather the novel structure of corporations and the incentives created by its relations.
By reexamining his critique with an eye towards the dynamic between economic relationships
and personal motivation, new insights into his thought with striking relevance to contemporary
life emerge.
In Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith describes prudence to be a virtue, the cultivation of
which, helps a person to overcome the near universal human tendency to over-value reward and
to under-value risk. He writes, that “the chance of gain is naturally over-valued, we may learn
from the universal success of lotteries” 553 and “that the chance of loss is frequently undervalued…we may learn from the very moderate profit of insurers.”554 Prudence corrects this
tendency by developing a faculty of temporal calculation rooted in the material present. Unlike
the certainty of the present, the future is always uncertain, which therefore engenders caution in
the pursuit of future rewards. As such, prudence makes a person fundamentally risk averse.
However, the actions of members of a corporation are typified by risk-seeking behavior, a
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phenomenon Smith traces to a few key features of their organization, “which differ in several
respects, not only from regulated companies, but from private copartners.”555
Essential among these features is the limited liability assumed by partners. Unlike other
company structures in which “each partner is bound for the debts contracted by the company to
the whole extent of his fortune,” in a corporation, “each partner is bound only by the extent of his
share.”556 Though prudence tempers reward seeking behavior by consideration of risk, limited
liability entails a “total exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum,” which
upsets the relationship between risk and reward sufficiently enough so that people who would
“upon no account, hazard their fortunes in a private copartnery” are nevertheless encouraged to
“become adventurers” in a corporation.557 Further, the actions of corporations are determined by
a board of directors, who are similarly insulated from risk because they are “the managers rather
of other people’s money than of their own.” For this reason, Smith argues, they do not “watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently
watch over their own,” resulting in “negligence and profusion…in the management of the affairs
of such a company.”558 Collectively, these features of corporate organization make great personal
rewards possible at little personal cost.
The severing of personal consequence from personal action engenders a particular
pathology. Although Smith expends a considerable amount of energy critiquing the monopolistic
practices of joint stock companies, it is the “organization and manner in which they operate” that
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compels monopoly seeking behavior.559 Although corporations are structured in such a way that
maximizes risk-seeking, this is not because its members are blind to risk. To the contrary, it is
precisely their accurate assessment of risk that gives rise to aggressive risk-seeking’s twin
phenomenon, aggressive security seeking. That is, rather than overvaluing their own ability to
turn a profit while turning a blind eye to the downsides of risky economic ventures, traders, in
this instance, pursue security even more aggressively. In the context of accelerated anxiety, a
kind of Hobbesian parallel emerges, as the actions engendered by an infinite security problem
are socially destabilizing. The primary way in which corporations seek security is by
manipulating systems to offset risk through government protections and offsetting its costs to
others. Unlike the prudent man who brings risk under his control, the corporate man is a “man of
system,” who attempts to rework the system to prevent loss. Such endeavors are not only
doomed to fail on account of Smith’s aforementioned critique, but because this system is
fundamentally untenable. Because risk and uncertainty are intrinsic features of the future, so too
is loss. Therefore, a system that facilitates maximum personal gain insulated from risk does not
eliminate risk, but rather transfers its losses. In so doing, the pathology of corporations engenders
behavior that destabilizes the security that is the very precondition for commercial society.
Smith demonstrates the consequences of the pathology of corporations by way of a
lengthy historical analysis, in which he focuses primarily on the joint stock companies
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established to develop trade.560 These kinds of ventures, in so far as they develop new resources
and routes, begin as de facto monopolies. Yet, he somewhat surprisingly concedes that it “may
not be unreasonable” for the state to grant such a company exclusive trade rights for some
number of years because “it is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can
recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the publick is
afterwards to reap the benefit.”561 However, regardless of whether a corporation’s exclusivity is
de facto or de jure, Smith notes that on account of the “folly, negligence, and profusion”562
engendered by corporate organization, corporations are soon prompted to lobby the government
for protection. The efforts of “merchants and master manufacturers” to gain legislative subsidies
and trade protections are generally effective, because these they “commonly employ the largest
capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of publick
consideration.”563 Unfortunately, the deception of wealth is compounded in the case of corporate
interests. It is the ability to command large amounts of capital that garners public esteem, but the
inefficiencies and injustices produced by corporate organization cause corporations to leverage
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this esteem politically against the public—to conceal losses by extracting further capital from the
public, thereby increasing wealth and public esteem.
Smith contends that the “interests of dealers, in any particular branch of trade or
manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even in opposite to, that of the
publick.” This difference of interest manifests itself politically in dealers’ attempts to “raise their
profits above what they naturally would be” by levying “an absurd tax upon the rest of their
fellow-citizens.”564 Merchants further seek to depress wages, by asserting that increased wages
cause low foreign sales565 and high domestic prices.566 This, despite the fact that the relationship
between prices and wages is akin to “simple interest” and that between price and profit “operates
like compound interest.”567 In addition to these domestic policies, corporations will seek to
perpetuate their existence by seeking needless and wasteful colonies.568 Each of these maneuvers
reflect aggressive security seeking made possible by the organization of corporations. However,
far from arguing a kind of structural determinism, in which behavior is necessarily compelled,
Smith argues that these individuals engage in an intentional conspiracy, to “deceive and even
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oppress the publick, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and
oppressed it.”569 In this way, Smith describes with almost comic irony, how “a single order of
men”570 can orchestrate policies that are “very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders
upon the whole body politick.”571
Though Smith’s political critique is often framed as an paean of the free market, upon
closer inspection it is clear that the true object of his criticism is not intervention but collusion.
The problem is not that corporations are state run, but rather that they capture the state—the
problem is political subservience to particular economic interests that necessarily undermine the
public interest. On this topic, Smith writes in a letter, that trade regulations “may, I think, be
demonstrated to be in every case a complete piece of dupery, by which the interest of the State
and the nation is constantly sacrificed to that of some particular class of traders.”572 The
fundamental incongruity of private economic interests and public political interests is made all
the more evident, he argues in foreign lands where joint stock companies serve as de facto
sovereigns yet “still consider as their principle business, and by a strange absurdity, regard the
character of sovereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant, as something which ought to
be made subservient to it.”573 It is precisely the subservience of politics to economic interests that
Smith identifies as the problem. Such a context reveals both the devastation wrought by a
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government entirely run by those whose interests are “directly opposite…of the country which
they govern,” because the primary objective of sovereignty is to increase the avenues by which
people can pursue their own interests. This objective reflects not only a practical duty to increase
the productivity of a society,574 but a moral duty to “the right one has to the free use of his person
and in a word to do what he has a mind when it does not prove detrimental to any other
person.”575 As such, Smith’s critique reflects a normative claim about the necessity, both moral
and economic, of establishing a hierarchy in which political institutions are charged with
protecting and promoting the equality of interests in the economy.
Though Smith’s critique of corporate interests is sharp, he reserves his moral indictment
for the complicity of statesmen. He writes,
To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers,
may at first sight appear a project only fit for a nation of shopkeepers. It is,
however, a project, altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit
for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and
such statesmen only, are capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in
employing the blood and treasure of their fellow citizens, to found and to maintain
such an empire.576
His indignation reflects a normative position regarding political institutions, to which he ascribes
a moral obligation to public interest. The merchants and manufacturers are, in some way, not the
cause of the problem, but the effect of it. They cannot help but to pursue self-interest, but do not
find themselves in an environment that supports prudent self-interest, they rather find themselves
with incentives and opportunity for reckless behavior. This is a failure of statecraft, caused by
legislatures that fail,” to resist “the clamorous importunity of partial interests,” as they
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“ought,”577 and it further reflects a failure of moral duty to structure incentives to engender
prudence.
One of the primary ways political institutions fulfill their primary objective of cultivating
a prudent society is through security, which he understands along Hobbesian lines as a concept
both material and temporal. However, unlike both Hobbes and Locke, the future Smith seeks to
secure is neither a general idea or materially specific vision of the future. Smith talks little of the
future at all, in fact, and does not echo the, by his time, well-established liberal narrative of
progress.578 For Smith, the future cannot be planned, is not inevitable, and though it has a
trajectory, he is ambivalent about its character, because human interaction produces uneven
results and unintended consequences. Although the future itself cannot be pursued, he
nevertheless argues that greater security and opportunity can be created by shaping the timescale
of social interaction, by extending the duration of leases, eliminating economic relationships of
dependence like apprenticeships and slavery, which curtail the future, and preventing economic
arrangements that incentivize short term logic by offsetting private risk to the public.
Smith understands political institutions to be singularly capable of this task, and argues
that they can shape the future expectations that inform motivation by structuring social relations
in ways that expand social horizons. This marks a departure from Hobbes and Locke, who deal
with expectations at an individual level, with others appearing as existential or physical threats to
a person’s ability to meaningfully contemplate the future. Smiths ideas of time are, like
everything else in his thought are produced in the context of society. By managing the timescale
of interaction, whether through extending leases, eliminating apprenticeships, expanding
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education opportunities, or city planning, political institutions can shape our expectations of
other, which reflects back on personal motivations.
It is now perhaps unsurprising that the biggest threat to this enterprise that Smith
identifies is also temporal. Inhibiting the development, both moral and practical, of society are
contexts that shrink the timescale of interaction, which incentivizes short-term thinking and ones
that make it possible to simultaneously create a future while claiming no responsibility for it. He
finds both of these to be endemic to corporations, as their structure incentivizes short-term
thinking, high-risk behavior, as well as the aggressive pursuit of protection from the
consequences of these actions at the sake of the broader society.579
In this way, Smith’s thought not only marks a sufficient point of development in thinking
about how modern ideas of autonomy, morality, and politics are animated by time, but his
thinking about time is further influenced by his thoroughly social perspective, which
meaningfully pivots to our present in instructive ways. For in Smith, we have Hobbes’s temporal
multiplicity, Locke’s linking of the moral and material through labor, but united and seen as the
driving force of history towards an indeterminate future. It can nevertheless illuminate the
present in so far as it provides an avenue for thinking about how the timescales of overlapping
and often conflicting social relations and institutions of power can engender or inhibit the ability
to locate one’s agency.
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Reclaiming Time: The Future is Making a Comeback
The early modern mind was captivated by a future that suddenly appeared as an
indeterminate human creation—an object of thought tied to actions in the material present. This
newly conceived connection between materiality and futurity constituted a new framework for
understanding human freedom. It is for this reason that the modern preoccupation with freedom
must also be understood as a preoccupation with the future. Despite their differences, Hobbes,
Locke, and Smith each seek to expand the possibilities of human freedom by way of
understanding the forces that shape our personal relationship with the future. In their work, we
see the relationship between futurity and freedom first take shape, but in tracing this idea through
their work we also find increasing complexity that reflects the increasingly complex world
produced by those expanded possibilities. That is, their philosophy develops not in a vacuum, but
in response to real world developments—developments that themselves are in response to
expanded social, political, and economic landscapes reflective of new ways of thinking about the
future. The paradox, of course, is that despite a preoccupation with expanding the horizon of the
future, we are confronted with a present of much narrower possibilities. Hobbes, Locke, and
Smith can help illuminate this foil between the promise of liberalism and the paralysis of
neoliberalism of our present in manifold ways.
Locke is perhaps the best entry point into this discussion, as he offers a theory of
subjectivity rooted in the material world and liberated through temporality, yet he also offers a
state that does not intervene into the former and a society that does not intervene into the latter.
The very nature of his subject lends itself to a political imaginary in which both the material
present and ideas of the future are the domain of the individual. Political interventions into the
material present upset a moral hierarchy, and social ideas regarding the future are morally
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corrupting. Though well-hidden, temporal, social, and material disjuncture is endemic to Locke’s
liberal imagination. This makes Hobbes and Smith particular well-suited as counterpoints, as
Hobbes reveals why the material is crucial and Smith why society is crucial, if we want to think
about the future in a real way. That is, they help to reveal how although the future continues to
play a central role in contemporary society, it has become untethered from the material present
and the future we are collectively creating. It has become a future in name alone, but one that can
be revealed for what it is—not the future, but an illusion. However, the present is increasingly
being reclaimed as the site of reappraisal, for collective imaginations to contrast symbols and
narratives of project with the actual trajectory of our collective behavior.
In recent years, we have witnessed a kind of sweeping realization that political narratives
about the future are disconnected from the material present. However, this is a phenomena of
much greater duration. In the 1970’s the malaise of a generation sparked a punk subculture in
England, whose anthem is often identified as the 1976 Sex Pistol’s #1 hit song “God Save the
Queen,” which asserts, “There’s no future…and England’s dreaming”580 —echoing, if not in
more youthful and dire terms, Adam Smith’s plea that England awake from its “golden
dream…and endeavor to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her
circumstances.”581 The political response to growing popular discontent, however, was to
reaffirm the neoliberal future. In 1980, Margaret Thatcher argued that future prosperity demands
present sacrifice that is unpopular but “sound,” and moreover, “there is no alternative.”582 In the
United States, President Reagan affirmed the same message, but in the language of renewal,
asserting, “It’s morning again in America…young men and women…can look forward with
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confidence to the future.”583 This dance between expressions of hopelessness and immobility
from below and affirmations of present sacrifice or future promise from above continued in fits
and starts over the intervening years. But recently, something has changed. It has become
increasingly difficult to attribute feelings of paralysis or dislocation to personal failings—as a
matter of an individual’s, or a generation’s, unwillingness to engage in hard work and sacrifice.
Rather, it seems that people in great numbers are finding themselves unable locate themselves or
society, in the future.
The political philosophy of early modern liberalism developed a concept of autonomy
inextricably linked to the future that profoundly expanded the possibilities for the human future.
Locke gave us a political rhetoric of pursuit, which Jefferson invoked to foment a political
revolution in the name of radical democracy—by universally extend the right of selfdetermination. This language regarding the future is still echoed today, but what has been lost is
the present. For while imagination shapes the world, so too does the world shape imagination.
Returning to the early modern moment crucially reveals that freedom requires ideas of the future
to be grounded in the material present. It was the advancements of early modernity, including the
development of industry and the erosion of arbitrary hierarchies, that broadened the horizon of
the future and expanded the possibilities of the future. Rather than expressing idealistic optimism
divorced from reality, or a mere theoretical possibility, Jefferson’s declaration of the equal right
of all to “Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” reflected substantive hope in the possibilities
of an existing present. That is, while early modern political philosophers clearly prioritized the
future, the future they conceptualized was necessarily tied to the objective reality of the
present—the future is a source of liberation only insofar is its promises can be made real. Yet
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today we find political discourse to be dominated by visions of the future quite disconnected
from the material present.
Consider, for example, the state of environmental discourse in the United States. Despite
the future that we are creating in an objective, material way—a future produced by
overconsumption and climate change—political discourse is dominated by narratives that
disregard the material and instead appeal to faith. Faith is fundamental to the liberal psyche, and
one the Tocqueville wrote about with awe in Democracy in America. Finding a shipbuilder in the
process of building a ship of poor quality, he inquired why and was told that, “the art of
navigation is everyday making such rapid progress, that the finest vessel would become almost
useless if it lasted beyond a certain number of years.”584 The faith here is an expectation that the
future will be different from, and better than, the past. Such faith is not, in and of itself, a bad
thing, as faith can be a powerful source of empowerment itself. However, when faith becomes
disconnected from the human agency that ostensibly produces it, it can be a source of alienation.
Such is the case with environmental messaging that acknowledges that there is some kind of
objective problem—that the climate is warming, fossil fuels are finite, and our means of
extraction are damaging—but the steady wheel of progress will inevitably solve these problems.
This messaging invokes faith to salve the reality of a present quite disconnected from the future
it invokes. But what Hobbes crucially reveals is that the realization of agency requires the
possibility of acting for a future we can imagine producing from the space of the present. Or
phrased in the inverse, distorting the future can distort the present, thereby upsetting one’s ability
to locate oneself in the world. Framed in this way, it is perhaps unsurprising to find political
apathy to result from such a disjuncture.
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Aside from these affirmative ecological narratives that invoke faith to prompt inaction,
others invoke an alternative temporal logic, to spur it. Rather than appealing to the future, these
focus on the present, which, they argue, is so insecure it precludes thinking for the future at all.
Some argue, for example, that foreign oil dependence constitutes a security threat so dire that the
most immediate solution must be pursued—no matter how costly, or damaging. Hobbes is useful
here too, as he demonstrates how conditions of insecurity foreshorten the imagination. In the
immediacy of fear, short-term planning is incentivized, while its long term costs and
consequences are difficult to fathom. In this way, he helps to illuminate how cultivating crisis
and emphasizing insecurity can be politically useful to those who most benefit from exploiting
the present.
Smith is also helpful, as he can help us to think not about the political narratives designed
to invoke apathy or fear in the people, but about how corporate structure itself incentivizes shortterm thinking. That is, the finite nature of fossil fuels inherently demands that corporations like
Exxon develop long-term alternative revenue plans. And indeed, it is for this reason that
ExxonMobile invested in fossil fuel research that resulted in them discovering the link between
fossil fuels and climate change in 1981—seven years before it became a public issue. Yet as
reported in The Guardian, “the firm spent millions over the next 27 years to promote climate
denial,”585 rather than invest in renewable energy that would ensure long-term future for the
corporation. According to Lenny Bernstein, Exxon’s former in-house climate expert stated,
“Natural resource companies – oil, coal, minerals – have to make investments that have lifetimes
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of 50-100 years.”586 The timescale of corporate futures, is measured by the lifetime, not of
individuals or society, but of investments.
Smith can also help to expose a similar kind of counter-intuitive short-term logic in tech
industries. The technology firms of Silicon Valley are largely comprised of young, socially
progressive entrepreneurs that frequently affirm commitments to equality and diversity. Yet
these firms are notoriously homogenous—when Twitter released its diversity staff, it showed
their their tech staff to be 90% male, and 92% white and Asian.587 Conversations about these
statistics tend to center around political ideals. However, the problem may actually be temporal.
Research has proven diversity to make for better problem-solving, because, quite simplistically,
people with similar backgrounds and tend to use similar problem-solving strategies. The
problem, however, is that the benefits of diversity require more time to materialize. As explained
in a recent Reply All podcast that engaged diversity research and researchers, “when people have
the same cultural background, the same educational background, they can communicate much
more quickly, they can collaborate much more easily, there’s less misunderstanding.” And
because tech startups face incredible pressure from their investors to grow and turn a profit
quickly, they “don’t want to take the risk” of diversity. The problem with diversity, is that “the
benefit comes later.”588 Smith helps us to see this not as a problem of political ideas or
irrationality, but as resulting from a temporal logic that is endemic to a particular form of
economic arrangement.
These examples that explore how the temporal logic of corporations have high public
costs, is a useful backdrop for returning to the social present, and examining its economic reality
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through the lens of temporality. The global present is one increasingly characterized by an
enduring state of immediacy and precarity, yet our dominant ideologies continue to assert
narratives of modernity in which the future is fetishized at the expense of the present. The most
common form this takes is austerity. In addition to the austerity policies adopted in response to
the 2008 crisis, in the U.S., at the federal level, austerity has taken the form of the 2013
sequestration and the end of the payroll tax cut. At the state level, funding for universities,589
schools, and public services have been cut,590 while tuition costs have increased, 591 and the job
security of teachers and public-sector employees has been continually threatened, if not
dismantled.592 Defenses of austerity measures take many forms, but all pivot on a temporal logic
wherein the present is sacrificed for the future—in order to create a secure future, an already
insecure present must be made more insecure. Unlike environmental narratives that obfuscate the
causal link between the present and the future, neoliberal economic policies like austerity affirm
the connection. However, they distort the relationship between present and future; rather than a
free present producing ideas of the future, ideas of a free future renders the present subservient to
that vision. Returning to the past is helpful here too. For Hobbes understood security as a
prerequisite for meaningful agency, and we can extend his argument to see how increasing
insecurity can increasingly alienate people from their agency. Moreover, he can help us to make
sense of why those who would most benefit from revolutionary dispositions assume apathetic or
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reactionary ones—a revolutionary disposition requires believing it is possible to act for a
different future.
But the future is making a comeback. Recent years have seen an acceleration in the
confronting and challenging of the futurelessness first expressed in the 1970’s. The first stirrings
of hope came in 2010, when a revolutionary wave of demonstrations swept the Arab world. The
causes of the Arab Spring were many and complex, yet it was undeniably one in which a
younger generation played a sizable role in the name of self-determination—of reclaiming a
personal right to the future. In the U.S. in 2011, Zuccotti Park became a site of occupation, in
protest against economic inequality. Here too the presence was youthful, and the messages
temporal, with signs proclaiming, “This was supposed to be the future.” When it comes to
thinking about the future, it seems, the young act as the canaries in the coal mine. In Zuccotti and
elsewhere, they express a yearning for, and an inability to find, promise in this present. In a
recent article, Corey Robin recounted a discussion with young magazine interns, each of whom
thought the concept of a career was defunct. “The future was so uncertain, they said, the
economy so broken, there was simply no point in devising a plan, much less trying to execute it.”
Robin surmised that this is because “for the last forty years, we’ve been preparing for this
generation without a future” as society has grown increasingly hopeless, the message we have
passed on is that there are “no futures to be had.”593 And yet, what is most remarkable is that the
response to this message has not been lament but a new hope. In the end, the finality of
futurelessness itself seems to be a source of radical possibility, of radically reenvisioning the
present. And it is in the present, that we find a youthful optimism—a self-regarding optimism
born of seeing oneself as an agent of change. And in this, we come full circle to the early modern
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moment, destabilized by the loss of inherited sources of meaning and ideas of the future, but
invigorated by the sense that it is with us, here, and now, that the future begins.

217

Bibliography
Alvey, Jim. Adam Smith, Optimist or Pessimist?: A New Problem Concerning the Teleological
Basis of Commercial Society. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
Aristotle. Aristotle on Generation and Corruption. Edited by Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfeld.
Vol. 1. Symposium Aristotelicum. New York: Clarendon Press, 2004.
———. Physics. Edited by David Bostock. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford World’s
Classics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
———. Prior Analytics. Translated by Gisela Striker. Clarendon Aristotle Series. New York:
Clarendon Press, 2009.
Atherton, Margaret. “Locke on Essences and Classification.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman, 258–85.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Austin, John. Lectures on Jurisprudence: Or, The Philosophy of Positive Law. Edited by Robert
Campbell. Vol. 1. 2 vols., 2011.
Ayers, Michael. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology. Vol. 1. 2 vols. New York: Routledge, 1993.
———. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology. Vol. 2. 2 vols. New York: Routledge, 1993.
Balibar, Etienne. Identity and Difference: John Locke and the Invention of Consciousness. Edited
by Stella Sandford. New York: Verso Books, 2013.
Bennett, Jonathan. “Time in Human Experience.” Philosophy 79, no. 02 (April 2004).
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819104000221.
Berry, Christopher J. “Smith and Science.” In The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, edited
by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Boyle, Robert. “New Experiments.” In The Works of Robert Boyle, edited by Michael Hunter
and Edward Bradford Davis, Vol. 6. Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, 2003.
———. “Origin of Forms and Qualities.” In The Works of Robert Boyle, edited by Michael
Hunter and Edward Bradford Davis, Vol. 6. Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation,
2003.
Bredekamp, Horst, Melissa Thorson Hause, and Jackson Bond. “From Walter Benjamin to Carl
Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes.” Critical Inquiry 25, no. 2 (n.d.): 247–66.
Broadie, Alexander. “Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Brown, Vivienne, Samuel Fleischacker, and Balliol College (University of Oxford), eds. The
Philosophy of Adam Smith: Essays Commemorating the 250th Anniversary of the Theory
of Moral Sentiments. The Adam Smith Review, v. 5. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Brunner, Jose. “Modern Times: Law, Temporality and Happiness in Hobbes, Locke and
Bentham.” Theoretical Inquiries into Law 8, no. 277 (January 2007).
Buchan, James. The Authentic Adam Smith: His Life and Ideas. 1st American ed. Enterprise.
New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.
Bunce, R. E. R. Thomas Hobbes. New York: Continuum, 2009.
Calhoun, Craig. “The Privatization of Risk.” Public Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): 257–63.
Campbell, Tom. Adam Smith’s Science of Morals. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971.
Casas Klausen, Jimmy. “Room Enough: America, Natural Liberty, and Consent in Locke’s
Second Treatise.” The Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 (August 2007): 760–69.
218

Chappell, V. C., ed. Locke. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press,
1998.
Chappell, Vere. “Power in Locke’s Essay.” In The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay
Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
Coby, Patrick. “The Law of Nature in Locke’s Second Treatise: Is Locke a Hobbesian?” The
Review of Politics 49, no. 1 (Winter 1987): 3–28.
College Board. “2014-15 In-State Tuition and Fees at Public Four-Year Institutions by State and
Five-Year Percentage Change.” Trends in Higher Education, n.d. http://bit.ly/1Hhc6us.
Conn, Christopher Hughes. Locke on Essence and Identity. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands,
2003.
Craig, Willaim Lane. “Whitrow and Popper on the Impossibility of an Infinite Past.” The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30, no. 2 (June 1979): 165–70.
Darwall, Stephen. “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith.” Philosophy &
Public Affairs 28, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 139–64.
Davidson, Arnold I., and Norbert Hornstein. “The Primary/secondary Quality Distinction;
Berkeley, Locke, and the Foundations of Corpuscularian Science.” Dialogue 23, no. 2
(1964): 281–303.
Davidson, Justin. “Which New York Is Yours? A Fierce Preservationist and a pro-Development
Blogger Debate.” New York Magazine, May 4, 2015.
Debes, Remy. “Adam Smith on Dignity and Equality.” British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2012): 109–40.
de Jong, Willem R. “Hobbes’s Logic: Language and Scientific Method.” History and Philosophy
of Logic 7, no. 2 (1986): 123–42.
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Edited by John Cottingham, Dugald
Murdoch, and Robert Stoothoff. Vol. 3. 3 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1984.
———. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Vol. 1. 3 vols. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985.
Dilts, A. “To Kill a Thief: Punishment, Proportionality, and Criminal Subjectivity in Locke’s
Second Treatise.” Political Theory 40, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 58–83.
Downing, Lisa. “Locke’s Ontology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay
Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman, 352–80. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Dunn, John. “From Applied Theology to Social Analysis: The Break between John Locke and
the Scottish Enlightenment.” In Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in
the Scottish Enlightenment, edited by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Fleischacker, Samuel. “Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy.” Edited by Edward N.
Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2015.
Forde, Steven. Locke, Science and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral
Theory. Ideas in Context 96. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Francis, Hutcheson. An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two
Treatises. Edited by Wolfgang Leidhold. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004.
219

Friedman, Milton. “Adam Smith’s Relevance for 1976.” In Adam Smith and the Wealth of
Nations, 1776-1976 Bicentennial Essays, edited by Fred R. Glahe, 7–20. Bolder:
Colorado Association University Press, 1978.
Frost, Samantha. Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and
Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Gautheir, David. “Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes and Locke.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977): 425–46.
Grant, Ruth Weissbourd. John Locke’s Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Gregg, Pauline. King Charles I. London: Phoenix Press, 2000.
Griswold, Charles L., Jr. “Imagination: Morals, Science, and Arts.” In The Cambridge
Companion to Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Haakonssen, Knud. “Introduction.” In The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, edited by
Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
———. , ed. The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith. Cambridge Companions to
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Haakonssen, Knud, and Donald Winch. “The Legacy of Adam Smith.” In The Cambridge
Companion to Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Translated by Frederick
Lawrence. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2004.
Hill, Mike, and Warren Montag. The Other Adam Smith. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2015.
Hirschman, Albert O. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before
Its Triumph. First Princeton Classics edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Hobbes, Thomas. De Cive. Edited by Howard Warrender. The Clarendon Edition of the
Philosophical Works of Thomas Hobbes 3. New York: Clarendon Press, 1983.
———. “Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy.” In The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by William Molesworth, Vol. 4. London: John
Bohn, 1840.
———. Leviathan. Edited by Noel Malcolm. Vol. 4. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of
Thomas Hobbes. New York: Clarendon Press, 2012.
———. Leviathan. Edited by Noel Malcolm. Vol. 5. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of
Thomas Hobbes. New York: Clarendon Press, 2012.
———. “Liberty, Necessity, and Chance.” In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury, edited by William Molesworth, Vol. 5. London: John Bohn, 1841.
———. Man and Citizen: De Homine and de Cive. Edited by Bernard Gert. Indianapolis:
Hackett Pub. Co, 1991.
———. “Of Liberty and Necessity.” In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury,
edited by William Molesworth, Vol. 4. London: John Bohn, 1840.
———. “Part First, or Logic.” In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury Volume
1, edited by William Molesworth. London: John Bohn, 1839.
———. “Seven Philosophical Problems.” In The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of
Malmesbury, edited by William Molesworth, Vol. 5. London: John Bohn, 1841.
220

———. “Short Tract on First Principles.” In The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, edited by
Ferdinand Tönnies. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., 1889.
———. The Correspondence. Edited by Noel Malcolm. Vol. 6. The Clarendon Edition of the
Works of Thomas Hobbes. New York: Clarendon Press, 1994.
———. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Edited by William Molesworth.
Vol. 1. 12 vols. London: John Bohn, 1839.
———. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Edited by William Molesworth.
Vol. 4. 12 vols. London: John Bohn, 1840.
———. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Edited by William Molesworth.
Vol. 5. 12 vols. London: John Bohn, 1841.
———. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Edited by William Molesworth.
Vol. 8. 12 vols. London: John Bohn, 1843.
Hobbes, Thomas, and John Bramhall. Hobbes and Bramhall: On Liberty and Necessity. Edited
by V. C. Chappell. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Hont, Istvan, and Michael Ignatieff, eds. Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy
in the Scottish Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter J. R. Millican.
Oxford World’s Classics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
———. “Of National Characters.” In Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by E.F.
Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987.
———. “The Sceptic.” In Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by E.F. Miller.
Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987.
Hundert, E.J. “The Making of Homo Faber: John Locke between Ideology and History.” Journal
of the History of Ideas 33, no. 1 (March 1972): 3–22.
Jacovides, Michael. “Locke’s Distinctions between Primary and Secondary Qualities.” In The
Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” edited
by Lex Newman, 101–29. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Johnson, Nicholas, Phil Oliff, and Erica Williams. “An Update on State Budget Cuts.” Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, February 9, 2011. http://bit.ly/1zqGmgf.
Kallich, Martin. “The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and Addison.”
English Literary History 12, no. 4 (December 1945): 290–315.
Kim, Han-Kyul. “Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of His Agnosticism.”
Philosophy 83, no. 326 (October 2008): 439–58.
Koselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004.
Leachman, Michael, and Chris Mai. “Most States Funding Schools Less than before the
Recession.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 20, 2014. http://bit.ly/1eaepgh.
Leijenhorst, Cees. “Sense and Nonsense about Sense: Hobbes and the Aristotelians on Sense
Perception and Imagination.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan,
edited by Patricia Springborg, 82–107. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———. The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas
Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy. Boston: Brill, 2002.
Lieberman, David. “Adam Smith on Justice, Rights, and Law.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New
221

York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The Clarendon Edition of the Works
of John Locke. New York: Clarendon Press, 1979.
———. Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical
Writings. Edited by G. A. J. Rogers and P. H. Nidditch. Vol. 1 Drafts A and B. The
Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke. New York: Clarendon Press, 1990.
———. “Elements of Natural Philosophy.” In The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, 12th
ed. Vol. 2. Rivington: London, 1824. oll.libertyfund.org/titles/762.
———. “Knowledge B.” In Locke: Political Essays, edited by Mark Goldie. Cambridge Texts in
the History of Political Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
———. Locke on Money. Edited by P. H. Kelly. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John
Locke. New York: Clarendon Press, 1991.
———. Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Edited by John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton.
The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke. New York: Clarendon Press, 1989.
———. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988.
Macfie, Alec. “The Invisible Hand of Jupiter.” Journal of the History of Ideas 32, no. 4 (October
1971): 595.
Macpherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Ontario:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Maloney, John. “Gladstone, Peel and the Corn Laws.” In Free Trade and Its Reception 18151960, edited by Andrew Marrison, 28–47. London: Routeledge, 1998.
Markie, Peter. “Rationalism vs. Empiricism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2015.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/rationalism-empiricism/.
McNally, David. Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist
Critique. New York: Verso, 1993.
Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. “Self-Interest and Other Interests.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Adam Smith, edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Michaelis, Loralea. “Hobbes’s Modern Prometheus: A Political Philosophy for an Uncertain
Future.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 101–27.
Mortenson, Thomas G. “State Funding: A Race to the Bottom".” American Council on
Education: The Presidency Winter (2012).
Muller, Jerry Z. Adam Smith in His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995.
Muthu, Sankar. “Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing
‘Globalization’ in the Age of Enlightenment.” Political Theory 36, no. 2 (April 2008):
185–212.
Newman, Lex, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.” New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Pack, Spencer J. Capitalism as a Moral System: Adam Smith’s Critique of the Free Market
Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010.
Peters, R. S., and H. Tajfel. “Hobbes and Hull—metaphysicians of Behavior.” The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science VIII, no. 29 (1957): 30–44.
Plamenatz, J. P. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
222

Pocock, J. G. A. “Adam Smith and History.” In The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith,
edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
———. “Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo-American Thought.” In Politics, Language,
and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1989.
———. Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the
Eighteenth Century. Ideas in Context. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Rapaczynski, Andrzej. Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
Raphael, D. D. The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy. New York: Clarendon
Press, 2007.
Reply All. Raising the Bar. Accessed January 20, 2016. https://gimletmedia.com/episode/52raising-the-bar/.
Rickless, Samuel C. “Locke’s Polemic against Nativism.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman, 33–66.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———. “Will and Motivation.” In The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the
Seventeenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Riney, Hal. “‘Prouder, Stronger, Better’ (Presidential Election Commercial),” 1984.
https://youtu.be/_fy-uhxiXcE.
Robin, Corey. “The Bernie Generation.” Jacobin, March 29, 2016.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/bernie-sanders-millennials-precarious-youth/.
Rogers, G. A. J. “Hobbes and His Contemporaries.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes,
edited by Tom Sorell, 413–40. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
———. Locke’s Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of His Philosophy.
Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag Ag, 1998.
———. , ed. Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context. Paperback ed. New York: Clarendon
Press, 1994.
———. “The Intellectual Setting and Aims of the Essay.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding.” New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
Rosenberg, Nathan. “Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations.” Journal of Political
Economy 68, no. 6 (December 1960): 557–70.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men or
Second Discourse.” In The Discourses and Other Political Writings, edited by Victor
Gourevitch. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Schneewind, J. B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Scott, Dominic. Plato’s Meno. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Segal, Jacob. “A Storm from Paradise: Liberalism and the Problem of Time.” Critical Review 8,
no. 1 (January 1994): 23–48.
Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2009.
Shaver, Robert. “Virtues, Utility, and Rules.” In The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith,
223

edited by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Sherover, Charles. “The Temporality of the Common Good.” The Review of Metaphysics 37, no.
3 (March 1984): 475–97.
Skinner, Quentin. Hobbes and Civil Science. Visions of Politics, Quentin Skinner ; Vol. 3. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
———. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1. Edited by
William B. Todd. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam
Smith, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
———. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2. Edited by
William B. Todd. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam
Smith, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
———. “Appendix II.” In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L.
Macfie. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 1.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
———. Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Edited by W. P. D. Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I.S.
Ross. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 3.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
———. Lectures on Jurisprudence. Edited by Ronald L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and Peter Stein.
The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 5. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
———. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Edited by J. C. Bryce. The Glasgow Edition of
the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 4. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983.
———. The Correspondence of Adam Smith. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner, Ian Simpson
Ross, and Adam Smith. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam
Smith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
———. “The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the
History of Astronomy.” In Essays on Philosophical Subjects, edited by W. P. D.
Wightman, J. C. Bryce, and I.S. Ross. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
———. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie. The
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Vol. 1. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976.
Sorell, Tom. Hobbes. The Arguments of the Philosophers. New York: Routledge: Kegan Paul,
1986.
———. “Hobbes’s unAristotelian Political Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23, no. 2 (1990):
96–108.
———. , ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996.
———. “The Science in Hobbes’s Politics.” In Perspectives on Thomas Hobbes, edited by G. A.
J Rogers and Alan Ryan. New York: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Stigler, George. “Smith’s Travels on the Ship of the State.” History of Political Economy 3
(1971).
224

Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
Talaska, Richard A. “Analytic and Synthetic Method according to Hobbes.” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 26, no. 2 (1988): 207–37.
Tarlton, Charles D. “Reason and History in Locke’s Second Treatise.” Philosophy 79, no. 02
(April 2004). http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819104000257.
Teichgraeber, Richard F. “‘Less Abused than I Had Reason to Expect’: The Reception of the
Wealth of Nations in Britain, 1776-90.” The Historical Journal 30, no. 2 (June 1987):
337–66.
Thatcher, Margaret. “Speech to Conservative Women’s Conference.” Festival Hall, London,
May 21, 1980.
The Sex Pistols. God Save the Queen (no Future). Virgin, 1977.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Edited by Harvey Claflin Mansfield and Delba
Winthrop. Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Tribe, Keith. “Adam Smith: Critical Theorist?” Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 2 (June
1999): 609–32.
Tucker, Benjamin. “The Ethics of Memory in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.” Lyceum X, no. 2
(Spring 2009): 11–28.
Tuckness, Alex. “Retribution and Restitution in Locke’s Theory of Punishment.” The Journal of
Politics 72, no. 3 (July 2010): 720–32.
Tully, James. A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1980.
———. An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Ideas in Context. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Wedeking, Gary. “Locke on Personal Identity and the Trinity Controversy of the 1690s.”
Dialogue 29 (1990): 163–88.
Yaffe, Gideon. “Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” edited by Lex Newman, 192–320.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Yolton, John W. A Locke Dictionary. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1993.
———. Locke and French Materialism. New York: Clarendon Press, 1991.
———. Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding: A Selective Commentary on the
“Essay.” New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

225

